China's tech companies are making waves with their recent achievements, including a "trifold" phone from Huawei and the revolutionary AI reasoning model from DeepSeek. Much discussion has centered on the founders of these companies and their ability to gain an edge on American rivals. But what is less appreciated or understood among foreign analysts of China’s tech giants is the role that innovation and transformation in corporate governance and organizational structure has played in these companies’ successes. Moreover, there are unique aspects of these companies from a corporate governance perspective that are not commonly seen in tech companies in other parts of the world or even within China itself. For instance, Huawei is 99% employee owned, while Alibaba is primarily governed by an "Alibaba Partnership." These unique corporate structures have arisen due to several factors, including the rapid changes to China’s regulatory landscape over the past three decades, distinct characteristics of Chinese business culture, geopolitical tensions and preoccupations with national security, and the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” model. In this article I overview some of the more distinctive corporate governance mechanisms of four Chinese tech companies: Huawei, Alibaba, Bytedance, and DeepSeek, and explain why these structures were adopted.

Shill bidding, the use of non-genuine bids to inflate prices, undermines auction market integrity. Exploiting China’s online judicial housing auctions as a laboratory, we identify 2% of participants as suspected shill bidders, affecting 8% of auctions. They raise price premium by 14.3%, causing an annual deadweight loss of ¥570 million for homebuyers. Mechanism analysis reveals they create bidding momentum and intensify competition. We establish causality using a difference-in-differences analysis leveraging a 2017 regulatory intervention and an instrumental variable approach using dishonest judgment debtors. These findings offer actionable insights for policymakers and auction platforms to combat fraud in online high-stake auctions.

We find evidence that firms engage in earnings management to potentially diminish environmental regulatory attention after the implementation of an automatic air pollutant monitoring system in China. Polluting firms increase their use of discretionary accruals and reduce the informativeness of earnings, compared to non-polluting firms. Polluting firms that are larger, more profitable, located near monitoring stations, and situated in less market-oriented regions exhibit heightened earnings management, consistent with the greater environmental regulatory exposure these firms face. The behavior is moderated by stronger customer-supplier relationships and lower market competition, when the cost of earnings management is higher. Our findings highlight the conflict between environmental and governance issues.

A strong reputation is a cornerstone of corporate finance theory, widely believed to relax financial constraints and lower capital costs. We challenge this view by identifying an ‘reputation paradox’: under modern risk-sensitive regulation, for firms with long-term liabilities, a better reputation may paradoxically increase capital strain. We argue that the improvement of firm’s reputation alters customer behavior , , which extends liability duration and amplifies measured risk. By using the life insurance industry as an ideal laboratory, we develop an innovative framework that integrates LLMs with actuarial cash flow models, which confirms that the improved reputation increases regulatory capital demands. A comparative analysis across major regulatory regimes—C-ROSS, Solvency II, and RBC—and two insurance products, we further demonstrate that improvements in reputation affect capital requirements unevenly across product types and regulatory frameworks. Our findings challenge the conventional view that reputation uniformly alleviates capital pressure, emphasizing the necessity for insurers to strategically align reputation management with solvency planning.

How do Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities that limit the impacts of banks’ unrealized capital loss on the regulatory capital measures affect banks’ exposure to deposit run risks when policy rates increase? And how should regulators design policies on classifying securities as HTM jointly with bank capital regulation? To answer these questions, we develop a model of bank runs in which banks classify long-term assets as HTM or Asset-for-Sale (AFS). Banks trade off the current cost of issuing equity to meet the capital requirement when the interest rate increases against increasing future run risks when the interest rate increases further in the future. When banks underestimate interest rate risks or have limited liability to depositors in the event of default, capping held-to-maturity long-term assets and mandating more equity capital issuance may reduce the run risks of moderately capitalized banks. Using bank-quarter-level data from Call Reports, we provide empirical support for the model’s testable implications.

