Contrary to the U.S., Chinese stock markets exhibit negative overnight returns, which further decrease with information asymmetry. We demonstrate that China’s "T+1" trading rule, which prohibits same-day selling, exacerbates adverse selection for uninformed buyers by limiting them to react to post-trade information. Prices are hence initially discounted at opening and recovered by the market close, generating negative overnight returns that are inversely related to information asymmetry risks. Consistent with adverse selection, empirical evidence reveals lower overnight returns during market declines and high-volatility periods, with robust negative associations between overnight returns and information asymmetry proxied by ffrm size, analyst coverage, and earnings announcement proximity. A model is introduced to rationalize our findings. The framework also sheds light on China’s "opening return puzzle", the phenomenon that intraday price rises concentrate predominantly in the initial 30 minutes of trading, by showing how reduced adverse selection enables rapid price recovery during opening session.

We document “foreign bias” in AI financial predictions, reversing the classic home bias. U.S.-based ChatGPT is systematically more optimistic than China-based DeepSeek about Chinese firms—in price predictions and directional forecasts—yet significantly less accurate. Evidence supports an information-availability mechanism: bias is strongest when U.S. media coverage of Chinese firms is limited and attenuates for cross-listed firms. Crucially, injecting Chinese news eliminates the prediction gap. Both models produce similar forecasts for U.S. firms, consistent with broader worldwide coverage. LLMs trained in different information environments can create divergent signals, with implications for investors and policymakers as AI increasingly intermediates global markets.

This paper develops an autonomous framework for systematic factor investing via agentic AI. Rather than relying on sequential manual prompts, our approach operationalizes the model as a self-directed engine that endogenously formulates interpretable trading signals. To mitigate data snooping biases, this closed-loop system imposes strict empirical discipline through out-of-sample validation and economic rationale requirements. Applying this methodology to the U.S. equity market, we document that long-short portfolios formed on the simple linear combination of signals deliver an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.75 and a return of 54.81%. Finally, our empirics demonstrate that self-evolving AI offers a scalable and interpretable paradigm.

We examine the information content of the call-put implied volatility spread (IVS) of Shanghai Stock Exchange 50 ETF options. Empirically, the IVS significantly and negatively predicts future SSE50 ETF returns at both weekly and monthly horizons. This predictability is robust both in-sample and out-of-sample, which stands in contrast to prior evidence from the U.S. options market. We explore several potential explanations and show that the IVS is closely linked to the option-cash basis. Its predictability is consistent with the model of Hazelkorn, Moskowitz, and Vasudevan (2023), where the option-cash basis reflects liquidity demand common to both options and underlying equity markets.

We document a striking anomaly in international capital flows that we term "sanction arbitrage": U.S. investors exploited the 2014 sanctions on Russia by significantly increasing holdings in Russian equities while Rest-of-World (ROW) investors fled. We rationalize this behavior through a simple game-theoretic model where the sanctioning government faces a trade-off between geopolitical objectives and domestic welfare, effectively creating a protective shield for domestic investors and driving out ROW investors. Empirically, we confirm that pre-sanction U.S flows negatively predicted subsequent sanction designations. Consequently, U.S. investors internalized this protection to act as opportunistic buyers, absorbing fire-sale assets from exiting foreign investors and capturing significant excess returns from Russian stock holdings. These findings reveal that "smart" sanctions designed to preserve market access can inadvertently generate wealth transfers from foreign to domestic agents.

I study whether workplace smoking bans change how bond investors assess firm risk. Using staggered state adoption across U.S.\ states from 2002 to 2012 and a heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences design, I find that smoking bans increase six-month cumulative abnormal bond returns by about 90 basis points. The average effect is only the starting point: the response is much larger for speculative-grade issuers and firms with low interest coverage, indicating that investors reprice the policy where downside operating risk matters most for debt values. Mechanism tests point most clearly to improved operating performance and lower worker turnover, while broader financial-constraint, liquidity, and duration channels remain close to zero. Alternative estimators, placebo diagnostics, and geographic spillover checks all support the interpretation that workplace smoking bans trigger targeted credit-risk reassessment rather than a generic regional shock. My findings connect public-health regulation to capital-market outcomes and show how non-financial policy shocks can reveal economically meaningful information about corporate credit risk.

The flow-performance relation in China’s mutual fund market differs from that in developed markets (e.g., the U.S.). We find that investors actively allocate capital to poorly performing funds, generating a negative relation at the bottom of return distribution. These flows are driven mainly by increased purchases rather than reduced redemptions. We then examine the mechanisms behind this anomaly. First, investors act on rational expectations of performance reversals, with this pattern being more pronounced among funds with higher activeness. Second, product differentiation attracts heterogeneous investors when performance is weak. Third, marketing and fund family effects serve as simple signals that amplify inflows. Overall, our study provides new empirical evidence on fund investor behavior and its economic consequences in an emerging market context.

We examine how organizational learning and organizational disruption jointly arise when Chinese audit firms have U.S. cross-listed clients and which effect dominates. Among public companies listed only in China, we define the treatment group as companies audited by Chinese audit firms serving at least one U.S. client, similar companies audited by firms without U.S. clients as the control group. Survey evidence indicates strong incentives and opportunities to learn from U.S. engagements and frequent learning activities in treatment audit firms. The archival evidence however shows that their domestic audit quality declines relative to the control group. The effect is more pronounced when U.S. clients demand more audit resources, when domestic clients are more sensitive to limited audit attention, and when U.S. and domestic clients are more similar. Overall, our findings indicate a negative externality of U.S. cross-listing audit when resource constraints hinder an effective firm-wide learning.

China's SMIC and Taiwan's TSMC are caught on opposite sides of the "Global Chip War." TSMC, despite having extensive commercial ties and fabs in the Mainland, is a beneficiary of U.S. efforts to stifle competition from Mainland competitors like SMIC. Geopolitical considerations, therefore, are increasingly influencing TSMC’s business decisions, as shown by TSMC’s construction of fabs in Japan and the United States despite founder Morris Chang’s longstanding opposition to overseas fabs due to their high costs. SMIC, meanwhile, is the Mainland’s best hope for creating a “red chip supply chain” and achieving 70% semiconductor self-sufficiency via domestic suppliers, which has taken on even more importance due to U.S. sanctions on advanced chips for AI model development. This article analyzes SMIC founder Richard Chang’s dream of building a red chip giant on the Mainland that can rival or even replace TSMC, which will directly conflict with Chang's former co-worker and fellow Taiwanese Morris Chang’s dream of solidifying TSMC and Taiwan’s position as the irreplaceable center of the semiconductor industry well into the 21st century.

The U.S. Treasury yields reached a 20-year high under acute inflation pressure in the post-pandemic era amid aggravated geopolitical conflicts. To quantify the underlying effects of regional geopolitical risks (GPRs) of key U.S. strategic interests, we employ an extended affine term structure model with unspanned GPRs and conventional macroeconomic drivers. We find that GPR shocks, particularly those manifesting U.S.-China rivalry, contribute more to expectations and variations of inflation and yields than shocks to U.S. macroeconomic variables. The results warn on the adequacy of monetary policy in curbing inflation in a fragmented global order with escalating GPRs.