This study investigates the impact of RegTech adoption in the M&A regulatory review process on deal performance. Leveraging the staggered implementation of the SOEs Online Supervision System (SOSS) by China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) across its central and 31 provincial offices from 2018 to 2021, we find that SOSS directly enhances SASAC’s decision-making efficiency and improves its capacity to screen and approve higher-quality M&A deals. More importantly, SOE-led M&A transactions exhibit higher announcement returns as well as improved long-run stock and operating performance following the system’s implementation. The positive impact of SOSS is more pronounced for acquirers with stronger technological infrastructure, in transactions characterized by low transparency and weak governance, and in provinces with more stringent external scrutiny. Overall, by addressing regulator-firm information asymmetry and reinforcing managerial accountability, SOSS improves regulatory effectiveness in overseeing major investment activities among SOEs.

本文立足于金融强国建设与“十五五”规划对金融工作提出的新要求，聚焦票据市场做好“五篇大文章”中的“数字金融”核心驱动力。从信息经济学、交易成本理论与金融功能观等理论视角出发，文章首先系统阐释了数字技术赋能票据市场高质量发展的深层理论逻辑，认为其通过重塑信息生产与传递机制、重构业务流程与组织形态，从根本上降低了信息不对称、提升了运营效率、创新了服务模式并强化了风险管理能力，从而为票据市场服务科技创新、绿色发展、普惠金融、养老金融和数字金融自身提供了坚实的底层技术支撑与创新范式。 随后，文章结合上海票据交易所的创新实践及国际票据市场数字化经验，全面梳理了当前数字技术在票据业务关键领域的应用图景与实践路径。具体包括：基于大数据与人工智能的智能信用评级、反欺诈与精准定价体系；依托区块链技术构建的、可实现信用穿透与拆分的供应链票据平台及应收账款数字化探索；运用物联网与卫星遥感技术实现的绿色票据环境效益可信追踪与核证机制；以及通过开放API与生态平台化建设推动的普惠金融服务高效下沉模式。这些实践共同勾勒出票据市场从“电子化”向“数字化”再向“智能化”演进的清晰路径。 然而，技术的深入应用在释放巨大效能的同时也伴生了新型风险，呈现出“赋能”与“赋险”并存的复杂面相。本文借鉴技术社会学与治理理论，重点剖析了电子化背景下票据业务面临的多维挑战：数据安全与个人/企业隐私保护的严峻性；算法模型的“黑箱”特性可能引发的公平性质疑与新型歧视；对集中化技术系统的高度依赖所演化的新型操作风险与系统性脆弱点；法律与监管框架相对于技术创新的适配性滞后问题，特别是《票据法》在面对数字票据、智能合约时的解释困境；以及可能加剧的“数字鸿沟”对金融包容性目标的潜在冲击。 最后，本文构建了一个涵盖技术伦理、协同治理、监管科技（RegTech）、法律修订与生态培育的多维度、前瞻性风险治理框架。该框架强调技术治理的内生性、监管的敏捷性、法律的包容性与生态的可持续性。在此基础上，本文提出了具体的阶段性政策建议，旨在为票据市场在安全、合规、包容的前提下，深化数字技术融合应用，全面提升服务实体经济质效，最终助力金融强国战略目标的实现提供系统的理论参考与实践指引。

We document that firms' strategic reactions could hamper the effectiveness of RegTech. Our paper focuses on one RegTech innovation in China—online platforms launched by stock exchanges for investors to communicate with listed companies. We find that firms provide a number of no-answer replies—answers without clear, specific, or useful information—to investors' questions. Consistent with strategic information hoarding, no-answers are shown to be associated with subsequent unfavorable news. Moreover, firms with higher no-answer rates tend to have lower price efficiency, higher return volatility, and higher stock price crash risk. The evidence suggests regulators' objective of enhancing investor protection is not fully fulfilled.