Research has argued that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should bear more social responsibility than other listed firms, because their own goals include maintaining social stability and promoting social welfare. In contrast with the privatization of SOEs observed in other countries, in China, some listed firms’ major shareholders have become SOEs in recent years. This transition offers a good opportunity to investigate the impact of ownership change on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using the propensity score matching difference-in-differences method, we document that the CSR performance of these firms does not improve when their ownership structure changes, and it can even worsen. Our results remain robust to a series of tests. Further investigating the underlying economic mechanism, we uncover those political connections, bank financing, and government subsidies play critical roles in determining the negative effect of ownership structure change on public firms, which is consistent with the soft budget constraint framework. In an additional analysis, we find that CSR performance is poor for manufacturing industry firms after ownership structure change. After calculating the frequency of keywords appearing in the annual reports of such firms, we find them to be satisfied with their new SOE background after ownership structure change. Our paper provides a possible explanation for the phenomenon of SOEs becoming major shareholder of listed firms.

Using proprietary individual level loan data, this paper explores the economic consequences of the 2009 bank entry deregulation in China. Such deregulation leads to higher screening standards, lower interest rates, and lower delinquency rates for corporate loans from entrant banks. Consequently, in deregulated cities, private firms with bank credit access increase asset investments, employment, net income, and ROA. In contrast, the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) does not improve following deregulation. Deregulation also amplifies bank credit from productive private firms to inefficient SOEs due mainly to SOEs’ soft budget constraints. This adverse effect accounts for 0.31% annual GDP losses.

Using the data of privately-owned firms in China’s transition economy, we examine the effects of soft budget constraint on the expropriation of minority shareholders. We find that, compared to small firms, large firms have higher bank loans and are more likely to get government subsidies. However, large firms show higher divergence between cash flow and control rights, more fund occupation by controlling shareholders, and lower market valuation. Moreover these differences between large and small firms become particularly pronounced when the firms operate in the provinces with poorer fiscal conditions. These findings suggest that soft budget constraint can mitigate the expropriation costs of controlling shareholders, and subsequently deteriorates the expropriation of minority shareholders.

The Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) have become quite profitable recently. As the largest shareholder, the state has not asked SOEs to pay dividends in the past. Therefore, some have suggested that the state should ask SOEs to pay dividends. Indeed, the Chinese government has adopted this policy advice and started to demand dividend payment starting from 2008. While we do not question the soundness of the dividend policy, the point we raise is whether those profits are real if all costs owned by SOEs are properly accounted for. Among other things, we are interested in investigating whether the profits of SOEs would still be as large as they claim if they were to pay a market interest rate. Using a representative sample of corporate China, we find that the costs of financing for SOEs are significantly lower than for other companies after controlling for some fundamental factors for profitability and individual firm characteristics. In addition, our estimates show that if SOEs were to pay a market interest rate, their existing profits would be entirely wiped out. Our findings suggest that SOEs are still benefiting from credit subsidies and they are not yet subject to the market interest rates. In an environment where credit rights are not fully respected, dividend policy, though important, should come second and not first. Keywords:

In this paper, we examine the cost of equity capital for politically connected firms. After controlling for several firm- and country-level determinants, our results show that politically connected firms have a lower cost of equity capital than their nonconnected peers. Our results are robust to alternative measures and proxies for the cost of equity capital. We thus provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, suggesting that these firms are generally considered to be less risky than non-connected firms. Our findings imply that the benefits of political connections outweigh their costs. We conjecture that this perception is fueled by the soft budget constraints generally enjoyed by politically connected firms, and by their lower default probability, given the assurance of corporate bailout in the event of financial downturns.

Soft budget constraint refers to the situation where an economic entity expects to obtain economic assistance when in financial difficulties. During the past decade, a sizable literature has accumulated explaining the causes and consequences of the soft budget constraint. Many of the theories have traced soft budget constraint on enterprises to that on banks. However, why do banks often face soft budget constraint? How to mitigate the resulting problems? In this paper, we first show that owing to their special financial structure, banks as market institutions intrinsically face hard budget constraint and nevertheless remain stable and effective. Since banks’ finance mostly comes from deposits, it is very difficult for banks to be refinanced when their investment projects are unsuccessful due to the sequential service arrangement for bank deposits. This limitation hardens the budget constraint on banks and disciplines bankers’ investment decisions. However, the advent of instantaneous-social-welfareminded modern governments, which have both the resources and the incentives to bail out failing banks, gives rise to the soft budget constraint of banks. This causes bankers’ moral hazard problems. As an institutional solution to the resulting banking instabilities, banking regulation emerged in order to restrict banks’ investment decisions. We provide historical evidence on the genesis and symptoms of, and institutional solution to the soft budget constraint of banks over the past six hundred years to support our theory. We also conduct contemporary econometric analysis to show how the lack of government commitment to a hard budget constraint gives rise to a strict banking regulation. We further explore the predictions of our theory in the paper.