This paper develops an autonomous framework for systematic factor investing via agentic AI. Rather than relying on sequential manual prompts, our approach operationalizes the model as a self-directed engine that endogenously formulates interpretable trading signals. To mitigate data snooping biases, this closed-loop system imposes strict empirical discipline through out-of-sample validation and economic rationale requirements. Applying this methodology to the U.S. equity market, we document that long-short portfolios formed on the simple linear combination of signals deliver an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.75 and a return of 54.81%. Finally, our empirics demonstrate that self-evolving AI offers a scalable and interpretable paradigm.

We examine the information content of the call-put implied volatility spread (IVS) of Shanghai Stock Exchange 50 ETF options. Empirically, the IVS significantly and negatively predicts future SSE50 ETF returns at both weekly and monthly horizons. This predictability is robust both in-sample and out-of-sample, which stands in contrast to prior evidence from the U.S. options market. We explore several potential explanations and show that the IVS is closely linked to the option-cash basis. Its predictability is consistent with the model of Hazelkorn, Moskowitz, and Vasudevan (2023), where the option-cash basis reflects liquidity demand common to both options and underlying equity markets.

We document a striking anomaly in international capital flows that we term "sanction arbitrage": U.S. investors exploited the 2014 sanctions on Russia by significantly increasing holdings in Russian equities while Rest-of-World (ROW) investors fled. We rationalize this behavior through a simple game-theoretic model where the sanctioning government faces a trade-off between geopolitical objectives and domestic welfare, effectively creating a protective shield for domestic investors and driving out ROW investors. Empirically, we confirm that pre-sanction U.S flows negatively predicted subsequent sanction designations. Consequently, U.S. investors internalized this protection to act as opportunistic buyers, absorbing fire-sale assets from exiting foreign investors and capturing significant excess returns from Russian stock holdings. These findings reveal that "smart" sanctions designed to preserve market access can inadvertently generate wealth transfers from foreign to domestic agents.

I study whether workplace smoking bans change how bond investors assess firm risk. Using staggered state adoption across U.S.\ states from 2002 to 2012 and a heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences design, I find that smoking bans increase six-month cumulative abnormal bond returns by about 90 basis points. The average effect is only the starting point: the response is much larger for speculative-grade issuers and firms with low interest coverage, indicating that investors reprice the policy where downside operating risk matters most for debt values. Mechanism tests point most clearly to improved operating performance and lower worker turnover, while broader financial-constraint, liquidity, and duration channels remain close to zero. Alternative estimators, placebo diagnostics, and geographic spillover checks all support the interpretation that workplace smoking bans trigger targeted credit-risk reassessment rather than a generic regional shock. My findings connect public-health regulation to capital-market outcomes and show how non-financial policy shocks can reveal economically meaningful information about corporate credit risk.

The flow-performance relation in China’s mutual fund market differs from that in developed markets (e.g., the U.S.). We find that investors actively allocate capital to poorly performing funds, generating a negative relation at the bottom of return distribution. These flows are driven mainly by increased purchases rather than reduced redemptions. We then examine the mechanisms behind this anomaly. First, investors act on rational expectations of performance reversals, with this pattern being more pronounced among funds with higher activeness. Second, product differentiation attracts heterogeneous investors when performance is weak. Third, marketing and fund family effects serve as simple signals that amplify inflows. Overall, our study provides new empirical evidence on fund investor behavior and its economic consequences in an emerging market context.

We examine how organizational learning and organizational disruption jointly arise when Chinese audit firms have U.S. cross-listed clients and which effect dominates. Among public companies listed only in China, we define the treatment group as companies audited by Chinese audit firms serving at least one U.S. client, similar companies audited by firms without U.S. clients as the control group. Survey evidence indicates strong incentives and opportunities to learn from U.S. engagements and frequent learning activities in treatment audit firms. The archival evidence however shows that their domestic audit quality declines relative to the control group. The effect is more pronounced when U.S. clients demand more audit resources, when domestic clients are more sensitive to limited audit attention, and when U.S. and domestic clients are more similar. Overall, our findings indicate a negative externality of U.S. cross-listing audit when resource constraints hinder an effective firm-wide learning.

China's SMIC and Taiwan's TSMC are caught on opposite sides of the "Global Chip War." TSMC, despite having extensive commercial ties and fabs in the Mainland, is a beneficiary of U.S. efforts to stifle competition from Mainland competitors like SMIC. Geopolitical considerations, therefore, are increasingly influencing TSMC’s business decisions, as shown by TSMC’s construction of fabs in Japan and the United States despite founder Morris Chang’s longstanding opposition to overseas fabs due to their high costs. SMIC, meanwhile, is the Mainland’s best hope for creating a “red chip supply chain” and achieving 70% semiconductor self-sufficiency via domestic suppliers, which has taken on even more importance due to U.S. sanctions on advanced chips for AI model development. This article analyzes SMIC founder Richard Chang’s dream of building a red chip giant on the Mainland that can rival or even replace TSMC, which will directly conflict with Chang's former co-worker and fellow Taiwanese Morris Chang’s dream of solidifying TSMC and Taiwan’s position as the irreplaceable center of the semiconductor industry well into the 21st century.

The U.S. Treasury yields reached a 20-year high under acute inflation pressure in the post-pandemic era amid aggravated geopolitical conflicts. To quantify the underlying effects of regional geopolitical risks (GPRs) of key U.S. strategic interests, we employ an extended affine term structure model with unspanned GPRs and conventional macroeconomic drivers. We find that GPR shocks, particularly those manifesting U.S.-China rivalry, contribute more to expectations and variations of inflation and yields than shocks to U.S. macroeconomic variables. The results warn on the adequacy of monetary policy in curbing inflation in a fragmented global order with escalating GPRs.

The benchmark discrepancy phenomenon arises when fund managers deviate from their stated benchmarks. We investigate benchmark discrepancy in China's mutual fund market by analyzing holdings data from all actively managed funds and document its widespread prevalence. However, in China – unlike in the U.S. – benchmark discrepancy reduces relative performance and capital inflows. We also examine the characteristics of fund managers exhibiting benchmark discrepancies and find they are more likely to be male, highly educated, and professionally experienced.

Banks have a significant funding-cost advantage if their liabilities are protected by bailout guarantees. We construct a corporate finance-style model showing that banks can exploit this funding-cost advantage by just intermediating funds between investors and ultimate borrowers, thereby earning the spread between their reduced funding rate and the competitive market rate. This mechanism leads to a crowding-out of direct market finance and real effects for bank borrowers at the intensive margin: banks protected by bailout guarantees induce their borrowers to leverage excessively, to overinvest, and to conduct inferior high-risk projects. We confirm our model predictions using U.S. panel data, exploiting exogenous changes in banks' political connections, which cause variation in bailout expectations. At the bank level, we find that higher bailout probabilities are associated with more wholesale debt funding and lending. Controlling for loan demand, we confirm this effect on bank lending at the bank-firm level and find evidence on loan pricing consistent with a shift towards riskier borrower real investments. Finally, at the firm level, we find that firms linked to banks that experience an expansion in their bailout guarantees show an increase in their leverage, higher investment levels with indications of overinvestment, and lower productivity.