This paper investigates how noise trading behavior is influenced by limited attention. As the daily price limit rules of the Chinese stock market provide a scenario for the exhibition of salient payoffs, speculators elevate prices to attract noise traders into the market. Utilizing a series of distraction events stemming from mobile games as exogenous shocks to investors’ attention, we find that the gambler-like behavior, termed as “Hitting game” is crowded out. Consistent with our attention mechanism, indicators such as trading volume decline in response to these game shocks.

This paper investigates the volatility and turnover effects of underlying stocks associated with the introduction of warrants in China’s warrants market. We find that in a derivative market where noise traders dominate, the introduction of warrants increases the underlying stock’s volatility, which cannot be attributed to better information revelation. We also find that speculation on derivatives has a spillover effect on the underlying security. Higher volatility and turnover rate of underlying stocks are associated with higher warrants turnover, larger warrants price deviation from theoretical prices, and longer time to maturity of warrants. Additionally, we find that stocks with covered warrants have higher volatility and turnover than those with only equity warrants. Our paper provides new evidence for the impact of derivatives on underlying assets in the emerging market context.

A government policy aimed at the reduction of state shares in state-owned enterprises (SOE) triggered a crash in Chinas stock market. The sustained depression and spillover even after the policy adjustments were over constitute a puzzle the so-called state-share paradox. The empirical study finds evidence in two dimensions. First, a regime switching model with an absorbing state suggests that government policy switches the regime to liquidity black holes. Second, there is no evidence of light-to-liquidity during the crash, suggesting to model the crash as an aggregate phenomenon of the whole market. To carefully match the evidence, a theoretical model is set up within the framework of market microstructure. The state-share paradox is not a simply instance of news-driven crash. The model shows that Chinas stock market has distinctive features of liquidity production and price discovery. The irregularities of a representative liquidity supporter generate an inverted-S demand curve and give rise to potential liquidity black holes. Multiple equilibria and the resulting large drop in prices arise from supply dynamics of short-run investors, who buy the stock from the primary market liquidate their long positions in the secondary market. This study contributes a rational panics hypothesis to the literature. The rational panics hypothesis is neither an rational model with noise traders, nor a standard rational expectation model under the asymmetric information framework. It is based on homogeneous agents with incomplete information, and is consistent with the evidence of absorbing regime switching and the recent literature on state-dependent preference. Our findings have larger implications for ine¢ ciency of Chinas stock market.