By establishing a labor-retirement model within China’s unique intergenerational support culture and one-child policy, this study provides evidence of the one-child policy’s early effect on individuals’ retirement decisions. This finding highlights a contradiction between the retirement intentions of the 1960s and 1970s generations, who are most affected by the one-child policy, and the delayed retirement policy of Chinese government. Utilizing data from the CHARLS 2011-2018 and employing OLS, IV, and fuzzy cohort DID estimation methods, we observe that only-child parents tend to retire at an earlier age compared to non-only-child parents. This early effect of the one-child policy on retirement decisions can be attributed to intergenerational support for children’s marriage and career, as well as the educational attainments of children, as confirmed by both theoretical and empirical analysis.

The reform of China’s one-child policy allows families to have more children and thus may affect anticipation of intergenerational succession of family businesses and drive family firms to improve their corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that the reform positively affects family firm CSR. We also find that the positive impact is more pronounced for family firms whose owners have fewer children, have no son, and are of reproductive age, which confirms the theory that intergenerational succession anticipation drives family firm CSR. Moreover, we find that the positive impact is more pronounced for firms that operate in environments where CSR is more strategically important. We validate our findings by showing that the reform curtails family firms’ short-termism.