The emphasis on environmental sustainability outcomes (ESO) in emerging economies has increased recently, requiring in-depth research to manage the complex interplay between socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors. With a particular focus on China, this study describes this significant relationship using a good technique that comprises standardized questionnaires administered to a large sample of different organizational levels. This research examined several factors and their effects on ESO. First, the results show that the kind of economic system (EST) directly affects ESO; no direct relationship was discovered between ESO and the industrialization level (LI). Furthermore, it was demonstrated that government funding for eco-sustainability projects (GFESP) and community engagement and eco-education initiatives (CEEEI) had a direct impact on ESO. Secondly, the results demonstrated that implementing eco-policies and regulations (IEPR) had a full mediating effect between EST and ESO. Third, political instability (PI) and corruption level (CL), which are essentially the outcome of China's current political and environmental issues, diminish the correlation between EST and ESO. These findings demonstrate that China's environmental sustainability has to be improved using a multimodal approach. The public is encouraged to push legislators to bolster eco-laws and policies in order to emphasize environmental preservation. Initiatives to reduce corruption and maintain political stability may also bolster the beneficial effects of economic frameworks on ESO.

The existing literature on political capital and bank lending has largely overlooked the role of political environment. Based on the theories of political marketplace, all-pay auction and political instability, we examine the conditional effect of political capital on access to bank loans with political environment surrounding private firms changing, using a nationwide survey of private firms in 2010. In particularly, we characterize the political environment with political capital inequality and political instability. We find that private firms have more difficulty gaining access to bank lending with the increase in the degree of political capital inequality. Furthermore, political capital exerts a positive effect on access to bank loans only when political capital inequality within a province exceeds 0.4775 and political instability does not exceed 0.7.