Listed firms

  • 详情 Firm Profitability, State Ownership, and Top Management Turnover at the Listed Firms in China: A Behavioral Perspective
    Using data from a large sample of the listed firms in China from 1999 to 2002, we find that firm profitability and state ownership are negatively related to top management turnover only when firm profitability is below target (measured by industry median). We also find that top management turnover has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when it occurs under performance below target, but has a negative impact when it occurs under performance above target. Lastly, we find that top management turnover under low performance has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when the state is not the largest shareholder, but has no impact when the state is the largest shareholder.
  • 详情 State owned vs. privately owned firms: Whose CEOs are better compensated?
    This paper investigates CEO pay and pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. We distinguish four firm types based on their controlling owners: state owned enterprises affiliated with state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises affiliated with the central government (SOECGs), state owned enterprises affiliated with a local government (SOELGs), and private firms controlled by private investors. We also distinguish between firms with foreign investors and those without. Because the different types of controlling owners have different objectives, motivations, and political interests, they affect managers’ compensation in the firms in which they invest. Our results indicate that CEO pay is lowest in SAMB controlled firms and highest in SOECG controlled firms. Not only is CEO pay positively associated with firm performance, the positive pay-performance relationship is stronger in both types of SOE firms but weaker in privately controlled firms. In addition, firms with foreign investors compensate their CEOs more highly than those without foreign investors, an effect that is significant in both SOEs and privately controlled firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that CEO compensation in China is jointly determined by firm performance, market-oriented reform and the unique ownership structure, meaning that standard theories of efficient compensation contracts may not apply in such emerging markets.
  • 详情 Corporate Pyramid, Capital Investment and Firm Performance in China
    Business groups organized by pyramids enable the ultimate shareholders to control a portfolio of firms with less cash requirement. Further, corporate pyramid induces an internal capital market and makes capital transfer more convenient within the pyramid. In China, the state and business groups control a large number of listed firms through pyramidal ownership structure. What role does the corporate pyramid play in firms’ investment decisions? What is its influence on firm performance? This paper investigates the capital investment and firm performance from the perspective of pyramidal ownership structure. We find that as the layers of corporate pyramid increases, the capital overinvestment declines. The negative relations between pyramid and overinvestment exist for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which indicate that increasing the layers within corporate pyramid reduces the likelihood of overinvestment of the listing firm and improving investment efficiency. Moreover, we show that the effects of increasing the layers of corporate pyramid on accounting performance are different for SOEs and NSOES. For SOEs, increasing the layers of pyramid results in less government interference on the listed firm and more flexibility in operate. Therefore, increasing pyramidal layers is positively related to accounting performance. While for NSOEs, pyramiding is to build an internal capital market for the ultimate shareholder’s capital investment. Although pyramid may reduce overinvestment of the listing firm, agency costs may offset the positive effect and induce a lower accounting performance.
  • 详情 Executive Compensation, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from China
    Like other major countries in the world, Chinese listed firms have recently experienced a dramatic rise in executive compensation. However, the arguments that could explain the same phenomena in developed countries can not be extended to the case in China. First, most Chinese listed firms are controlled by the state, thus management cannot set their own compensations through captured boards as suggested by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). Second, very few listed firms in China granted stock options and/or common stocks as part of executive compensations prior to 2005. There is little possibility that executives increased their own compensations by offering stock-option plans implied by Bolton et al. (2006). Based on the facts that the legal investor protection has been improved in China, we argue theoretically and empirically in this paper that the rise in executive compensation of Chinese listed firms can be attributed to the enhancement of legal investor protection. Since the management has to give up part of their private benefit with the improvement of legal investor protection, some private benefits extracted by management before have to be paid in an explicit way in order to make management incentive compatible. This finding partially leads to the increasing trend in executive compensations. It therefore provides a new perspective to explain why executive compensations keep rising in this emerging market where legal investor protection has been improving.
  • 详情 Institutions, Ownership Structure and Financing Decisions: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
    This paper empirically investigates the determinants of financing decisions in Chinese listed firms, using 3,196 firm-year observations from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2005. Thereby, we investigate the effects of differences in institutions across Chinese provinces and municipalities, and compare the financing choices of state-controlled and private-controlled enterprises. We find that a better legal environment negatively affects the debt ratio and the proportion of debt that consists of bank loans in SOEs as well as private enterprises. Conversely, regional banking development positively influences these two variables. If anything, these effects of the rule of law and regional banking development on leverage are stronger for private-controlled firms. SOEs have lower debt ratios in regions with better stock market access, while private firms rely less on bank loans in regions with more government intervention in business. Finally, we document that SOE bank loans have a longer maturity, while their overall debt ratio and debt mix are comparable to those of private firms.
