This paper addresses the dynamic tail risk in price-limited financial markets. We propose a novel censored autoregressive conditional Fr´echet model with a fiexible evolution scheme for the time-varying parameters, which allows deciphering the impact of historical information on tail risk from the viewpoint of different risk preferences. The proposed model can well accommodate many important empirical characteristics, such as thick-tailness, extreme risk clustering, and price limits. The empirical analysis of the Chinese stock market reveals the effectiveness of our model in interpreting and predicting time-varying tail behaviors in price-limited equity markets, providing a new tool for financial risk management.

This paper investigates how noise trading behavior is influenced by limited attention. As the daily price limit rules of the Chinese stock market provide a scenario for the exhibition of salient payoffs, speculators elevate prices to attract noise traders into the market. Utilizing a series of distraction events stemming from mobile games as exogenous shocks to investors’ attention, we find that the gambler-like behavior, termed as “Hitting game” is crowded out. Consistent with our attention mechanism, indicators such as trading volume decline in response to these game shocks.

We analyze the possible effect of price limit to informed traders’ behavior and propose three hypotheses caused by price limit. Then comprehensively using the event study method and comparative grouping method, we empirically exams the performance of price limit in China’s stock market. Our finding is that price limit policy will bring significant effect to the trading behavior of insiders, which means price limit policy will impede the fulfillment of insiders’ trading activities and delay equilibrium price discovery.