This paper studies how regulatory changes affect investors’ reactions at shareholder meetings in China. The objective of this paper is twofold: first, to analyse the information content transmitted to the shareholders of the largest Chinese companies listed on the China Securities Index 300 when an Annual General Meeting is held. A distinction is made between ordinary and extraordinary general meetings. Second, to find out if regulatory changes related to the Company Law of China and online voting in Annual General Meetings affect the information content of those meetings. The abnormal return obtained is examined through an event study using the Fama-French five-factor model. The results of our study indicate that the release of information and involvement of minority shareholders in general meetings during the research period led to higher return volatility and traded volume.

This study investigates the impact of independent directors' participation in the shareholders meeting on corporate governance, and finds that the more frequently the independent directors attend shareholder meetings, the lower the degree of earnings management by the enterprise; the mechanism test shows that more information increases the probability, frequency, and severity of independent directors’ subsequent dissenting opinions; This study identified a new channel for independent directors to independently obtain true information and this is of great significance for regulators, shareholders, company board, and other stakeholders with an interest in how the information influence independent directors governance effects.

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.