We examine the risk-return trade-off in market anomalies within the A-share market, showing that even decaying anomalies may proxy for latent risk factors. To balance forecast bias and variance, we integrate the 1/N and mean-variance frameworks, minimizing out-of-sample forecast error. Treating anomalies as tradable assets, we construct optimized long-short portfolios with strong performance: an average annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.56 and a certainty-equivalent return of 29.4% for a mean-variance investor. These premiums persist post-publication and are largely driven by liquidity risk exposures. Our results remain robust to market frictions, including short-sale constraints and transaction costs. We conclude that even decaying market anomalies may reflect priced risk premia rather than mere mispricing. This research provides practical guidance for academics and investors in return predictability and asset allocation, especially in the unique context of the Chinese A-share market.

This study investigates the link between market arbitrage risk and liquidity risk pricing in a conditional asset pricing framework. We estimate comparative models both at the portfolio and firm level in the Chinese A- and B-shares to test behavioral hypotheses with respect to foreign ownership restrictions and market segmentation. Results show that conditional liquidity premium and risk betas exhibit pronounced asymmetry across share classes which could be attributed to differentiated levels of market mispricing. Specifically, stocks with a greater degree of information asymmetry and retail ownership are more sensitive to liquidity risks when the market arbitrage risk increase. Further policy impact analysis shows that China’s market liberalization efforts, contingent upon its recent stock connect programs, conditionally reduce the price of liquidity risk for connected stocks.

This study highlights asymmetries in liquidity risk pricing from the perspective of heterogeneously informed traders facing changing levels of preference uncertainty. We hypothesize that higher illiquidity premium and liquidity risk betas may arise simultaneously in circumstances where investors are asymmetrically informed about their trading counterparts’ preferences and their financial firms’ timely valuations of assets . We first test the time-varying state transition patterns of IML, a traded liquidity factor of the return premium on illiquid-minus-liquid stocks, using a Markov regime-switching framework. We then investigate how the conditional price of the systematic risk of the IML fluctuate over time subject to changing levels of preference uncertainty. Empirical results from the Chinese stock market support our hypotheses that investors’ sensitivity to the IML systematic risk conditionally increase in times of higher preference uncertainty as proxied by the stock turnover and order imbalance. Further policy impact analyses suggest that China’s market liberalization efforts, contingent upon its recent stock connect and margin trading programs, reduce the conditional price of liquidity risk for affected stocks by helping the incorporation of information into stock prices more efficiently. Tighter macroeconomic funding conditions, on the contrary, conditionally increase the price of liquidity that investors require.

Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, preventing financial crises has become one of the most important objectives of regulators and banks. Although previous studies have identified the phenomenon of risk contagion in the banking system, the underlying mechanisms of risk contagion are still unclear. This study delves into the multi-stage contagion mechanism of liquidity risk based on interbank lending linkages and clearing rules and introduces a new index to quantify bank liquidity risk. We find that the contagion of liquidity risk is primarily determined by the network structure of risk exposures between banks in default and is not significantly influenced by the lending relationships of banks that remain solvent. The empirical results suggest that banks with high risk should be prioritized for cash injections to improve system liquidity. These findings offer new insights into financial risk contagion and practical recommendations for regulatory authorities formulating intervention strategies and for banks conducting risk management.

To avoid illiquidity spillovers and basis risk in swaps, interbank lenders are especially cautious about whether interbank borrowers can meet their claims. We examine whether the incentive of interbank lenders to penalize risky borrowers can reduce borrowers' liquidity risk taking. We find that interbank borrowers, especially small and medium banks, manage their liquidity risks more prudently than their counterparts. This phenomenon is especially significant for borrowers with high information asymmetry, low liquidity buffers, and high funding gaps. Our results suggest that interbank exposure reduces the asset, funding, and off‐balance‐sheet liquidity risks of small and medium borrowing banks, and can therefore supplement regulatory liquidity requirements, which target only the largest banks.

