This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that VCs include more investor-friendly covenants in contracts when EPU increases. Our findings hold across a battery of robustness checks, including addressing endogeneity concerns and using alternative EPU measures. Our mechanism analysis shows that higher investment risk and increased VCs’ bargaining power might be plausible reasons why EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts.

This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that VCs include more investor-friendly covenants in contracts when EPU increases. Our findings hold across a battery of robustness checks, including addressing endogeneity concerns and using alternative EPU measures. Our mechanism analysis shows that higher investment risk and increased VCs’ bargaining power might be plausible reasons why EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts.

The enforcement of peer-to-peer (P2P) registration requirements in mid-2018 triggered a P2P market meltdown, highlighting the inherent challenge faced by Chinese market participants in distinguishing between genuine and fraudulent fintech firms. The difference-in-difference results suggest that the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) perception can effectively halve investor outflows and borrower outflows during periods of uncertainty. Dynamic analysis further validates the parallel-trend assumption and underscores the persistent influence of TBTF perception. Moreover, the empirical findings suggest that, in the face of a market downturn, fintech market participants become unresponsive to all other certification mechanisms, including venture capital participation, custodian banks, and third-party guarantees.

This paper studies how investing in venture capital (VC) affects the entrepreneurial outcomes of individual limited partners (LPs). Using comprehensive administrative data on entrepreneurial activities and VC fundraising and investments in China, we first document that individual LPs, on average, contribute about 50% of the capital of each fund in which they participate, and over 50% of them are entrepreneurs. We then exploit an identification strategy by comparing the entrepreneurial outcomes of individual LPs in funds that eventually launched with those in funds that failed to launch. The fraction of committed capital from corporate LPs in industries that subsequently encounter poor returns is used as an instrument for funds' launch failures. We find that after investing in a successfully launched VC fund, individual LPs create significantly more ventures than do LPs in funds which failed to launch. These new ventures tend to be high-tech firms and file more patents than do the LPs' prior ventures. We find evidence consistent with venture investments being a channel through which individual LPs learn.

This paper uses the IV-2SLS model to explore the impact of analyst attention on firms' internal and external innovation paths from a dynamic perspective of the life cycle. When firms are in the growth stage, the higher the analyst attention, the more firms will significantly increase their internal R&D efforts and make active technology acquisitions; As firms enter maturity, analyst attention plays a role in promoting R&D investment and corporate venture capital activities; When enterprises are in the recession period, firms are more inclined to innovate independently under the influence of analyst attention. This bias is more significant in non-state enterprises and high-tech enterprises. Further study finds that the interaction between analyst attention and firms' innovation path under different life cycles effectively enhances innovation output.

We study the role of Chinese government guidance funds (GGFs) in value creation for investee firms. Using a sample of 2,855 firms that went public during the period of 2010-2021, we show that GGF-backed IPO firms had higher initial returns than non-VC-backed IPO firms and nonGGF VC-backed IPO firms. After decomposing the initial return into IPO underpricing and market overvaluation, we find that GGF-backed firms enjoyed higher overvaluation and lower underpricing than other firms. Consistent with investor sentiment and information asymmetry hypothesis, our results indicate that public investors value the benefits of political resources more than the costs of government interference associated with GGF sponsoring. However, GGF-backed firms did not outperform other-VC-backed firms when post-IPO long-term stock, operating and innovation performance is assessed. The divergence in the effects of GGFs observed in the financial and product markets reveals the complexity in evaluating the role of GGFs in value creation.

This study investigates venture capital (VC) reputation impact on the pre-IPO performance of the entrepreneurial firms backed by three kinds of VCs. This study employs backward stepwise regression models following prior theoretical frameworks to examine the research question. Based on a database of the top 50 VC firms ranked during 2016 to 2020 and their portfolio firms. This study shows some contingent contribution to pre-IPO firm performance. Firstly, the reputation of the Chinese government-owned VCs is negatively associated with their portfolio firm performance. Still, there is a positive relationship between foreign and local private VCs. Secondly, entrepreneurial firm performance is significantly associated with industry policy and entrepreneur’s performance than VC reputation. This study has practical implications for entrepreneurs and limited partners regarding their corporation relationships with the Chinese VCs.

This paper examines the ‘certification’ of government venture capital (GVC) programs, disputes whether the Chinese government venture capital (CGVC) can promote target firms’financing through the ‘certification’ on target firms, and how the ‘certification’ work. Using a dataset of 87865 Chinese listed firms over 2008–2018, we confirmed that CGVC’s investment promotes target firms’ equity financing but inhibits corporate debt financing through the certification effect and CGVC’s reputation. Moreover, the high reputation of GVC and high market awareness could strength the ‘certification effect.’Simultaneously, the ‘certification effect’is only effective for early and late-stage firms and private-owned firms, and invalid for mature stage and state-owned firms.

We study the demand for government participation in China’s venture capital and private equity market. We conduct a large-scale, non-deceptive field experiment in collaboration with the leading industry service provider, through which we survey both sides of the market: the capital investors and the private firms managing the invested capital by deploying it to high-growth entrepreneurs. Our respondents together account for nearly $1 trillion in assets under management. Each respondent evaluates synthetic profiles of potential investment partners, whose characteristics we randomize, under the real-stakes incentive that they will be introduced to real partners matching their preferences. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties, indicating that the benefits of political connections are small compared to the cons of having the government as an investor. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms, and this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and follow-up surveys suggest political interference in decision-making is the leading mechanism why government capital is unattractive to private firms. We feed our experimental estimates and administrative data into a simple model of two-sided search to discuss the distributional effects of government participation. Overall, our findings point to a “grabbing hand” interpretation of state-firm relationships reflecting a desire by the government to keep control over the private sector.

There is little empirical work examining contractual innovation in the context of China, which is the second largest venture capital market in the world, after the United States. Drawing upon extensive interviews, a hand-collected dataset of investment agreements and judgements made by Chinese courts on venture capital disputes, this article examines a unique contractual design that is common in the Chinese venture capital sector—the valuation adjustment mechanism (“VAM”). A VAM provides investors with a right to adjust a portfolio company’s original valuation and to get compensation by cash or equity upon the occurrence of certain future events (such as failing to meet financial or non-financial performance indicators). The prevalence of VAMs in China is potentially attributable to: (1) severe information asymmetry in the less informed market, (2) the lack of convertible preferred stock under Chinese law and excessive legal restrictions over investment tools and contractual mechanisms in venture capital financing, and (3) insufficient legal protection for investors under Chinese law. This article argues that, unlike American venture capital contracts, which are designed to encourage long-term, sustainable investor-entrepreneur relationships, VAMs are predominantly investors’ self-help mechanisms to address specific and serious investor protection issues in the transitional and less informed Chinese market. Thus, it suggests that the problems regarding investor protection motivating the use of VAMs can be better solved by law reforms such as allowing limited liability companies to issue convertible preferred stock, introducing more legal remedies for minority investors, as well as an improved regulatory environment governing venture financing.