We (re)evaluate the general-equilibrium effects of (environmental) policies from the perspectives of input-output networks and firm dynamics and heterogeneity. Using China’s carbon emission trading system (ETS) as an example, we find that ETS leads to more patent applications, especially the ones associated with low-carbon technologies in the targeted sectors. The effects are muted at the firm level due to selection effects, whereby only larger firms are significantly and positively affected. Meanwhile, larger firms occupy a small share in number but a large share of aggregate outcomes, contributing to the discrepancy between the effects of ETS at the individual firm and aggregate sector levels. The effects also diffuse in input-output networks, leading to more patents in upstream/downstream sectors. We build and estimate the first firm dynamics model with input-output linkages and regulatory policies in the literature and conduct policy experiments. ETS’s effects are amplified given input-output networks.

Do firms adjust their hiring decisions after receiving environmental punishments? Using data on over 4.3 million job postings for Chinese listed firms from 2015 to 2021, we find that firms subjected to environmental punishments will subsequently increase their corporate green hiring (i.e., employees with green skills). Pressure from local environmental concerns and regulatory efforts incentivizes firms to increase their demand for employees with green skills. Environmental punishments have a more pronounced effect on corporate green hiring for non-state-owned enterprises and firms with lower financial constraints. Moreover, green hiring can have a remediation effect on firms' environmental performance and stimulate their green innovation activities and spillover effects on other firms within the industry. Overall, our findings shed light on corporate hiring decisions under environmental regulations.

Cultural capital plays a crucial role in influencing entrepreneurial entry, yet the regulatory and supportive role of digital finance in this context remains unclear. Based on Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS) and data from the Chinese Intangible Cultural Heritage List, this paper examines the significant regulatory role of digital finance in driving entrepreneurial entry through cultural capital. The research findings indicate that cultural capital, represented by the Intangible Cultural Heritage List, significantly enhances the probability of entrepreneurial entry. The support of digital finance effectively amplifies this promoting effect, as validated by multiple robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the regulatory impact of digital finance support is more pronounced among urban populations, low-income groups, and individuals with high internet usage frequency.

Why do firms appoint expired independent directors? How do expired independent directors affect corporate governance and thus impact investment decisions? By taking advantage of the sharp increase in expired independent directors’ re-employment in China caused by exogenous regulatory shocks, Rule No. 18 and Regulation 11, this paper adopts a PSM-DID design to test the impact of expired independent directors on CSR performance. We find that firms experience a significant decrease in CSR performance after re-hiring expired independent directors and the effect is stronger for CSR components mostly related to internal governance. The results of robustness tests show that the main results are robust to alternative measures of CSR performance, an extended sample period, alternative control groups, year-by-year PSM method, and a staggered DID model regarding Rule No. 18 as a staggered quasi-natural experiment. We address the endogeneity concern that chance drives our DID results by using exogenous regulatory shock, an instrumental variable (the index of regional guanxi culture), and placebo tests. We also find that the negative relation between the re-employment of expired independent directors and CSR performance is more significant for independent directors who have more relations with CEOs and raise less objection to managers’ decisions, and for firms that rely more on expired independent directors’ monitoring roles (e.g., a lower proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, high growth opportunities, and above-median FCF). The mediating-effect test shows that the re-employment of expired independent directors increases CEOs’ myopia and thus reduces CSR performance. In addition, we exclude the alternative explanation that the negative relation is caused by the protective effect brought by expired independent directors’ political backgrounds. Our study shows that managers may build reciprocal relationships with expired independent directors in the Chinese guanxi culture and gain personal interest.

This paper investigates whether increased female representation on corporate boards affects firms’ bond financing costs. Exploiting the 2017 Big Three’s campaigns as a plausibly exogenous shock, we document that firms experiencing larger increases in female board representation, induced by the campaigns, experience significant reductions in bond yield spreads and improvements in credit ratings. We identify reduced leverage and enhanced workplace environment as key mechanisms, and show that the effects are stronger among firms with greater tail risk and information asymmetry. An alternative identification strategy based on California’s SB 826 regulatory mandate yields consistent results. Our findings suggest that board gender diversity enhances governance in ways valued by credit markets.