A strong reputation is a cornerstone of corporate finance theory, widely believed to relax financial constraints and lower capital costs. We challenge this view by identifying an ‘reputation paradox’: under modern risk-sensitive regulation, for firms with long-term liabilities, a better reputation may paradoxically increase capital strain. We argue that the improvement of firm’s reputation alters customer behavior , , which extends liability duration and amplifies measured risk. By using the life insurance industry as an ideal laboratory, we develop an innovative framework that integrates LLMs with actuarial cash flow models, which confirms that the improved reputation increases regulatory capital demands. A comparative analysis across major regulatory regimes—C-ROSS, Solvency II, and RBC—and two insurance products, we further demonstrate that improvements in reputation affect capital requirements unevenly across product types and regulatory frameworks. Our findings challenge the conventional view that reputation uniformly alleviates capital pressure, emphasizing the necessity for insurers to strategically align reputation management with solvency planning.

How do Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities that limit the impacts of banks’ unrealized capital loss on the regulatory capital measures affect banks’ exposure to deposit run risks when policy rates increase? And how should regulators design policies on classifying securities as HTM jointly with bank capital regulation? To answer these questions, we develop a model of bank runs in which banks classify long-term assets as HTM or Asset-for-Sale (AFS). Banks trade off the current cost of issuing equity to meet the capital requirement when the interest rate increases against increasing future run risks when the interest rate increases further in the future. When banks underestimate interest rate risks or have limited liability to depositors in the event of default, capping held-to-maturity long-term assets and mandating more equity capital issuance may reduce the run risks of moderately capitalized banks. Using bank-quarter-level data from Call Reports, we provide empirical support for the model’s testable implications.

The economic institutionalist literature often suggests that sub-optimal institutional arrangements impart unique distortions in China, and excessive corporate debt is a symptom of this condition. However, lax monetary policies after the global financial crisis, and specifically, quantitative easing have led to concerns about debt bubbles under a wide range of institutional regimes. This study draws on data from Chinese listed firms, supplemented by numerous macroeconomic control variables, to isolate the effect of international capital flows from other drivers of firm leverage. We conclude that the rise in, and distribution of, Chinese corporate debt can partly be as-cribed to the effects of monetary policy outside of China and that Chinese institutional features amplify these effects. Whilst Chinese firms are affected by developments in the global financial ecosystem, domestic institutional realities and distortions may unevenly add their own particular effects, providing further support for and extending the variegated capitalism literature.

This study examines how localized carbon reduction policies affect corporate environmental productivity. Leveraging a quasi-experiment from China’s low-carbon pilot policy rollout across cities, we implement a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the causal impact of these interventions. Pilot policies significantly increased regulated polluting corporate environmental productivity by around 3 percentage points. The productivity gains persisted over time and were greater for financially constrained firms, firms facing less market competition and with lower capital intensity. Additional analysis reveals the pilots enhanced executive environmental awareness. Overall, our results demonstrate appropriately designed local regulations can improve environmental productivity.

Do firms adjust their hiring decisions after receiving environmental punishments? Using data on over 4.3 million job postings for Chinese listed firms from 2015 to 2021, we find that firms subjected to environmental punishments will subsequently increase their corporate green hiring (i.e., employees with green skills). Pressure from local environmental concerns and regulatory efforts incentivizes firms to increase their demand for employees with green skills. Environmental punishments have a more pronounced effect on corporate green hiring for non-state-owned enterprises and firms with lower financial constraints. Moreover, green hiring can have a remediation effect on firms' environmental performance and stimulate their green innovation activities and spillover effects on other firms within the industry. Overall, our findings shed light on corporate hiring decisions under environmental regulations.

