From 2013 onwards, the Chinese central government has subjected the largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to ‘disciplinary inspections’ to weed out and punish graft and other corruption. While this policy has been somewhat successful in punishing corruption—over 160 top SOE officials have been indicted—we show that the principal economic impact of these inspections has been to significantly cut investment by targeted firms, leading to a major decline in profitability, innovation and Tobin’s Q. Expenditures on R&D, entertainment, and travel also decline dramatically. The most obvious explanation is that the fear induced in SOE managers, who have limited risk-promoting equity holdings or incentive compensation and few external employment options, deterred them from taking risky but value-enhancing investments post-audit.

This paper provides a first systematic analysis of urban vibrancy in human capital supply in explaining persistent geographic firm valuation dispersion in China. We find persistent, significant city-to-city differences in Tobin’s q, especially among large, mature, or high labor-intensive firms. To explain such geographic differences in firm valuations, we identify several factors of the endowed city competitive advantages in creating human capital that play important roles in explaining the persistent geographic firm valuation premia. Our evidence suggests that city geographic location and initial cumulated human capital supply have created long-lasting, and growing, shareholder wealth by attracting and retaining talents and human resources in local firms.

We decompose the difference between a firm’s market and book values into two components: intangible assets that can be created by competing firms through SG&A/R&D expenditures, and the residual denoted as franchise value (FV). The estimated parameters in the model for creating intangible assets by capitalizing R&D/SG&A expenditures vary significantly across industries. Consistent with FV being a measure of economic rents and quasi-rents, ceteris paribus, higher FV firms face fewer product market threats, have higher markups, and their investments are less sensitive to their total Tobin’s Q. In contrast, firms with higher capitalized intangible assets, face higher product market threats.

This study examines the effects of acquirer characteristics, information asymmetry on method of payment of Chinese acquirers based on a sample of 1370 mergers and acquisitions that occur between 1998 -2008. Using both Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) approaches, we find that Chinese acquirers experience pre-acquisition abnormal returns ranging from 14.29%-121% over the period 12-36 months prior to the acquisition relative to 3 different portfolio benchmarks. In the pre-bid period, acquisitions financed by shares outperform acquisitions financed by cash. However, in the post-acquisition period, we document no significant difference between cash- and equity-financed acquisitions. We document a number of factors that determine the method of payment by Chinese acquirers: acquirer market value, Tobin’s Q, state ownership and leverage have significant effects on the method of payment.

We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions to a broad range of areas in the empirical corporate finance literature. We assemble the necessary data and then apply a single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999), to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems. In particular, we identify and estimate the role of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific characteristics in determining primary features of corporate governance, financial policy, payout policy, investment policy, and performance. Observed firm characteristics do best in explaining market leverage and CEO pay level and worst for takeover defenses and outcomes. Observed manager characteristics have relatively high power to explain CEO contract design and low power for firm focus and investment policy. Estimated specifications without firm and manager fixed effects do poorly in explaining variation in CEO duality, corporate control variables, and capital expenditures, and best in explaining executive pay level, board size, market leverage, corporate cash holdings, and firm risk. Including manager and firm fixed effects, along with firm and manager observables, delivers the best fit for dividend payout, the propensity to adopt antitakeover defenses, firm risk, board size, and firm focus. In terms of source, unobserved manager attributes deliver a high proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable for executive wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, board size, and sensitivity of expected executive compensation to firm risk. In contrast, unobserved firm attributes provide a high proportion of variation explained for dividend payout, antitakeover defenses, book and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings. In part, these results suggest where empiricists could look for better proxies for what current theory identifies as important and where theorists could focus in building new models that encompass economic forces not contained in existing models. Finally, we assess the relevance of omitted variables and endogeneity for conventional empirical designs in the various subfields. Including manager and firm fixed effects significantly alters inference on primary explanatory variables in 17 of the 20 representative subfield specifications.

