Empowered by comprehensive data on smartphone fund investors’ trading and browsing histories from a Chinese financial company, we explore the role of investors’ financial attention in influencing the relationship between unrealized profits and investors’ selling decisions. Against a backdrop in which retail investors are not attentive to their portfolio information, we find supportive evidence suggesting that investors exhibit realization preference when we condition on days when investors pay financial attention. Further, we show that failing to account for investors’ financial inattention may induce observers to reject the realization-preference hypothesis. This paper also offers insights into the determinants of financial attention and the influence of financial attention on investor disposition effect.

By using a unique proprietary dataset and implementing the Wuhan (China) lockdown from January to April 2020 as a natural experiment, we find that individual mutual fund investors in Wuhan significantly reduced their trading frequency, total investment of their portfolios, and risk level of their invested funds during the lockdown period as compared to investors in other cities. These changes are stronger for older investors and are reversed soon after the lifting of the lockdown. Our results suggest that the elimination of face-to-face interaction among individual investors reduced their information sharing, which led to more conservatism in their financial trading. These results are not supported by the alternative explanations of limited investor attention and temporary changes in personal circumstances, including depression and/or income reduction, during the lockdown period. Finally, consistent with the theory of naïve investor trading, we also find that investors received higher trading returns during the lockdown.

This paper finds that reported fund returns do not necessarily represent the returns of mutual fund investors, especially over long investment periods. We show that mutual fund’s reported returns are calculated using NAV and represent the mutual fund manager’s skill in extracting value from the capital market. However, the real returns earned by mutual fund investors depend not only on the mutual fund manager’s skill but also on the subscription and redemption activities. Using the inflow and outflow information reported in the mutual funds’ semi-annual reports in China, we are able to calculate mutual fund investors’ real returns. We further derive the adjusted gain coefficient (AGC) to capture the difference between the reported mutual fund returns and the mutual fund investors’ real returns. We find that the AGC is significantly lower than 1, which suggests that the real returns of mutual fund investors are significantly lower than reported mutual fund returns in China. The underperformance of mutual fund investors relative to the mutual fund managers they invest in is very persistent and is stronger in more recent years. A further investigation reveals that this underperformance is largely attributed to investors’ poor timing skills and additional fees incurred as a result of excessive subscription and redemption activities. We also identify skilled mutual fund investors using AGC and find that fund managers can benefit from investors’ timing skills. Skilled mutual fund investors flow in when the mutual fund managers have good investment opportunities and flow out when the mutual fund managers have extra cash. The synchronization of the mutual fund investors’ flow and mutual fund managers’ investment strategies can reduce the need for liquidity management and improve mutual fund performance. Using Chinese mutual funds data, we show that a 1% increase in AGC can increase fund riskadjusted return by 0.2% in the next six months.