Using a large sample of US individuals, we show that individuals with higher levels of trust have lower likelihoods of default in household debt and higher net worth. The effect is driven by trust values inherited from cultural and family backgrounds more than by trust beliefs about others. We demonstrate a causal impact of trust on financial outcomes by extracting the component of trust correlated with early-life ex- periences. The effect of trust is more pronounced among females, those with lower education, lower income, lower financial literacy, and higher debt-to-income ratio. Further evidence suggests that enhancing individuals’ trust, to the right amount, can improve household financial well-being.

Corporate misconduct poses significant risks to financial markets, undermining investor confidence and economic stability. This study investigates the influence of World Heritage culture, with its social, historical, and symbolic values, on reducing corporate misconduct. Using firm-level data from China, with its rich cultural heritage and ancient civilization, we find a significant negative association between the number of World Heritage sites near a company and corporate misconduct. This suggests that a richer World Heritage culture fosters an informal institutional environment that mitigates corporate misconduct. This effect is robust across 100 km, 200 km, and 300 km thresholds and remains significant when using a binary misconduct indicator. The results also show that World Heritage culture enhances corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social capital, which in turn reduces corporate misconduct. Additionally, the impact of World Heritage culture is more pronounced in firms located in high social trust areas, those with high institutional investor supervision, and those farther from regulatory authorities. These findings advance academic knowledge and offer practical implications for policymakers and investors.

This paper, based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 2009 and 2019, employs the implementation of the "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" as a landmark event of capital market liberalization, utilizing a difference-in-differences model to empirically examine the impact of market openness on firms' cross-region investment behavior and its underlying mechanisms. The findings indicate that: (1) the launch of the "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" has significantly promoted the establishment of cross-provincial and cross-border subsidiaries by the companies involved; (2) capital market liberalization influences firms' cross-region investment through three dimensions: finance, governance, and stakeholders. In terms of finance, the openness alleviated financing constraints and improved stock liquidity; in governance, it pressured companies to adopt more digitalized and transparent governance structures to accommodate cross-regional expansion; in the stakeholder dimension, it attracted the attention of external investors, accelerating their understanding of firms and alleviating the trust issues associated with cross-region expansion. (3) The effect of capital market liberalization on promoting cross-border investments by private enterprises is particularly pronounced, and this effect is further strengthened as the quality of corporate information disclosure improves. Firms with higher levels of product diversification benefit more from market liberalization, accelerating their overseas expansion. (4) Capital market liberalization has elevated the level of cross-region investment, thereby significantly fostering innovation and improving investment efficiency. The conclusions of this study provide fresh empirical evidence for understanding the microeconomic effects of China's capital market liberalization, the intrinsic mechanisms of corporate cross-region investments, and their economic consequences.

This paper investigates the supervisory incentive effects of employee stock ownership plans based on a corporate risk-taking perspective using data from a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006-2021. The results show that employee stock ownership plans significantly enhance corporate risk-taking. The specific mechanism is that employee stock ownership plans reduce the two-tier agency costs between shareholders and managers and managers and employees, alleviate corporate financing constraints, and thus enhance the level of corporate risk-taking. It is also found that employee stock ownership plan enhances the level of corporate risktaking with high quality, because employee stock ownership plan not only promotes R&D investment which is beneficial to corporate value growth, but also reduces excessive investment and high debt which are detrimental to corporate value, and the corporate risk-taking is of higher quality and more substantial value effect. In addition, differences in the institutional design of employee stock ownership plans have different effects on corporate risk-taking: employee stock ownership plans that are leveraged, highly discounted, with longer lock-up periods and duration, and entrusted to third-party institutions have a stronger effect on corporate risk-taking; employee subscriptions can promote corporate risk-taking more than executive subscriptions; employee stock ownership plans in China do not have the problem of "free-riding There is no "free-rider" problem in China's employee stock ownership plan. The larger the issuance ratio of the employee stock ownership plan, the greater the number of participants, and the larger the scale of capital, the better the implementation effect.

We investigate the impact of public climate concerns on corporate ESG performance and find a negative association between the two variables. Our mechanistic analysis suggests that public climate concern increases firm risk, which explains the negative effect of ESG performance. This negative effect is exacerbated by inefficient corporate investments and mitigated by increased local social trust. Furthermore, the negative relationship between climate attention and ESG performance is more pronounced for companies with weak CEO hometown identify, high resource acquisition costs, non-heavy polluting industries and in the colder northern regions of China. The findings highlight the need to address the challenging impact of climate attention on corporate sustainable performance by enhancing regional social trust and CEOs' sense of belonging.

We study the mandated introduction of a supervised auction for the primary bond market in China. The regulatory intervention significantly reduced the cost of debt for Chinese issuers. Most of the benefits flowed from reduced agency conflict between underwriters and issuers. Using unique bidder-level data from a lead underwriter, we develop replicable tools and techniques to identify collusive bidding behavior resulting in artificial (and economically costly) increases in bond yields. Such evidence can benefit global regulators, issuers, and investors currently using unsupervised auction mechanisms, for example, in securities issuance, construction projects, and procurement.

