Using one of the largest samples of litigation data available to date, we examine whether the political culture of a firm determines its propensity for corporate misconduct. We measure political culture using the politi- cal contributions of top managers, firm political action committees, and local residents. We show that firms with a Republican culture are more likely to be the subject of civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation than are Democratic firms, consistent with the Democratic ideology that emphasizes equal rights, labor rights, and envi- ronmental protection. However, firms with a Democratic culture are more likely to be the subject of litigation related to securities fraud and intellectual property rights violations than are Republican firms, whose party ideology stresses self-reliance, property rights, market discipline, and limited government regulation. Upon lit- igation filing, both types of firms experience similar announcement reaction, which suggests that the observed relationship between political culture and corporate misconduct is unlikely to reflect differences in expected litigation costs.

Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.

Using the formal implementation of the 2012 Green Credit Guidelines (GCG) as an exogenous shock to construct a quasi-natural experiment, we study the impact of green credit policies on the inefficient investment of heavily polluting firms in China's listed companies from 2008 to 2020. We find that green credit policies can significantly alleviate the inefficient investment of heavily polluting enterprises. By reducing agency costs and long-term liabilities, green credit policies mitigate the problem of inefficient investment in heavily polluting firms. Moreover, the mitigating effect of green credit policies on the inefficient investment of heavily polluting enterprises has significant heterogeneity in terms of property rights, internal characteristics.

The voluminous strategy research on the determinants of corporate scope is often premised on a well-established property rights regime, which contrasts with the weak property rights protection that still characterizes most countries today. We address this gap by applying property rights theory to theorize and empirically examine how the strengthening of the property rights regime affects corporate scope. Our analysis exploits the enactment of a property law that enhanced the formal protection of private properties in China as a quasi-experiment. We show that with a strengthened property rights regime, the horizontal relatedness among private firms’ businesses increases, but their vertical relatedness decreases, compared with state-owned firms. Further, these effects are less prominent for politically connected firms that are afforded informal protection of property rights. Our findings shed new light on the property rights regime as a critical determinant of firms’ horizontal and vertical scope.

This paper uses the enactment of China’s 2007 Property Law (the Law), which reduces the risk of expropriation by local governments, as the setting to investigate the importance of property rights protection for private firm investment. Using propensity score matching and a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms facing weaker property rights protection prior to the Law significantly increase their investment and investment efficiency after the Law. Cross-sectional analyses document evidence consistent with a decrease in firms’ perceived expropriation risk as the main mechanism underlying the Law’s effect. Finally, we show that the Law improves local economic outcomes and employment.

In the era of digital economy, the development and application of digital intelligence technology are changing rapidly, and human society has entered a new era where digital intelligence technology is rapidly advancing and playing an important role. Workers who master digital intelligence technology play a decisive role in the sustained and healthy development of enterprises, and the human capital possessed by workers has become the driving force for high-quality development of enterprises. The recognition and measurement of the value of human capital possessed by workers is the foundation and prerequisite for motivating workers, and the recognition and measurement of human capital value has become a core issue that urgently needs to be studied in human resource equity accounting. The article briefly introduces the development of human resource accounting theory, expounds that establishing human capital property rights is an important condition for the sustainable development of enterprises in the digital economy era, stimulates the potential of human capital, and is conducive to accelerating economic transformation and upgrading. The dynamic equity distribution mechanism is an important way to stimulate the vitality of human capital.

We conducted an assessment of the impact of Property Rights on the toxic emissions of Chinese industrial firms. Specifically, we focused on the 2007 enactment of the Property Law in China and utilized difference-in-difference estimations to analyze firms’ pollutant emissions. Our findings reveal compelling evidence that firms with low net fixed assets considerably reduce their chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions after the implementation of the Property Law. Moreover, the effect is more prominent in firms that face stronger financial constraints and are situated in areas with high external pressure on environmental protection or robust government monitoring. We concluded that the Property Law's influence on firms’ toxic emissions is through improving credit conditions and technology upgrades. Overall, our results indicate that a well-established Property Law has a significant impact on industrial firms' environmental policies.

Using a unique list of 528 fake state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exposed in China, we examine whether and how investors react to the government’s property rights protection actions. Our results show that real SOEs with more subsidiaries, pyramid layers, and popularity are more likely to be targeted by wrongdoers. We find that when fake SOEs were exposed, it caused a significant increase in the stock prices of listed central SOEs controlled by the State Council. Further analysis shows that the stock price rise is driven by both the cash flow and risk effects. We also find that the value impact of the crackdown is more pronounced for listed central SOEs with less media coverage, located in weaker legal protection regions, and facing more competition. Overall, our findings provide empirical support for the effectiveness of exposure, as a non-litigation channel of property rights protection, in enhancing firm value.

Despite the importance of property rights protection, evidence of their impact on thebirth, survival, and operations of the whole universe of firms, and the broad impact on the economy, is limited. In this paper we address this important question by utilizing unique administrative firm-level datasets in China. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that the China’s 2007 Property Law led to significant more new private firms, firms that eventually survive, firms with less shareholders, and more new exporters, whereas the impact is the opposite for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, we find that the switch in resources between private firms and SOEs contributes to higher economic growth without sacrificing environmental quality.

The Property Rights Theory states that clearly defined ownership is the premise of efficiency, while ambiguous property rights result in great externalities. We use the establishment of local SASACs as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how unifying the supervision rights and responsibilities internalizes externalities and enhances SOEs’ innovation. The primary results show that the total innovation outputs and high-quality innovation outputs of SOEs governed by local SASACs (i.e., treatment group) improve after creating SASACs. The mechanism analyses show that both the pyramids level and risk-bearing level of local SOEs increase. In cross-sectional tests, we unravel that the innovation improvement effect is subject to the following five factors, including SASACs’ independence, local government quality, industry competition, SOEs managers’ motivation for promotion, and whether the SOE is in high-tech industry. Our paper provides empirical evidence for evaluating the innovation effect of the establishment of local SASACs with a quasi-natural experiment when the public ownership of SOEs does not change. Chun