We study how financial constraints affect the process of firm agglomeration and, in particular, the creation of conglomerates and firms with subsidiaries. We focus on the constraints related to the geographical segmentation of the debt market. We argue that conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries are born as the outcome of a process of agglomeration around less financially constrained firms. This has three major implications: a) conglomerates (firm with subsidiaries) should be less financially constrained than single-segment (no-subsidiary) firms, b) the headquarters – in general the seat of the aggregating company – should be the least financially constrained unit of the new entity and therefore firms with subsidiaries should be more likely to borrow at the headquarters level, c) if conglomerates (firms with subsidiaries) are less financially constrained than the average firm in the market, their Tobin’s Q should be lower than that of the single-segment (no-subsidiary) firms in the same industries – i.e., they should display a “conglomerate (firm with subsidiaries) discount”. We test these hypotheses employing a novel – and exogenous – geographical-based measure of financial constraints. We focus on the US corporations from 1997 to 2004. We show that firms headquartered in less financially constrained areas are more likely to be headquarters of conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries and that conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries are less financially constrained. At the moment of agglomeration (M&A) we document a significant negative relation between the difference in a degree of financial constraints between the bidder and the target and the probability of choosing the target as well as the value created in M&A. In the years following the acquisition Tobin’s Q of acquirers are decreasing relative to their peers which is consistent with the fact that access to lower cost of financing allows to implement projects with marginal Q lower than the average Q of existing projects. Next, we find that the less financially constrained is the headquarters compared to the subsidiaries, the higher is the percentage of the total financing that takes place at headquarters level. Finally, we document a strong positive correlation between the difference in financial constraints of the conglomerate (firm with subsidiaries) and the average degree of financial constraints of the single-segment (no-subsidiary) firms and the conglomerate (firm with subsidiaries) discount. Our findings suggest that conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries are less constrained because less constrained firms take over more constrained ones.

This paper examines the effects of the agency costs on firm value in 156 Chinese publicly listed companies with individual ultimate owners between 2002 and 2007. The ultimate owners’ agency costs, as measured by the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, are shown to negatively and significantly affect firm value, as measured by the market-to-book ratio of assets (an approximation of Tobin’s Q). As the agency costs grow, the stock returns decrease around the connected party transaction announcements, and firms are more likely to engage in value-destroying connected party transactions. These effects are particularly strong for some types of connected party transactions, notably loan guarantees and direct fund transfers. Further, as the agency costs grow, the firms violate laws more frequently and the nature of legal violations becomes more severe. Evidence from an exogenous policy shock, the non-tradable share reform confirms that higher agency costs cause more unfavorable stock market reactions to connected party transaction announcements.

This paper examines the effects of the agency costs on firm performance in 156 Chinese publicly listed companies with private ultimate owners between 2002 and 2007. The ultimate owners’ agency costs are measured by the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights. Agency costs are shown to negatively and significantly affect firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. A major contribution of this paper is to identify connected party transactions as a channel through which such agency costs exert negative impact firm performance. Evidence from the public record of law violations of those firms lends further support to the “tunneling” view on the connected party transactions. The paper also shows that the larger the divergence, the less likely that firm managers will implement value-increasing industrial diversification. The last finding remains a puzzle.

本文研究了2004年贷款利率改革对企业间微观资本配置效率的影响。为合理衡量微观资本配置效率，本文对Wurgler（2000）的方法进行了修正，并构造了一个新的投资机会衡量指标——基准Q，用以克服Tobin’s Q的衡量偏误。我们的理论和经验分析表明：2004年贷款利率改革之后，微观资本配置效率在短期内不升反降，且在金融市场发展水平较低的地区下降得更为明显，这主要源于贷款利率上限取消在短期内导致的逆向选择效应。为使贷款利率改革的积极效果得以发挥，迫切需要提高金融市场发展水平和银行监控效率，减轻逆向选择效应的不利影响。

We seek to exam the government’s role on post-privatization performance in China. Using a sample of 514 firms privatized for the period from 1996 to 2002, we find evidence that the government’s role could be both positive and negative. On the one hand, firms with politically connected CEOs have significant higher return on sales (ROS) than firms with non-politically connected CEOs both before and after listing; and CEO’s political connection has a positive effect on firms with debt burden. Also there is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion of shares owned by Government Agencies and Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, firms with politically connected CEOs underperformance firms with non-politically connected CEOs in terms of ROS change after listing, and, a significantly negative relationship is found between the proportion of shares owned by Government Agencies and postprivatization ROS.