We study asset demand and price formation in a two-asset rational expectations equilibrium with narrow thinking, where traders imperfectly coordinate decisions across assets under non-nested price information. When the price of one asset increases, cross-asset inference from prices reduces expected demand for the other asset, which feeds back into the demand response for the original asset. Narrow thinking weakens internal coordination and amplifies reliance on price-based inference. As a result, more severe narrow thinking leads to higher own-price elasticities. The model delivers sharp implications for market liquidity and price informativeness in the presence of bounded rationality.

A strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is provided by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information. If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bid functions which is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents. In particular, the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents’ information.