  • 详情 Board Independence and Family Control
    The issues concerning the governance mechanism of board independence and its determinants remain controversial in the field of corporate finance. Particularly, the association between the properties of family power and board independence is yet comprehensively discussed and is crucial important for the financial market in Europe and Asia. We set out in our study to identify the determinants of board independence with the sample of listed firms in Taiwan from 2002 to 2006 based on the notions that independent boards play an important role to enhance corporate governance mechanism. The argument that the higher involvement of family power in the board room is harmful to the board independence is expected. The evidence shows that firms with larger size and greater opportunities of managers to consume private benefits tend to hire more independent directors. Besides, higher growth opportunities, as well as greater outsider influence provide the same positive effect on appointing independent directors. Regarding to the most important evidence, firms with greater proportion of family members on the directorship reduce the tendency to appoint more independent directors; moreover, the higher percentage of shares owned by family members provides the positive effect on board independence. However, firm age is found to have a contradictory effect to that reported in the prior studies and firms which are more seasoned do not necessarily tend to hire more independent directors. Furthermore, we also compare board structures across different firm sizes and find that board composition in small and large firms is extremely divergent. We tend to contribute to the literatures with the evidence that firms with greater influence of power of family directorship on the board meeting are burdened with severe problem of less independence of the board.
  • 详情 Listing BRICs: Stock Issuers from Brazil, Russia, India and China in New York, London, and Luxembourg
    In the last decade hundreds of companies from emerging markets have listed and issued their shares on American and European stock markets. Brazil, Russia, India, and China have been the main origins of issuers, and stock exchanges in the US, UK, and Luxembourg the main destinations involved in the process. These four home and three host markets are the empirical focus of our paper. We present an economic geography perspective on foreign listing, grounded in the geography of finance and the world city network approaches, emphasising the sub-national origins of foreign listed firms, the role of intermediaries, and competition for foreign listings. Our analysis, based on comprehensive up-to-date datasets on foreign listings and foreign equity issues, shows that issuers listing their shares abroad are predominantly large firms, coming from relatively high-growth, internationally oriented sectors, and headquartered overwhelmingly in the leading economic centres of their home countries. Key intermediaries in the foreign listing process are the global investment banks, operating out of the very same centres where the cross-listing firms and the host stock exchanges are located. Competition between host stock markets is affected significantly by the direct and indirect costs of foreign listing, including disclosure and corporate governance requirements. Both host markets and intermediaries exhibit a significant degree of specialisation in terms of the size, sector, and geographical origin of the issuers they serve. The market for foreign listing differs significantly between the BRIC countries, with the Chinese market offering the greatest potential, but facing considerable uncertainty.
  • 详情 The Role of Venture Capitalists in Listed Companies: Evidence from Mainland China
    We empirically examine the role of venture capital in VC-backed listed firms in Mainland China. It is found that the VC-backed firms experience higher underpricing as the investors in the second market are too optimistic about the prospect of the VC-backed firms, but not about the lower pricing in the primary market. In addition, the pre- and post-IPO operating performance of VC-backed firms are found to be significantly better than that of non VC-backed ones. The result supports the monitoring model. Meanwhile, there is no evidence to support the certification model. Furthermore, it is consistent with the grandstanding model proposed by Gompers that high-reputation VC-backed firms have a better post-IPO operating and market performance compared to low-reputation VC-backed ones.
  • 详情 Policy Burden, Firm Performance, and Management Turnover
    Lin, Cai, and Li (1998) argue that under information asymmetry, SOE managers can use state-imposed policy burdens as excuses of poor performance and make the State accountable for it. The argument implies that turnover-performance sensitivity of SOEs decreases as policy burdens increase and that such impact depends on the extent of information asymmetry. Accordingly, this paper empirically explores how policy burdens affect top management turnover of Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2005. We find that high surplus labor significantly reduces the sensitivity of chairman turnover to performance for state-controlled firms, while private firms do not exhibit such a pattern. Furthermore, our results show that high surplus labor reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity more for firms with greater information asymmetry. Overall, we find strong evidence supporting the implications of Lin, Cai, and Li (1998). In addition, we find that chairman turnover of Chinese firms is sensitive to different performance measures for state-controlled firms and private firms.
  • 详情 The Impact of Ownership and Ownership Concentration on the Performance of China’s Listed Firms
    This paper investigates the impact of ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China’s listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we conduct simplex, interactive and joint analyses. We find that ownership concentration is approximately associated with higher firm performance. Ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance. Firm performance is better when the state is the largest of the top shareholders and/or institutions dominate ownership among the top tradable shareholders. Our results support the theory that high ownership concentration mitigates the agency problem.