As China’s population ages, more older workers are participating in the labor market, including a significant number of older migrant workers moving to urban areas. However, surprisingly little research has been done on their destination city and employment patterns. This paper addresses this gap by investigating the impact of city-level and industry specialization on the employment prospects of older migrant workers. Using both individual- and city-level data, we find that unlike prime-age migrant workers, older migrant workers have higher employment probabilities in relatively less-developed lower-tier Chinese cities than in better-developed high-tier cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, or Guangzhou. This phenomenon is driven by industry specialization, particularly in the construction sector, which fosters a dense labor market and facilitates higher job-finding rates. Additionally, construction firms and real estate developers in lower-tier cities are more willing to offer better wages than those in high-tier cities, which aligns with older migrant workers’ relatively moderate education profile and wage preferences over housing costs.

This study examines whether and how minimum wage hikes affect workers’ strikes in the context of China. We show that minimum wage significantly increases strikes at the city-level, and this effect is mainly motivated by demands for unpaid wages and severance pay. Mechanism analysis reveals that workers’ strikes are caused by inevitable involuntary unemployment arising from wage hikes. In addition, the increase in workers’ strike activities is more significant in tertiary industries, which require a larger share of low-wage workers and in regions with a higher degree of digital economy and innovation. Our findings provide clear policy implications for policymakers concerned with minimum wage and unemployment.

Using the firm-level data of the Chinese industrial sector from 1998 to 2010, this study investigates the impact of the previous environmental protection experience of prefecture-level Communist Party secretaries on the COD regulation within the secretaries’ respective jurisdictions. The study finds that the secretaries’ previous environmental protection experience has reduced the COD discharge intensity. The duration of the previous environmental protection experience is selected as an instrumental variable and the endogeneity is further addressed; the research conclusion remains unchanged. However, this negative impact only lasts for two years and presents an unclear long-term impact. The negative effect on COD discharge intensity caused by the previous environmental protection experience is affected by the mandatory regulation pressure from the central government and the overall polluting density of the sub-sectors. Secretaries with previous environmental protection experience do not reduce the COD discharge intensity by using the punishment mechanism of increasing sewage charges. The secretaries, instead, encourage enterprises to use clean production technology, save water resources, and reduce the produced COD level. Also, the secretaries place an emphasis on the treatment of wastewater pollutants, thus reducing the COD discharge intensity. The conclusions of this study can provide decisionmaking reference for the selection and training of local officials, with the goal of environmental regulation.

Using the firm-level data of the Chinese industrial sector from 1998 to 2010, this study investigates the impact of the previous environmental protection experience of prefecture-level Communist Party secretaries on the COD regulation within the secretaries’ respective jurisdictions. The study finds that the secretaries’ previous environmental protection experience has reduced the COD discharge intensity. The duration of the previous environmental protection experience is selected as an instrumental variable and the endogeneity is further addressed; the research conclusion remains unchanged. However, this negative impact only lasts for two years and presents an unclear long-term impact. The negative effect on COD discharge intensity caused by the previous environmental protection experience is affected by the mandatory regulation pressure from the central government and the overall polluting density of the sub-sectors. Secretaries with previous environmental protection experience do not reduce the COD discharge intensity by using the punishment mechanism of increasing sewage charges. The secretaries, instead, encourage enterprises to use clean production technology, save water resources, and reduce the produced COD level. Also, the secretaries place an emphasis on the treatment of wastewater pollutants, thus reducing the COD discharge intensity. The conclusions of this study can provide decisionmaking reference for the selection and training of local officials, with the goal of environmental regulation.

Using a proprietary bank-loan-level dataset, we find a surprising negative relation between loan spreads and minimum wage. We propose a stylized model to explain the relation: banks filter out the low-quality borrowers after the wage shocks, resulting in a separating equilibrium. Our evidence is consistent with the model’s predictions: (1) city-level and firm-level evidence shows that an increase in minimum wage is negatively associated with the likelihood of obtaining bank loans, especially for labor-intensive borrowers, (2) deal-level evidence shows that both the average default rate and loan spreads decrease when minimum wage rises, and (3) subsequently, labor intensive firms that are still able to obtain bank loans when minimum wage rises outperform their peers. Our findings suggest that as more credit resources are allocated to better quality firms and leave other firms far more behind, the existence of such credit reallocation effects can exacerbate the divergence between higher and lower quality firms induced by an increase in minimum wages.

