While government support programs are often effective at helping firms achieve their objectives, these programs may have unintended consequences. Motivated by this, this study empirically examines the impacts of receiving investments from government-guided funds (GGFs) on executive-employee pay gaps in Chinese public firms. The results from difference-in-differences analyses show that GGFs investments lead to a significantly greater widening of the pay disparities between executives and employees in recipient firms than in other firms after funding is granted. This widening gap is driven by a larger increase in executive compensation relative to employee wages. The mechanism analysis suggests that increased cash holdings associated with receiving GGFs create financial slack that facilitates managerial opportunism, ultimately resulting in greater pay gaps. These findings reveal an unintended consequence of GGFs, highlighting an overlooked agency cost of government financial support programs.

Previous studies on the impact of corporate information disclosure on stock price crash risk have largely focused on financial statements. In contrast, China’s unique monthly operating report disclosure system—featuring high frequency and realtime operational data—offers a distinct information channel. Using data from A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2021, we find that monthly operating report disclosures significantly reduce stock price crash risk by alleviating information asymmetry between firms and external stakeholders. The underlying mechanisms involve restraining managerial opportunism and correcting investor expectation biases. Further analysis shows that firms’ official responses to investor inquiries has no significant effect on crash risk once monthly operational disclosures are accounted for, underscoring that the quality of information disclosed is as important as its frequency. The risk-reducing effect is more pronounced among firms with greater business complexity, weaker internal controls, and lower institutional ownership.

corporate governance. We hypothesize that (a) Firms in more individualistic cultures should suffer more from agency problems and should use more corporate governance practices; (b) Firms in more individualistic cultures should use more debt since financing policy can also be used to control managerial opportunism, but the cultural effect should be smaller in firms with already higher corporate governance standards. Using the corporate governance scores from ASSET4, we find that individualism can explain a large variation in firm-level corporate governance and the empirical results are consistent with the our hypotheses.