China faces significant environmental challenges, including reducing pollutants, improving environmental quality, and peaking carbon emissions. Industrial restructuring is key to achieving both emission reductions and economic transformation. This study uses the Environmentally Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output model and multi-objective optimization to analyze pathways for China’s industrial transformation to synergistically reduce emissions. Our findings indicate that under a compromise scenario, China’s carbon emissions could stabilize at around 10.9 billion tonnes by 2030, with energy consumption controlled at approximately 5 billion tonnes. The Papermaking sector in Guangdong and the Chemicals sector in Shandong are expected to flourish, while the Coal Mining sector in Shanxi and the Communication Equipment sector in Jiangsu will see reductions. The synergy strength between carbon emission reduction and energy conservation is highest at 11%, followed by a 7% synergy between carbon emission and nitrogen oxide reduction. However, significant trade-offs are observed between carbon emission reduction and chemical oxygen demand, and ammonia nitrogen reduction targets at -9%. This comprehensive analysis at regional and sectoral levels provides valuable insights for advancing China’s carbon reduction and pollution control goals.

This paper examines the impact of green mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on firms’ transition to green exports. We develop a “Technology-Qualification” theoretical framework and conduct the empirical analysis using a matched dataset of Chinese listed manufacturing firms and customs records. The findings show that green M&As significantly promote firms’ green exports, and this effect remains consistent across a series of robustness test. Mechanism analysis reveals that green M&As promote green exports through two key channels: green innovation spillovers and green qualification spillovers. Further heterogeneity analysis indicates that the positive impact of green M&As on green exports is more pronounced among firms with stronger operational performance, weaker green foundations, and those involved in processing trade. In addition, green M&As not only stimulate green exports but also prevent the entry of polluting products and reduce the exit of green product, thereby driving a green-oriented dynamic restructuring of firms’ export structure. This paper offers micro-level insights into how firms can navigate the dual challenges of enhancing green production capabilities and overcoming barriers to green trade during their transition to green exports.

Little is known about the underlying sources of gains from takeovers. Using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I show that one source of gains is increased productivity of capital and labor in target plants. In particular, acquirers significantly reduce investments, wages, and employment in target plants, though output is unchanged relative to comparable plants. Acquirers also aggressively shut down target plants, especially those that are inefficient. Moreover, these changes help explain the merging firms' announcement returns. The total announcement returns to the combined firm are driven by improvements in target firm's productivity, rather than cutbacks in wages and employment. Also, targets with greater post-takeover productivity improvements receive higher offer premiums from acquirers. These results provide some of the first empirical evidence on the direct relation between productivity, labor, and stock returns in the context of takeovers.

Little is known about the underlying sources of gains from takeovers. Using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I show that one source of gains is increased productivity of capital and labor in target plants. In particular, acquirers significantly reduce investments, wages, and employment in target plants, though output is unchanged relative to comparable plants. Acquirers also aggressively shut down target plants, especially those that are inefficient. Moreover, these changes help explain the merging firms' announcement returns. The total announcement returns to the combined firm are driven by improvements in target firm's productivity, rather than cutbacks in wages and employment. Also, targets with greater post-takeover productivity improvements receive higher offer premiums from acquirers. These results provide some of the first empirical evidence on the direct relation between productivity, labor, and stock returns in the context of takeovers.

We investigate the choice problem in the massive Chinese restructuring campaign that has been described as “grasping the large and letting go of the small,” in which a third of the million or so Chinese state-owned enterprises were either corporatized or privatized. Corporatization differs from privatization in the Chinese context, as in the former case the state remains a large shareholder, whereas in the latter case it has little or no ownership. Using a panel of provincial level statistics, we show that greater local employment pressure, less local fiscal pressure, and a more corrupt local business environment all lead to a lesser likelihood that privatization will be chosen over corporatization. Privatization is found to yield consistent efficiency gains over corporatization in terms of employment and firm profitability. Our evidence is supportive of the theoretical framework of Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), who model privatization as an endogenous decision in which politicians trade off employment pressure against public fiscal interest.

