When examining corporate governance in China, it is crucial to recognize the unique socio-economic structures and legal systems at play. The mechanisms of corporate governance theorized in the West might not necessarily have the same impact in China. In particular, given China’s distinct feature of the domestic economy and its socio-political structure, the results of introducing a hostile takeover system might not align with common anticipations that scholars and policymakers in China and elsewhere broadly share. In greater detail, this paper highlights the significant market imperfections in the Chinese economy, stemming from information asymmetry, imperfect product markets, and capital-market inefficiency. These market imperfections suggest that an active hostile takeover regime might not function effectively in China, as its disciplinary mechanism operates successfully in other advanced countries. Additionally, this paper underscores that due to China’s distinctive features—including its state-owned corporate landscape, the dominance of controlling shareholders in private corporations’ ownership structures, and its unique brand of socialism—the introduction of an active takeover regime could produce unintended consequences in the Chinese economy. Overall, challenging the prevailing perspective, I posit that within the Chinese hostile takeover framework, corporate governance is not as influential as one might assume.

The discussion on the innovative effects of intellectual property pledge financing is a mainstream trend. In this context, this study has improved the existing research from several aspects, such as broadening the dimensions of innovation, adding dynamic analysis, refining multidimensional mediation mechanisms, and employing unique samples. Ultimately, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Intellectual property pledge financing suppresses enterprise innovation, especially innovation quality, but this pattern will be broken by raising the threshold of innovation conditions. The reason is that strict innovation conditions can lead to a poor innovation foundation for enterprises, which are rarely affected by the fluctuation of funds obtained from intellectual property pledge financing. (2) Intellectual property pledge financing has a non-linear effect on firm innovation, characterized by an increase followed by a decrease, suggesting that intellectual property pledge financing in current China can only provide a temporary stimulus for firm innovation. (3) The relationship between intellectual property pledge financing and enterprise innovation is strongly moderated by the ownership, type, and size of the enterprise, with the inhibitory effect of intellectual property pledge financing on enterprise innovation occurring mainly in state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and small enterprises, while its positive effects are more pronounced in private enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises. (4) Financing constraints, internal incentives, external supervision, and signaling mechanisms are indeed key pathways through which intellectual property pledge financing affects firm innovation, especially when we analyse these mechanisms using dynamic models.

We investigate the effect of third-party certification for green bonds by analyzing its impact on issuer's future green innovation performances. We find that third-party certification for green bonds can significantly promote issuer's future green innovation performances. Furthermore, the promotion effect is more prominent in non-state-owned issuers, large issuers and heavy polluting issuers, and can be more significantly exerted by professional and reputable third-party certification agencies. Besides, third-party certification for green bonds can play the effect by reducing the issuer's tax expenditure, increasing the issuer's loan financing, and receiving a positive response in stock returns. But unexpectedly, it cannot play the effect by further reducing the credit spread of green bonds. Our findings indicate that independent external supervision can play a positive role in green bond issuance, but there is still a long way to go.

We examine the impact of state-owned shareholders on fraud within private firms. Utilizing a sample of A-share private listed firms in China observed from 2008 to 2021. We discover a significant negative association between state-owned shareholders and the likelihood of fraud in private firms. State-owned shareholders primarily act as inhibitors of fraud, and their effect on the probability of fraud being detected is not statistically significant. This finding remains robust even after conducting a series of sensitivity tests to mitigate potential selectivity bias and reverse causality endogeneity issues. In the analysis of heterogeneity, we found that state-owned shareholders play a more active role under conditions of imperfect external institutional development, and they also exert a more significant inhibitory effect on enterprises with lower governance levels and higher business risks. Our mechanism test demonstrates that the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on corporate fraud is achieved by improving corporate governance and alleviating financial distress. This study also examines the impact of state-owned shareholders' local characteristics, external supervision mechanisms, and internal governance mechanisms in unique Chinese enterprises on fraudulent behaviour by private enterprises. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that state-owned shareholder ownership is associated with reducing fraudulent behaviour within private firms.

Amid growing global interest in state interventions, this paper examines the impact of Chinese government infrastructure investments on improving firm productivity. It centers on a policy aimed at directing regional governments to foster a more conducive market environment for private enterprises. Our analysis reveals that the positive effect of infrastructure investment on firm productivity is increased by 42.5% for private firms in industries that benefitted from improved market entry opportunities and an even more striking 97.9% in provinces where arbitrary fines were curtailed. These findings underscore the complementary roles of state interventions and the development of market mechanisms in boosting firm productivity.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

The role of Market-incentive environmental regulation (MIER) within the framework of environmental governance is patently evident. While extant literature lauds the advantageous outcomes attributed to the environmental protection tax (EPT) which as a representative of MIER, our empirical inquiry presents a contrasting narrative. By employing the sophisticated Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) methodology and utilizing data from A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015-2022, our investigation reveals a significant decrease in firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) following the implementation of EPT. Our core assertion is fortified through the discernment of two plausible mechanisms, namely, the production downsizing effect and the production capital crowding-out effect. Building upon this revelation, we delve into the nuanced pathways through which firms can strategically mitigate the impacts of EPT, encompassing the enhancement of human capital, amplification of research and development (R&D) investments, and fortification of overall firm resilience. Heterogeneity analysis discloses a notably heightened impact of EPT on TFP of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), larger enterprises and enterprises located in eastern regions. Ultimately, an approximately cost-benefit analysis conclusively demonstrates that the benefits derived from EPT far surpass the costs incurred by the concomitant industrial output reduction, which further illustrates the rationale for the implementation of EPT.

We examine whether large language models (LLMs) can extract contextualized representation of Chinese news articles and predict stock returns. The LLMs we examine include BERT, RoBERTa, FinBERT, Baichuan, ChatGLM and their ensemble model. We find that tones and return forecasts extracted by LLMs from news significantly predict future returns. The equal- and value-weighted long minus short portfolios yield annualized returns of 90% and 69% on average for the ensemble model. Given that these news articles are public information, the predictive power lasts about two days. More interestingly, the signals extracted by LLMs contain information about firm fundamentals, and can predict the aggressiveness of future trades. The predictive power is noticeably stronger for firms with less efficient information environment, such as firms with lower market cap, shorting volume, institutional and state ownership. These results suggest that LLMs are helpful in capturing under-processed information in public news, for firms with less efficient information environment, and thus contribute to overall market efficiency.

We study how financial markets integrate news about pollution abatement costs into firm values. Using China’s automation of pollution monitoring, we find that firms with factories in bad-news cities---cities that used to report much lower pollution than the automated reading---see significant declines in stock prices. This is consistent with the view that investors expect firms in high-pollution cities to pay significant adjustment and abatement costs to become “greener.” However, the efficiency with which such information is incorporated into prices varies widely---while the market reaction is quick in the Hong Kong stock market, it is considerably delayed in the mainland ones, resulting in a drift. The equity markets expect most of these abatement costs to be paid by private firms and not by state-owned enterprises, and by brown firms and not by green firms.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy—introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers’ leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance, with privately-owned developers disproportionately affected relative to state-owned firms. Using granular project-level data, we document significant drops in sales and a demand shift from private to state-owned developers. The policy also reduced local governments’ land sale revenues, prompting greater reliance on hidden local government financing vehicles for land purchases. The policy induced broad structural changes in China’s housing and land markets.