The Chinese government has actively traded in the stock market through governmentsponsored institutions, the National Team, since the 2015 market crash. I adopt Koijen and Yogo’s (2019) demand system approach in China’s stock market to understand the impact of government participation. Estimation results indicate the government tilts towards large, less risky, and SOE stocks. During the crash, government participation indeed stabilized the market: the large-scale purchases reduced the cross-sectional market volatility of annual return by 1.8% and raised the market price by 11%. When the market ffuctuation returns to normal, the government acts more like an active investor; its price impact remains high but does not contribute to the cross-sectional volatility. Based on the theoretical framework of Brunnermeier et al. (2020), I investigate the interaction between the Nation Team and retail investors to reveal the government trading strategy. No evidence shows that government participation signiffcantly distorts market information efficiency.

Purpose – To examine whether and how the different levels of regional economic incentives would have an effect on underwriters’ market share in general. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on Chinese IPO firms during the period 2006-2016, this study examines the impact of different levels of regional economic incentives on underwriters’ market share. Findings – The authors find thatregional economic incentives have a positive impact on underwriters’ market share and that local economic incentives have a significantly strongerimpact than central economic incentives. Furthermore, the authors find that IPO firms with underwriters driven by regional economic incentives experience worse post-IPO performance than firms with underwriters driven by central economic incentives, which do not experience a significant decline in post-IPO performance. Originality/value – Taken together, the authors’ findings are consistent with the notion that performance assessment motivates officials at various levels of government to bring companies in their jurisdiction to the IPO market prematurely. In addition, the results indicate that central economic incentives play a significantrole in driving China’s macroeconomic development and market-oriented system reforms. As such, they are one of the major driving forces behind China’s market-oriented system reforms.

We study the role of Chinese government guidance funds (GGFs) in value creation for investee firms. Using a sample of 2,855 firms that went public during the period of 2010-2021, we show that GGF-backed IPO firms had higher initial returns than non-VC-backed IPO firms and nonGGF VC-backed IPO firms. After decomposing the initial return into IPO underpricing and market overvaluation, we find that GGF-backed firms enjoyed higher overvaluation and lower underpricing than other firms. Consistent with investor sentiment and information asymmetry hypothesis, our results indicate that public investors value the benefits of political resources more than the costs of government interference associated with GGF sponsoring. However, GGF-backed firms did not outperform other-VC-backed firms when post-IPO long-term stock, operating and innovation performance is assessed. The divergence in the effects of GGFs observed in the financial and product markets reveals the complexity in evaluating the role of GGFs in value creation.

Through four rounds of total coverage survey on VC funds in Mainland China , we received 41 VC fund samples. This paper, we empirically test the relation among the size (number) of VC fund portfolios, entrepreneurs’ (enterprise management teams’) profit shares and exogenous factors and find: (1) the portfolio size of a VC fund significantly varies non-monotonically with entrepreneurs’ profit shares, the number of venture firms is first increasing when entrepreneurs’ profit share is low and then decreasing when it is high; (2) entrepreneurs’ profit share is significantly positive related with the number of venture firms in a VC fund; (3) the government-sponsored VCs invest more venture firms but retain less profit shares .