We employ a time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) joint connectedness approach to study the dynamic risk spillover effects between cryptocurrencies and China’s financial market, further exploring the impact of cryptocurrencies on China’s financial market. Our results show that there is asymmetric risk transmission between cryptocurrencies and China’s financial market, and the risk spillover effect is very weak. Specifically, the spillover of cryptocurrencies to China’s financial market is significantly stronger than the spillover of China’s financial market to cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies have a stronger spillover effect to China’s exchange rate and gold. The net spillover effect of cryptocurrencies is weakening over time. Overall, the return spillover impact of cryptocurrencies on China’s financial market is greater than the volatility spillover impact, and the degree of impact of different cryptocurrencies is heterogeneous. This study provides some reference and guidance for cross-market investment portfolios and the regulation of China’s financial market.

This study investigates the role of financial development in shaping the relationship between FDI and firm innovation, based on Chinese firm-level dataset during 2008-2014. Our findings reveal that bank deregulation significantly enhances the positive effect of FDI on firm innovation. We also find that firms with greater financial constraints and those located in cities with lower levels of bank competition exhibit a more pronounced response. These results underscore the importance of considering financial market conditions and highlight the role of financial constraints and bank competition as crucial channels through which bank deregulation influences the effect of FDI on firm innovation.

Why do firms appoint expired independent directors? How do expired independent directors affect corporate governance and thus impact investment decisions? By taking advantage of the sharp increase in expired independent directors’ re-employment in China caused by exogenous regulatory shocks, Rule No. 18 and Regulation 11, this paper adopts a PSM-DID design to test the impact of expired independent directors on CSR performance. We find that firms experience a significant decrease in CSR performance after re-hiring expired independent directors and the effect is stronger for CSR components mostly related to internal governance. The results of robustness tests show that the main results are robust to alternative measures of CSR performance, an extended sample period, alternative control groups, year-by-year PSM method, and a staggered DID model regarding Rule No. 18 as a staggered quasi-natural experiment. We address the endogeneity concern that chance drives our DID results by using exogenous regulatory shock, an instrumental variable (the index of regional guanxi culture), and placebo tests. We also find that the negative relation between the re-employment of expired independent directors and CSR performance is more significant for independent directors who have more relations with CEOs and raise less objection to managers’ decisions, and for firms that rely more on expired independent directors’ monitoring roles (e.g., a lower proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, high growth opportunities, and above-median FCF). The mediating-effect test shows that the re-employment of expired independent directors increases CEOs’ myopia and thus reduces CSR performance. In addition, we exclude the alternative explanation that the negative relation is caused by the protective effect brought by expired independent directors’ political backgrounds. Our study shows that managers may build reciprocal relationships with expired independent directors in the Chinese guanxi culture and gain personal interest.

This paper investigates the impact of curation algorithms through the lens of stock market dynamics. By innovatively incorporating the dynamic interactions between social media platforms, investors, and stock markets, we construct the Social-Media-augmented Artificial Stock marKet (SMASK) model under the agent-based computational framework. Our findings reveal that curation algorithms, by promoting polarized and emotionally charged content, exacerbate behavioral biases among retail investors, leading to worsened stock market quality and investor wealth levels. Moreover, through our experiment on the debated topic of algorithmic regulation, we find limiting the intensity of these algorithms may reduce unnecessary trading behaviors, mitigates investor biases, and enhances overall market quality. This study provides new insights into the dual role of curation algorithms in both business ethics and public interest, offering a quantitative approach to understanding their broader social and economic impact.

Reputation is widely regarded as a stabilizing factor in financial institutions, reducing capital constraints and enhancing firm resilience. However, in the insurance industry, where capital requirements are shaped by solvency regulations and policyholder behavior, the effects of reputation on capital management remain unclear. This paper examines the unintended consequences of reputation in insurance asset-liability management, focusing on its impact on capital allocation. Using a novel reputation risk measure based on large language models (LLMs) and actuarial models, we show that reputation shifts influence surrender rates, altering capital requirements. While higher reputation reduces surrender risk, it increases capital demand for investment-oriented insurance products, whereas protection products remain largely unaffected. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that reputation always eases capital constraints, highlighting the need for insurers to integrate reputation management with capital planning to avoid unintended capital strain.