Many studies suggest a positive and monotonic relationship between technological progress and wage income inequality since 1980s for industrialized economies. We examine this topic in the context of the Chinese economy where new technologies like automation, AI and digitalization have witnessed worldís most rapid growth in the last decade. Surprsingly, we Önd an inverted U-Shaped relationship - a "Digital Kuznets Curve", using a panel dataset constructed in line with the newly published "2021 Categorization of Core Industries of Digital Economy". We then set out a task-based growth model with heterogenous human capital and occupational choice, and show that this hump-shaped relationship can emerge either by introducing an erosion e§ect of digitalization on worker ability that increasingly counterveils the skill-biasing e§ect, or by directly adding a dynamic learning cost that captures the externality of digitalization. Our study contributes to the understanding of the nature of digitalization in re-shaping labor market structure.

Declining worker bargaining power has been advanced as an explanation for dramatic generational changes in the U.S. macroeconomic environment such as the substantial decline in labor’s share of the national income, the loss of consumer purchasing power, and growing income and wealth inequality. In this paper, we investigate microeconomic implications by examining the effect of declining worker power on firm-level investment responses to a labor cost shock (mandated increases in the minimum wage). Over the past four decades, we find that investment-wage sensitivities go from negative to insignificant as management becomes less constrained and can pursue outside options. Consistent with drivers of weakening worker power, investment-wage sensitivity changes are more significant for firms that are more exposed to globalization, technological change, and declining unionization.

China’s emissions trading system applies a two-stage emissions intensity-based compliance quota allocation scheme different from the cap-and-trade systems prevalent in developed economies. It was designed to accommodate the country’s socioeconomic complexities and implemented following a learning-by-doing approach. Compliance firms significantly expanded green investment and production workforce. Their climate decisions are influenced by state ownership and regional heterogeneity. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and less liberal market firms increased hiring, but not investment; non-SOEs and more liberal market firms grew investment. There are mixed welfare effects: compliance firms maintained productivity and efficiency; however, ordinary workers’ real wages were reduced, more prominent in SOEs.

This paper examines the effect of political favoritism on economic inequality in the short run and political polarization in the long run. We exploit the sudden death of an authoritarian leader – President Chiang Ching-Kuo of Taiwan – in 1988 to generate plausibly exogenous variation in partiality. We find that Chiang’s nationalist regime conducted political favoritism broadly toward political immigrants via cronyism (allocating public sector positions) and also differentially toward specific subgroups of political immigrants via wage discrimination (offering higher wages to these subgroups within the public sector). Favoritism led to a 7.2 percent immigrant wage premium, which accounted for nearly three quarters of the immigrant-native wage gap at the time. This in turn propelled overall income inequality by 4.5 percent. Moreover, political favoritism breeds political polarization in the long run by pulling apart the political views of immigrants and natives. Compared with natives, immigrants who were exposed to favoritism tend to adopt political positions that are aligned with the nationalist party today: they are more likely to support unification with China, and are more inclined to trust the mainland Chinese government and its citizens. Exposed immigrant (native) swing voters are also more (less) likely to vote for the nationalist party today.

In China's labor market, there is a phenomenon that enterprises choose whether to provide "social insurance and housing fund" to laborers autonomously. This paper use micro-data from two leading Internet recruitment platforms and empirically finds that in a labor market with double-side information asymmetry, "social insurance and housing fund" is not only a cost but also a signal. Providing workers with "social insurance and housing fund" can both send a signal of stable operation to the labor market and identify high-quality workers for enterprises. With an instrument variable of local average social security payment rate, this paper excludes the endogenous effect of labor supply on wages while the signaling effect above is still significant. In addition, "housing fund" has a stronger signaling effect than "social insurance", and the strength of the two signaling effects is affected by the scale of the enterprises and the level of local payment rates. This paper also introduces a theoretical framework of two micro-mechanisms — signaling and screening — into the analysis. In terms of policies, this paper proposes to strengthen the information disclosure and the propagation of social security payment, and further reduce the financial burden of enterprises.