A strong reputation is a cornerstone of corporate finance theory, widely believed to relax financial constraints and lower capital costs. We challenge this view by identifying an ‘reputation paradox’: under modern risk-sensitive regulation, for firms with long-term liabilities, a better reputation may paradoxically increase capital strain. We argue that the improvement of firm’s reputation alters customer behavior , , which extends liability duration and amplifies measured risk. By using the life insurance industry as an ideal laboratory, we develop an innovative framework that integrates LLMs with actuarial cash flow models, which confirms that the improved reputation increases regulatory capital demands. A comparative analysis across major regulatory regimes—C-ROSS, Solvency II, and RBC—and two insurance products, we further demonstrate that improvements in reputation affect capital requirements unevenly across product types and regulatory frameworks. Our findings challenge the conventional view that reputation uniformly alleviates capital pressure, emphasizing the necessity for insurers to strategically align reputation management with solvency planning.

Using the formal implementation of the 2012 Green Credit Guidelines (GCG) as an exogenous shock to construct a quasi-natural experiment, we study the impact of green credit policies on the inefficient investment of heavily polluting firms in China's listed companies from 2008 to 2020. We find that green credit policies can significantly alleviate the inefficient investment of heavily polluting enterprises. By reducing agency costs and long-term liabilities, green credit policies mitigate the problem of inefficient investment in heavily polluting firms. Moreover, the mitigating effect of green credit policies on the inefficient investment of heavily polluting enterprises has significant heterogeneity in terms of property rights, internal characteristics.