The development of the wealth management market is based on the needs of investors. The logic of market regulation should also be based on the interests of investors. On the basis of summarizing the regulatory experience of the global wealth management market, suggestions are put forward to improve the system of China's wealth management market . The fundamental driving force for the establishment of a regulatory legal system for the wealth management market comes from the needs of the development of the wealth management market. Moreover, the structure and process of this institutional construction are also closely related to the structure and development of market demand. China's current wealth management market has become a huge financial sector, and the deepening of the market and the diversification of participants all put forward requirements for the construction of a fair and scientific regulatory system. Wealth management business is different from traditional financial business in many aspects such as function, business standard and business model, and its basic legal relationship is also far from traditional business. The commonality of business in China's current wealth management market is in line with the basic elements of the legal relationship of trust. From the perspective of the realistic basis and the nature of the industry, it is appropriate to define the basic legal nature of wealth management business as a trust relationship. Due to factors such as information asymmetry and economic scale, financial investors are in a serious imbalance and imbalance when they trade with financial institutions. Therefore, the financial supervision system should grasp this core contradiction, give investors the status of consumer protection, and establish the concept of protecting wealth consumers. The regulation of wealth management operators should grasp the requirements of the basic trust relationship, take the basic principle of supervising the performance of trustee duties by financial management institutions, and implement a series of rules for trustees to be loyal and prudent in financial management. These rules should focus on risk prevention, and include establishment of access standards for wealth management business, supervision of independent development of wealth management business, supervision of full performance of prudent management duties by wealth management institutions, and guidance for healthy development of wealth management institutions. The experience in the supervision of developed wealth management markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore shows that the establishment of a legal system for the protection of wealth management consumers is an inevitable result of the development of the financial market, and it is necessary to set up special institutions and mechanisms to implement the concept of wealth management investor protection, and emphasize wealth management products. Providers' fiduciary obligations to investors, and functional supervision based on a unified system in the regulatory system can be used as a reference for China . China's wealth management market regulatory system include inconsistent rules, weak protection, biased guidance, and lack of independence. Due to the separate regulatory system, different game rules apply to homogeneous wealth management business operated by different types of financial institutions, resulting in rule conflicts and market injustice. However, the substantive rights of wealth management investors still exist in a vacuum that cannot be confirmed. At the same time, the status of consumers is far from being officially confirmed, and the consumer protection mechanism cannot truly achieve justice. As regulatory guidance still favors the concept and tools of supervising traditional businesses, wealth management institutions mainly expand extensively by selling products, and wealth management products also present serious "bond-like" characteristics. The "non-neutral " positioning of financial regulatory agencies has externalized into phenomena such as rule conflicts, "policy following suit" and "excessive maintenance of stability". Constructing and continuously improving China's wealth management market supervision system is: the purpose of supervision is to restore the effective operation of the market mechanism. The basic legal relationship in China's wealth management market should be recognized as a trust relationship. This is not only an essential requirement of the wealth management market, but also a practical need to integrate regulatory chaos. It is the trend of financial and economic development that the regulatory system positions the position of wealth management consumers. It should start with legislative policies, make key breakthroughs around consumers' substantive rights and protection mechanisms, and gradually improve investor protection mechanisms. The regulatory system should focus on supervising financial institutions to fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and establish sound access rules, business independence rules, prudent management rules, and strict market exit mechanisms. China's wealth management market supervision system should be based on unified legislation and gradually implement functional supervision in order to achieve effective management and harmonious development of the wealth management market.

We provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of shadow banking in terms of technological innovation. Firm-to-firm entrusted loans, the largest part of the shadow banking sector in China, enhance the borrowers’ innovation output. The effects are more prominent when the borrowers are subject to severer financial constraints, information asymmetry, and takeover exposures. A plausible underlying channel is capital reallocations from less productive but easy-financed lender firms to more innovative but financially less-privileged borrower firms. Our paper suggests that shadow banking helps correct bank credit misallocations and thus serves as a second-best market design in financing the real economy.

Does the ancient farming culture shape the risk-taking behavior of households today? Using a dataset covering over 130,000 households from a Chinese national survey, our study examines the relationship between the culture of rice cultivation and the financial behavior of modern households. We find that households in regions with a higher rate of historical rice cultivation are more likely to invest in the financial market and buy lottery, but less likely to purchase insurance. We also find that the rice area has more households with risk preferences consistent with prospect theory expectations. To account for omitted variable bias, we use average regional rainfall and downstream distance to ancient irrigation systems as instrumental variables for rice cultivation, and our results remain robust. We find that the rice effect cannot be explained by regional economic development, traditional Confucian values, or ethnic diversity. To explore potential mechanisms, we find that households in rice regions are more likely to borrow money from friends and relatives and have interest waived, and historical commercial development has also been influenced by the rice culture.

We examine the effect of a regulation in China that restricts perquisite consumption by managers of state-owned companies. We find that the regulation causes state-owned companies to issue more entrusted loans to other firms. Furthermore, entrusted loans issued by state-owned companies have lower interest rates and larger loan amounts. These results suggest that managers of state-owned companies use entrusted loans to extract personal benefits to compensate for the lost perquisite consumption due to the regulation.