Identifying and addressing the factors influencing the within-firm pay gaps has become a pressing issue amidst the widening global income inequality. This study investigates the impact of corporate ESG ratings on employee income and pay gaps using data from Chinese-listed companies between 2017 and 2021. The results suggest that ESG ratings significantly increase employee income. Further research indicates that ESG ratings exacerbate the within-firm pay gaps and income inequality due to the varying bargaining power among employees. This effect is particularly pronounced in non-state-owned and large-scale companies. This is also true for all kinds of companies in traditional and highly competitive industries. However, reducing agency costs and improving information transparency can help vulnerable employees with weaker bargaining power in income distribution to narrow their pay gaps. The research findings offer important insights to promote fair income distribution within companies and address global income inequality.

Digital transformation (DT) is an ongoing and costly process that requires careful planning and the motivation of top executives (CEOs). This research analyze the CEOs compensation as a motivation to embrace DT by reducing agency issue. We determine the extent of DT through a textual analysis method and utilize data from Chinese publicly traded companies spanning the period between 2007 and 2020. Our study findings are threefold, (a) we observe a positive relationship between CEOs' pay gap and DT, highlighting the significant role CEOs compensation plays in encouraging CEOs to adopt digitalization, (b) we find that managerial shareholding significantly enhances this relationship, (c) we note that the relationship between CEOs pay gap and DT is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises compared to non-stateowned enterprises. Additionally, we discover through channel analysis that agency cost and audit quality mediate the relationship between CEOs pay gap and DT potentially by reducing the agency problem between CEOs and shareholders. These findings are vital for comprehending the pay practices and behaviors of corporate executives regarding digitalization in China. Importantly, the study results remain robust when considering instrumental variables (IV), propensity score matching (PSM), and alternative techniques.

This article tests several predictions of tournament theory on executive compensation in the context of a transition economy. Using an unbalanced panel which consists of a total of 34701 executives in 450 publicly listed firms in China during 1999 and 2006, we find that (1) pay increases as executives move up the corporate hierarchy into higher ranks; (2) pay gap is the largest between the first and second tier executives, although it does not increase monotonically across all executive ranks; and (3) pay dispersion increases with the number of tournament participants and the level of noise in the business environment. In addition, we find evidence that state ownership of shares reduces executive compensation and pay gap, and corporate governance structure affect pay dispersion. Overall, our study shows that listed firms in China, as they become more and more market-oriented, have adopted a pay structure that is largely consistent with the predictions of tournament theory, and that it is important to consider both ownership structure and corporate governance in analyzing executive compensation structure.