The Full Guaranteed Purchase System began to replace the subsidy system as the core policy for promoting renewable energy integration, designating grid companies as the sole entity responsible for the physical integration of renewable energy. Meanwhile, the Tradable Green Certificates system provides environmental benefits for renewable power generators through market mechanisms. Therefore, exploring the strategic choices of various entities under the dual policy interventions, and uncovering the mechanisms for realizing electricity energy value and green value under different integration models, is of great significance for advancing China’s renewable energy integration. Based on China’s actual conditions, this study integrates the features of both policies and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving government, power generators, and grid enterprises to simulate their interactions and identify key factors influencing strategic choices. The results show that active government regulation effectively encourages positive strategies from both generators and grid companies, and that active power integration by grid companies further promotes green power generation. A “stepwise complementary” relationship exists among reputation gains, reputation losses, and regulatory costs: higher reputation gains can offset decision-making resistance arising from increased regulatory costs. Green power generation costs and innovation costs have significant negative effects on strategic choices, while the guaranteed purchase price has a significant positive effect on generators’ active strategies. The penalty parameter plays a key positive role in grid companies’ active strategies, and the guaranteed purchase price significantly influences their active integration behavior. This paper provides recommendations for motivating all entities actively participate in the consumption process.

To address the challenges posed by renewable energy integration in power systems, China is advancing the development of Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS). However, the rapid growth of PHS installations, coupled with strict regulations and a high reliance on capacity compensation, has led to increasing financial burdens on other utilities. One solution is to reallocate the capacity compensation through market-based approaches to implement the “beneficiary-pays” principle. To achieve this goal, an operational policy named ’partial-regulated dispatch’ is proposed in this study. The analysis of this policy encompasses two crucial dimensions: the dispatch mechanism and business models. The dispatch mechanism evaluates PHS’s capacity contribution to grid stability, while the business models focus on enhancing PHS profitability to reduce dependency on capacity compensation while ensuring long-term economic sustainability. Furthermore, the flexibility of PHS is introduced as a criterion for assessing system security contributions, considering both individual unit vibration characteristics and multi-unit commitment strategies. The case study shows that through partial-regulated dispatch, PHS can reduce its reliance on capacity compensation by nearly 50% while ensuring its regulation service via flexibility compensation. This policy effectively balances economic viability with system support capabilities. Moreover, flexibility compensation provides PHS operators with a risk mitigation strategy in the complex power market environment. Under an appropriate operational strategy and policy incentives, the flexibility can be enhanced by nearly 30% in a fully marketized scenario, contributing to both system stability and operational efficiency.