This paper investigates the role of information asymmetry in how financial decision-making responsibility is allocated within households. Using data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), we document that when only the wife has access to the Internet, the probability of her taking primary responsibility for household financial decision-making increases significantly. Conversely, when only the husband uses the Internet, this probability decreases. Mechanism analysis shows that Internet access expands individuals’ access to financial information, and spouses with exclusive Internet access leverage this informational advantage to influence their partners’ decisions through strategic partial information disclosure. These findings indicate that such informational advantages translate into a bargaining power premium within households.

We document that firms' strategic reactions could hamper the effectiveness of RegTech. Our paper focuses on one RegTech innovation in China—online platforms launched by stock exchanges for investors to communicate with listed companies. We find that firms provide a number of no-answer replies—answers without clear, specific, or useful information—to investors' questions. Consistent with strategic information hoarding, no-answers are shown to be associated with subsequent unfavorable news. Moreover, firms with higher no-answer rates tend to have lower price efficiency, higher return volatility, and higher stock price crash risk. The evidence suggests regulators' objective of enhancing investor protection is not fully fulfilled.