Recent studies highlight the resurgence of state capitalism, with the state increasingly acting as equity investors in private firms. Why do state--business equity ties, including partial and indirect state ownership in private firms, proliferate in weakly institutionalized contexts like China? While conventional wisdom emphasizes state-driven explanations based on static evidence, I argue that regulatory risk reshapes business preferences, prompting firms to seek state investors and expanding state--business equity ties. These ties facilitate information exchange and signal political endorsement under regulatory scrutiny. Focusing on China's crackdown on the Internet and IT sectors, difference-in-differences analyses of all investments from 2016 to 2022 reveal a rise in state--business equity ties post-crackdown. In-depth interviews with investors along with quantitative analysis, demonstrate that shifts in business preferences drive this change. This study shows the resurgence of state capitalism is driven not only by the state but also by businesses in response to regulatory risks.

This paper provides evidence on the cost of political interference on banks with Chinese Private Enterprise Survey data between 2002 and 2012. Using regional political turnovers as a proxy for political influence, we show that political motivations for future promotions distort the bank lending decisions and crowd out lending to private firms. Besides, firms with business connections are more sensitive to turnover, while political connections are not significantly affected. These lending distortions are more considerable where competition for future promotion is more intense and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Moreover, the effect is especially pronounced for small firms. As a result of reduced bank credit, firms’ total credit availability decreases and they have to cut investments. Overall, our results suggest that preferential lending to politically important sectors has negative spillovers and can lead to costly crowding-out of private sectors.

Digital transformation empowers enterprises with new kinetic energy for high-quality development, can digital transformation enhance the transparency of capital market? This study constructs a corporate digital transformation index, and examines its impact on Chinese capital market transparency from the perspective of information senders. We find that corporate digital transformation significantly improves transparency, and this finding is more pronounced in non-SOEs, firms with low political connection, high industry environment uncertainty, and low regional marketization level. Channel tests show that lowering management myopia and increasing analyst attention are possible mechanisms. Furthermore, digital transformation improves stock liquidity by enhancing enterprises’ information transparency. Overall, our findings provide critical insights for improving transparency in China’s capital market.

Corporate philanthropy is increasingly seen as an effective way to promote social equity. This paper estimates the effect of donation tax deduction policy on corporate donations. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies, we find that the donation tax deduction policy has a significant positive effect on the amount donated. This finding remains robust to a number of robustness tests. Meanwhile, our study also suggests that the policy increases donation participation. Finally, heterogeneity analysis suggests that the effect is significant only for firms with high media attention and political connections. Our findings provide important evidence for the optimizing of social welfare.

This research analyses the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic on China's economy, examining the divergent epidemic prevention policies used by local governments. Empirical evidence highlights that the emergence of COVID-19 cases correlates with a 1.13% reduction in quarterly GDP growth. However, when a city's secretary maintains an informal ties with the provincial secretary, GDP growth remains resilient. Analyzing micro-level data, we observe that city secretaries with informal ties tend to enact flexible anti-contagion measures. This flexibility stems from a decreased likelihood of reprimand for virus transmission. Such shields exclusively manifests when incumbent provincial secretaries share informal ties with central leadership. This underscores the interplay of political networks in shaping localized economic responses.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

Research has argued that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should bear more social responsibility than other listed firms, because their own goals include maintaining social stability and promoting social welfare. In contrast with the privatization of SOEs observed in other countries, in China, some listed firms’ major shareholders have become SOEs in recent years. This transition offers a good opportunity to investigate the impact of ownership change on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using the propensity score matching difference-in-differences method, we document that the CSR performance of these firms does not improve when their ownership structure changes, and it can even worsen. Our results remain robust to a series of tests. Further investigating the underlying economic mechanism, we uncover those political connections, bank financing, and government subsidies play critical roles in determining the negative effect of ownership structure change on public firms, which is consistent with the soft budget constraint framework. In an additional analysis, we find that CSR performance is poor for manufacturing industry firms after ownership structure change. After calculating the frequency of keywords appearing in the annual reports of such firms, we find them to be satisfied with their new SOE background after ownership structure change. Our paper provides a possible explanation for the phenomenon of SOEs becoming major shareholder of listed firms.

We examine the impact of political connections on the investment decisions of Chinese mutual funds. We identify a direct link between mutual funds’ political connections and stocks held from the same political network using hand-collected information on the professional backgrounds of Chinese mutual fund managers and fund management company (FMC) shareholders. While mutual funds tend to allocate more investments to stocks based on their political connections, this effect alleviates somewhat after the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. Our findings suggest that anti-corruption campaigns can help to reduce the political effects of government-related agencies on fund holdings and contribute to better market fairness.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.