Great credit risk is a big headache which blocks the development of the banking sector of China. Based on the panel data of the Chinese banking sector from 2002 to 2006, this paper empirically examines the effects of foreign strategic investors’ participation on the risk behavior of Chinese banks. The results show that foreign strategic investors (FSI) had a positive, but limited impact on the credit risk of Chinese banks. Further analysis reveals that the risk management abilities of Chinese banks have improved apparently when the proportion of shareholding of the leading foreign strategic investors exceeds 15 percent, which results in a significant drop of the credit risk. However, due to the ‘minority ownership’ restriction on foreign investors' stock shares, the positive effect of the participation of foreign strategic investors is limited. The visible decline in both non-performing loans (NPLs) and the NPL ratio of Chinese banks mainly reflects the rapid growth of China's economy and benefits a lot from the massive financial restructuring of state-owned banks.

This study proposes an incentive alignment hypothesis of corporate spin-off activities, in which executive compensation contracts tie the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders and the reduction of agency problems enhances firm value through corporate spin-offs. Consistent with this hypothesis, CEOs with a high level of equitybased compensation are more likely to initiate a spin-off. The announcements of such corporate restructurings are reacted positively by the market. Firms engaging in spin-offs provide greater operating growth in the years following the restructurings compared with their size- and industry-matched control firms. Also consistent with this hypothesis, high incentive CEOs yield more personal gains by selling shares and exercising options following spin-offs.

During the reform era, the Chinese government has been carrying out strategic industrial policies modelled on those in post-war Japan and South Korea, in the hope of transforming its highly fragmented manufacturing sector into one that comprises a small number of internationally competitive big businesses. Using the evolution of the Chinese steel industry structure from the late 1980s to the early 2000s as a case in point, this paper finds that the Chinese government's consolidation attempts have, by and large, not been very successful. The disappointing policy outcome is interpreted by a detailed examination of the industry policy mechanism in China. It is concluded that the institutional framework of the Chinese state differs from its counterparts in Korea and Japan in some fundamental aspects. Among these, the fragmented and uncoordinated Chinese bureaucracy contributes significantly to the inefficacy of policy implementation.

This paper uses a unique micro-level data-set on Chinese firms to test for the existence of a "political-pecking order" in the allocation of credit. Our findings are threefold. Firstly, private Chinese firms are credit constrained while State-owned firms and foreign-owned firms in China are not; Secondly, the geographical and sectoral presence of foreign capital alleviates credit constraints faced by private Chinese firms. Thirdly, geographical and sectoral presence of state firms aggravates financial constraints for private Chinese firms (“crowding out”). Therefore it seems that ongoing restructuring of the state-owned sector and further liberalization of foreign capital inflows in China can help to circumvent financial constraints and can boost the investment of private firms.

China’s non-performing loans were as high as 35 percent of state banks’ total loans, or about RMB 3,549 billion (about 40 percent of its GDP) in 2000. The adequacy ratios of the four state banks were only between 1.4 percent to 4.6 percent in September 2000. Moreover, non-bank financial institutions as a group as early as 1996 had non-performing assets equal to 50 percent of their total assets. By Western accounting standards, China’s most financial institutions are insolvent. Be conventional standards for measuring financial sector robustness, China is past the point at which a systemic banking crisis might be expected. China faces enormous risks delaying the state bank reforms due to increasing capital account leaks, increasing large proportion of household deposits in banks’ total liabilities, and gradual structural shift of Chinese saving behavior. China needs to resolutely address the financial reforms soon to avoid a financial crisis, which will lead to a broad anti-regime coalition against the Chinese government. Nevertheless, China faces enormous difficulties. First, the 2000 Chinese official estimate puts the financial cost of restructuring the state banks at RMB 2,260 billion ($273 billion), or close to 30 percent of GDP. Second, the current AMC scheme is fraught with difficulties. Finally, the required financial sector reforms are closely interlinked with many other reforms such that a sequential or partial approach will not be effective.