We develop a banking model to explain the remarkable growth of China’s shadow banking since the global financial crisis. In the presence of local government interventions for low-quality projects due to short-termism, a policy combination of tightening formal banking and loosening shadow banking can reduce inefficiency given the information asymmetry between banks and regulators. This is because the higher funding liquidity risk of shadow banking incentivizes banks to be more disciplined about the quality of projects. We find consistent empirical evidence that when on-balance-sheet financing was constrained by regulators, banks shifted high-quality projects into shadow banking and rejected low-quality ones.

This study investigates and compares the effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)'s negative price suggestion on prices and trading activities in the crude oil futures market to discuss the cause of negative crude oil futures prices. Through event studies, our results show that the COVID-19 pandemic no longer impacts crude oil futures prices in April after controlled market risk, while the CME’s negative prices suggestion can explain the crude oil futures price changes around and around even after April 8 to some degree. Moreover, our study uncovers anomalies in prices and trading activities by analyzing returns, trading volume, open interest, and illiquidity measures using vector autoregressive (VAR) models. The results imply that CME’s allowing negative prices strengthens the price impact on trading volume and makes illiquidity risk matter. Our results coincide with the following lawsuit evidence of market manipulation.

China’s shadow banking system has experienced surprisingly high growth since the global financial crisis. We develop a model to understand this puzzling phenomenon. With local government interventions in bank loans for low-quality projects and information asymmetry between banks and regulators, a policy combination of tightening formal banking and loosening shadow banking can reduce inefficiency, because the higher funding liquidity risk of shadow banking incentivizes banks to be more disciplined about the quality of projects. We find consistent empirical evidence that when on-balance-sheet financing was constrained by regulators, banks primarily shifted high-quality projects into their controlled shadow banking system.

China's local government debt financing grows rapidly featuring surging chengtou bond issuance and risk exposure since the global financial crisis in 2008. The accumulation of local government debt poses systemic risks to China's fiscal and financial systems. Using weekly data from 2009 to 2014, this paper studies the joint dynamics and risk transmission mechanism between chengtou bond spreads and treasury yields under the framework of the extended no-arbitrage Nelson-Seigel term structure model, which guarantees the no-arbitrage relationship between treasury yields of different maturities. The results show that the chengtou bonds indeed exhibit considerable local risks and can lead to systemic risk of the treasury bonds, such that the treasury yields have significant component of risk premium due to chengtou risk. On the other hand, as the safest asset in China at present, the treasury yields with short-to-medium maturities decrease as a result of the “fly-to-safety" effect when the chengtou risk increases. Meanwhile, the dynamics of chengtou bond spreads reflect the market-oriented risk pricing by investors on credit and liquidity risks under limitations of the government implicit guarantee. Under this condition, it is the right timing to reasonably standardize and institutionalize the local government bond market with transparent market mechanism.

We provide a model of hedge fund securing financing from a prime broker where deterioration in collateral value exacerbates counterparty risk and liquidity risk for the prime broker due to strategic actions of hedge funds. Costs of liquidity insurance and enforcing contracts determine hedge fund leverage. The model provides several new insights. First, it uncovers a new channel for funding liquidity that can explain why illiquid funds fare worse in times of stress and why better governed funds fared better during the financial crisis. Second, the model provides a new testable hypothesis that systematic or idiosyncratic shocks to fundamentals of bank holding companies may spillover to connected hedge funds through internal capital markets. It also offers an identification strategy to distinguish between possible competing hypotheses. Third, strong governance at hedge funds may reduce incentives to invest in profitable opportunities. Fourth, banking reforms such as Supplementary Leverage Ratio, Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Standing Repo Facility intended to improve resilience of banks may also make hedge funds less vulnerable to shocks in the banking sector. Fifth, the model offers a possible reconciliation for the mixed evidence on the impact of leverage on hedge fund survival documented in the literature.