Traditional information asymmetry theories suggest that greater corporate transparency should reduce investor disagreement. Using Chinese mutual fund holdings, we document the opposite pattern: transparency amplifies disagreement among institutional investors. Mechanism tests show that transparency discourages herding while intensifying private information acquisition among fund managers. The effect is stronger for growth-oriented and high-skill funds, and during periods of elevated market sentiment, and among firms with lower credibility, excessive disclosure frequency, and greater investor attention. Further analysis indicates that this transparency-induced disagreement stems from informed trading rather than noise, thereby enhancing price informativeness and market efficiency. Overall, the evidence reveals the dual nature of transparency as both an informational input and a behavioral catalyst that increases disagreement in financial markets.

This study constructs a three-dimensional space model based on fund investment styles, using a sample of open-end equity and mixed funds from 2005 to 2021 to measure the degree of style convergence. The research explores how style convergence impacts fund managers’ window dressing behavior. The results indicate that, after accounting for the effects of fund performance, style convergence exacerbates window dressing behavior among fund managers. Specifically, this is reflected in fund managers increasing their holdings in winning stocks and selling off losing stocks, which indirectly highlights the intense competition within China’s open-end fund industry. The findings remain robust after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests. Further analysis reveals that style convergence contributes to the risk of client attrition, thereby intensifying the agency problem within the fund industry. The window dressing effect due to style convergence is particularly pronounced in funds managed by individuals with lower educational backgrounds, lower investment skills, smaller family sizes, and lower institutional investor ownership. The paper offers valuable insights into the agency problems arising from investment style convergence and provides guidance for mitigating fund managers' self-interested behavior.

Do investors respond to what fund managers say, or how they look saying it? Using 2,000 live-streamed sessions by Chinese ETF managers and multimodal machine learning, we show that managers’ facial expressions, not their words, drive fund flows. A one-standard-deviation increase in positive facial affect raises next-day flows by 0.17pp (260% of mean). Vocal tone shows weak effects; textual sentiment shows none. Critically, facial expressions predict flows but not returns, indicating pure persuasion rather than information transmission. Effects strengthen when investors are emotionally vulnerable (down markets, retail-heavy funds) and persist 2-3 weeks before dissipating. Our findings challenge the emphasis on textual disclosure in finance and raise questions about investor protection as video communication proliferates.

This paper examines whether mandatory ownership disclosure aligns incentives or distorts in-vestor beliefs. Using a sample of 1,436 Chinese equity-oriented mutual funds from 2012 to 2023,we find that higher managerial and senior ownership are significantly associated with larger in-flows, suggesting that investors treat ownership as a quality signal. However, we find no evidencethat ownership forecasts superior future returns or risk-adjusted alphas. Mechanism tests showthat the ownership-flow effect is much stronger in low-marketing funds and that managers increaseownership after weak flows, a countercyclical pattern inconsistent with overconfidence and consis-tent with strategic remedial signaling. Overall, ownership disclosure appears to operate primarilythrough investor perception rather than information about managerial ability, weakening the linkbetween capital allocation and true skill in the mutual fund industry.

This paper studies how mutual fund managers update their beliefs as macroeconomic conditions change. Using regulator-mandated reports from Chinese mutual funds, we measure the intensity of belief updating from year-over-year changes in stated outlooks and decompose those updates into macro and micro themes. We show that belief updating is state-contingent: funds with more intensive belief updating shift their narratives toward macro (micro) topics during recessions (expansions) and concurrently reduce (increase) procyclical stock exposures and on-site company visits. This state-contingent belief updating predicts superior performance when matched to prevailing economic conditions, with macro-oriented updates paying off mainly for high-updating funds in recessions and micro-oriented updates paying off more broadly in expansions. Investors recognize this signal of skill, allocating greater flows to these funds, especially when past returns are less informative. Finally, belief updating is stronger for younger managers and for funds from newer, smaller families, consistent with signaling under career and competitive pressures.

This paper investigates how foreign institutional investors, specifically Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs), influence the investment strategies of Chinese mutual fund management companies (FMCs) in which they hold shares. By analysing panel data from 1,766 mutual funds managed by 44 foreign-invested FMCs in China between 2005 and 2021, we explore whether QFII-invested FMCs (Q-FMCs) learn more from their domestic counterparts (D-FMCs) than other foreign-invested FMCs (NQ-FMCs). Our findings show that Q-FMC-managed mutual funds exhibit portfolio allocations more closely aligned with local DFMCs than those managed by NQ-FMCs. This imitation is particularly pronounced when selecting new stocks, enhancing portfolio performance, but not when rebalancing existing positions. Additionally, Q-FMCs trade more actively than NQ-FMCs. Robustness checks confirm these results across various ownership structures, fund characteristics, market conditions, and regulatory changes. These findings highlight the dual role of QFIIs as both investors and learners in China’s evolving financial landscape, offering insights into how foreign capital integrates into emerging mutual fund markets, informing regulatory policy aimed at fostering cross-border financial development.

We examine how Chinese mutual funds react to superstitious beliefs about bad luck during one’s zodiac year, which occurs on a 12-year cycle around a person’s birth year. Funds decrease their holdings of zodiac stocks, non-state-owned enterprises in the zodiac years of their chairperson, and profit more from trading zodiac stocks than from trading other stocks. This pattern is more pronounced in firms with lower investor awareness and higher liquidity, and for fund managers with higher past ability, indicating that fund managers trade in anticipation of the negative market reaction towards zodiac stocks.

This paper investigates how the geographical distribution of shareholders in Chinese mutual fund management companies influences investment decisions. We show that mutual funds are more inclined to hold and overweight stocks from regions where their shareholders are located, thus capitalizing on a local information advantage. By examining changes in fund holdings in response to shifts in the shareholder base, we rule out the possibility that these effects are driven by fund managers’ local biases. Our findings reveal that stocks from the same region as the fund’s shareholders tend to outperform and significantly contribute to the fund’s overall performance.

Innovation is crucial for long-term corporate value and competitive advantage; however, it can misalign the interests of managers and investors. Balancing managers’ short- and long-term goals is a pivotal challenge in promoting innovation incentives. Therefore, this study examines innovative incentives for managers of publicly traded firms to address the issue of agency problems. The study focuses on economic value-added (EVA) reform implemented by China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which encourages EVA-driven R&D investments as the primary management metric. The policy effectively motivates key corporate managers by reducing capital costs and stimulating increased innovation. Following this policy’s implementation, notable innovation disparities exist between state-owned enterprises and firms not subject to the reform. Furthermore, innovation incentives significantly affect overconfident company managers, yielding positive effects on innovation.

Exploring the relationship between government subsidies, market competition, and the digital transformation of cultural and tourism enterprises (CTEs) will provide inspiration for upgrading and promoting the digitization development of China’s cultural and tourism industry. This paper theoretically and empirically evaluates the effect of government subsidies on digital transformation of CTEs by developing an evolutionary game combined with Hotelling model, and meanwhile using the econometric model. The theoretical model demonstrates that different subsidy scale will affect the evolutionary efficiency of the system under different market competition intensities. And the empirical model shows that the relationship between government subsidies and the digital transformation of CTEs is a U-shaped curve and the market competition exerts the flattening moderation on the U-shaped relationship. The findings provide guidance to both policymakers and managers.