This study examines the relationship between industry litigation risk and corporate misconduct using China's A-share listed companies’ data from 2007 to 2022. The findings indicate a significant and negative association, where companies in industries with higher median litigation amounts relative to their assets exhibit reduced incidents of misconduct. This suggests that businesses in high-risk litigation sectors may adopt more cautious practices to mitigate legal challenges and protect their reputations. The robustness of these findings is confirmed through a variety of tests, including a quasi-experimental setting of the chief judges rotation implemented in 2008. Furthermore, the study finds that external monitors including financial analysts’ site visits and local law firms moderate the negative relationship between litigation risk and misconduct. We further show that legal enforcement and moral capital are the two channels through which industry litigation risk impacts corporate misconduct. Our findings underscore the role of litigation risk in shaping peer firms' behavior.

We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s man- agement of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in indus- tries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.

Purpose – This study aims to investigate whether firms purchase directors’ and officers’ liability (D&O) insurance when the country-level economic policy uncertainty (EPU) is high. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses D&O insurance data from Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2019 to conduct regression analyses to examine the association between D&O insurance and EPU. Findings – The results show that government EPU, despite being an exogenous factor, increases the likelihood of firms’ purchasing D&O insurance, and this effect is more pronounced when firms are exposed to great share price crash risk and high litigation risk, suggesting that firms intend to purchase D&O insurance possibly due to the accentuated stock price crash risk and litigation risk associated with EPU. In addition, the results indicate that the effect of EPU on the D&O insurance purchase decision is moderated by the provincial capital market development and internal control quality. Practical implications – The study highlights the role of uncertain economic policies in shareholder approval of D&O insurance purchases. Originality/value – The study enriches the literature on the determinants of D&O insurance purchases by documenting novel evidence that country-level EPU is a key institutional factor shaping firms’ decisions to purchase D&O insurance.

In contrast to previous literature, our study not only examines the communicative value of Key Audit Matters (KAMs) through the capital market reaction to KAMs but also analyses the content and reporting format of KAMs, which vary based on the intrinsic risk of business activity. Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2017 to 2020, we find that more M&A-related KAMs are reported and they are disclosed through less boilerplate language when M&As are accompanied with the Performance Commitment contracts (PCs), an indicator as high possibility of overpayment during M&As thus inducing the high risk of the goodwill impairment and high litigation risk. Additionally, we find that the negative impact of PCs on boilerplate language is amplified when the benchmark in PCs is precisely achieved or when the firm has been sued in recent years. In other words, the disclosure of M&A-related KAMs is more tailored to the client firm when auditors observe a high risk for accountability. Consequently, capital market participants, as well as other recipients of auditing reports, such as regulators and analysts, perceive non-boilerplate M&A-related KAMs as informative for their decision-making process.

Standard principal-agent theory predicts that the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) decreases in the risk of the firm. An alternative literature argues that entrenched executives as in weakly governed firms use compensation contract to extract the rent, which renders risk irrelevant in determining PPS. This paper uses event study approach to test both principal-agent model and CEO power theory by studying changes in executives’ compensation contract around litigation events. Consistent with principalagent model prediction, we find that, after the initiation of litigation, PPS drops, compensation shifts from performance-sensitive component (equity) to performanceinvariant component (cash). In addition, all the changes reverse themselves after litigation settlements. To test CEO power theory, we further partition the event firms into firms with good and bad corporate governance. We find that the PPS in firms with bad corporate governance increases after lawsuit and decreases after the settlement. This suggests that litigation brings the bad compensation practice of poorly governed firms to the limelight and forces firms to discipline their CEOs temporarily during the litigation period (so called “limelight effect”), which lends indirect support to CEO power theory. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests including two endogeneity tests.