To address the challenges posed by renewable energy integration in power systems, China is advancing the development of Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS). However, the rapid growth of PHS installations, coupled with strict regulations and a high reliance on capacity compensation, has led to increasing financial burdens on other utilities. One solution is to reallocate the capacity compensation through market-based approaches to implement the “beneficiary-pays” principle. To achieve this goal, an operational policy named ’partial-regulated dispatch’ is proposed in this study. The analysis of this policy encompasses two crucial dimensions: the dispatch mechanism and business models. The dispatch mechanism evaluates PHS’s capacity contribution to grid stability, while the business models focus on enhancing PHS profitability to reduce dependency on capacity compensation while ensuring long-term economic sustainability. Furthermore, the flexibility of PHS is introduced as a criterion for assessing system security contributions, considering both individual unit vibration characteristics and multi-unit commitment strategies. The case study shows that through partial-regulated dispatch, PHS can reduce its reliance on capacity compensation by nearly 50% while ensuring its regulation service via flexibility compensation. This policy effectively balances economic viability with system support capabilities. Moreover, flexibility compensation provides PHS operators with a risk mitigation strategy in the complex power market environment. Under an appropriate operational strategy and policy incentives, the flexibility can be enhanced by nearly 30% in a fully marketized scenario, contributing to both system stability and operational efficiency.

The Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) have become quite profitable recently. As the largest shareholder, the state has not asked SOEs to pay dividends in the past. Therefore, some have suggested that the state should ask SOEs to pay dividends. Indeed, the Chinese government has adopted this policy advice and started to demand dividend payment starting from 2008. While we do not question the soundness of the dividend policy, the point we raise is whether those profits are real if all costs owned by SOEs are properly accounted for. Among other things, we are interested in investigating whether the profits of SOEs would still be as large as they claim if they were to pay a market interest rate. Using a representative sample of corporate China, we find that the costs of financing for SOEs are significantly lower than for other companies after controlling for some fundamental factors for profitability and individual firm characteristics. In addition, our estimates show that if SOEs were to pay a market interest rate, their existing profits would be entirely wiped out. Our findings suggest that SOEs are still benefiting from credit subsidies and they are not yet subject to the market interest rates. In an environment where credit rights are not fully respected, dividend policy, though important, should come second and not first. Keywords: