This paper examines the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing the distress of a city-level commercial bank. This policy shift led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis reveals a novel contagion mechanism driven by reduced confidence in future bailouts (implicit non-guarantee), contributing to the subsequent collapse of other small banks. However, in the longer term, this policy shift improved price efficiency, credit allocation, and discouraged risk-taking among small banks.

The enforcement of peer-to-peer (P2P) registration requirements in mid-2018 triggered a P2P market meltdown, highlighting the inherent challenge faced by Chinese market participants in distinguishing between genuine and fraudulent fintech firms. The difference-in-difference results suggest that the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) perception can effectively halve investor outflows and borrower outflows during periods of uncertainty. Dynamic analysis further validates the parallel-trend assumption and underscores the persistent influence of TBTF perception. Moreover, the empirical findings suggest that, in the face of a market downturn, fintech market participants become unresponsive to all other certification mechanisms, including venture capital participation, custodian banks, and third-party guarantees.

This study shows that investment decisions drive tail risks (i.e., systemic risk and stand-alone tail risk) of TBTF (Too-Big-to-Fail) banks, while financing decisions determine tail risks of non-TBTF banks. After the Dodd-Frank Act, undercapitalized non-TBTF banks continue to gamble for resurrection, and their stand-alone tail risk become more sensitive to funding availability and net-stable-funding-ratio than TBTF banks. We show that implementing a slimmed-down version of TBTF regulations on non-TBTF banks cannot efficiently contain the stand-alone risk of non-TBTF banks and cannot eliminate TBTF privilege. Moreover, non-TBTF banks together generate larger pressure of contagion on the real economy, and they herd more when making financing decisions after the Act. Our findings highlight the need for enhanced regulations on the liability-side of non-TBTF banks.

This paper investigates the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing a city-level commercial bank’s distress. This event led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis pinpoints a novel contagion mechanism marked by diminished confidence in bank bailouts, which accounts for the subsequent collapse of several other small banks. However, the erosion of confidence in government guarantees enhances price efficiency and credit allocation while discouraging risk taking among small banks.