Declining worker bargaining power has been advanced as an explanation for dramatic generational changes in the U.S. macroeconomic environment such as the substantial decline in labor’s share of the national income, the loss of consumer purchasing power, and growing income and wealth inequality. In this paper, we investigate microeconomic implications by examining the effect of declining worker power on firm-level investment responses to a labor cost shock (mandated increases in the minimum wage). Over the past four decades, we find that investment-wage sensitivities go from negative to insignificant as management becomes less constrained and can pursue outside options. Consistent with drivers of weakening worker power, investment-wage sensitivity changes are more significant for firms that are more exposed to globalization, technological change, and declining unionization.

The U.S. stock market has long been the most popular venue for both foreign companies and global investors. The recent cross-border regulation tensions between the U.S. and China, however, have exposed many U.S.-listed China Concepts Stocks (CCS) to substantial de-listing risks, forcing them to pursue dual listings on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX). In this paper, we quantify the economic value of dual-listing, using the SEC’s adoption of the ffnal amendments implementing mandates of the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) on December 2, 2021 as a natural experiment. We estimate that CCS with pre-shock dual-listing status on average have 14.88% higher returns, or USD 8 billion in market capitalization, than their peers listed only on the U.S. exchanges during a three-month period after the shock. Our ffndings survive a set of robustness checks, including parallel trends test, alternative treatment and control groups based on the qualiffed but not yet dual-listed CCS, and various sub-sample and placebo analyses. In addition to stock returns, dual-listed CCS are also less adversely affected in trading volume, volatility, and liquidity. Our ffndings highlight the large economic impact of the escalating political U.S.-China tensions on the global ffnancial markets.

We review theoretical and empirical work on the economic effects of the United States and China trade relations during the last decades. We first discuss the origins of the China shock, its measurement, and present methods used to study its economic effects on different outcomes. We then focus on the recent U.S.-China trade war. We discuss methods used to evaluate its effects, describe its economic effects, and analyze if this increase in trade protectionism reverted the effects of the China shock. The main lessons learned in this review are: (i) the aggregate gains from U.S.-China trade created winners and losers; (ii) China's trade expansion seems not to be the main cause of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment during the same period; and (iii) the recent trade war generated welfare losses, had small employment effects, and was ineffective in reversing the distributional effects due to the China shock.

We develop measures for technology decoupling and dependence between the U.S. and China based on combined patent data. The first two decades of the century witnessed a steady increase in technology integration (or less decoupling), but China’s dependence on the U.S. increased (decreased) during the first (second) decade. Decoupling in a technology field predicts China’s growing dependence on U.S. technology, which, in turn, predicts less decoupling further down the road. Decoupling is associated with more patent outputs in China, but lower firm productivity and valuation. China’s innovation-oriented industrial policies trade o↵ the inherent conflict between indigenous innovation and firm competitiveness.