This paper focuses on evidence from stock markets as it investigates the spillovers from the United States to mainland China and Hong Kong SAR during the subprime crisis. Using both univariate and multivariate GARCH models, this paper finds that China's stock market is not immune to the financial crisis, as evidenced by the price and volatility spillovers from the United States. In addition, HK's equity returns have exhibited more significant price and volatility spillovers from the United States than China's returns, and past volatility shocks in the United States have a more persistent effect on future volatility in HK than in China, reflecting HK's role as an international financial center. Moreover, the impact of the volatility from the United States on China's stock markets has been more persistent than that from HK, due mainly to the United States as the origin of the subprime crisis. Finally, as expected, the conditional correlation between China and HK has outweighed their conditional correlations with the United States, echoing increasing financial integration between China and HK.

The Article first presents a brief history or survey of some of the earlier problems that associate with China’s banking and financial institutions. The Article then addresses specific problems, in the context of the rules, procedures, and practices of the banking and finance sector, which widely range from non-performing loans, to China’s money market and interbank lending business. These problems also directly associate with the liberalization of the banking and finance sector of the economy, and the requirements of both the WTO rules and China’s WTO Protocol on accession. The Article also briefly explores the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and its contagion effect throughout the world, including the Asian region. In the context of China and the subprime crisis, the Article summarizes some of the problems that associate with China banking and financial institutions, by focusing on the policy implications of the history of banking and finance in China, and what this means in terms of both WTO compliance and greater liberalization of banking and financial institutions, especially pursuant to the WTO GATS, as service industries. All of this, eventually, allows for the presentation of certain conclusions concerning China banking and finance in the new era of a global subprime crisis.

Despite the considerable media attention given to the collapse of the market for complex structured assets that contain subprime mortgages, there has been too little discussion of why this crisis occurred. The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences argues that three basic issues are at the root of the problem, the first of which is an odious public policy partnership, spawned in Washington and comprising hundreds of companies, associations and government agencies, to enhance the availability of affordable housing via the use of creative financing techniques. Second, federal regulators have actively encouraged the rapid growth of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and securities by all types of financial institutions. And third, also bearing blame for the subprime crisis is the related embrace by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board of fair value accounting. After reviewing the Bush administration's proposed solutions as flawed, this article recommends a strategy for subprime crisis resolution. Job one is to rebuild market confidence in structured assets by going back to first principles on issues such as market transparency, standardization of contracts, and accounting treatment. By reducing complexity on the trade of structured assets through simple deal structures and providing investors with the information they need to analyze collateral, for example by requiring SEC registration and public pricing of assets, much of the current liquidity problem is ameliorated.