This study identifies an incentive-compatible mechanism to foster individual environmental engagement. Utilizing a dataset comprising 100,000 randomly selected users of Ant Forest—a prominent personal carbon accounting platform embedded within Alipay, China's leading BigTech super-app—we provide causal evidence that individuals strategically engage in eco-friendly behaviors to enhance their credit limits, particularly when approaching borrowing constraints. These behaviors not only illustrate the green nudging effect of BigTech but also generate value for the platform by leveraging individual green actions as soft information, thereby improving the efficiency of credit allocation. Using a structural model, we estimate an annual green value of 427.52 million US dollars generated by linking personal carbon accounting with BigTech credit. We also show that the incentive-based mechanism surpasses green mandates and subsidies in improving consumer welfare and overall societal welfare. Our findings highlight the role of an incentive-aligned approach, such as integrating personal carbon accounts into credit reporting frameworks, in addressing environmental challenges.

This study examines how classified boards affect workplace safety, an important dimension of employee welfare. Using comprehensive establishment-level injury data from the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration and a novel classified board database, we document that firms with classified boards experience 12-13% lower workplace injury rates. To establish causality, we employ instrumental variable and difference-in-differences approaches exploiting staggered board declassifications. The safety benefits of classified boards operate through increased safety expenditures, reduced employee workloads, and enhanced external monitoring through analyst coverage. These effects are strongest in financially constrained firms and those with weaker monitoring mechanisms. Our findings support the bonding hypothesis that anti-takeover provisions facilitate long-term value creation by protecting stakeholder relationships and provide novel evidence that classified boards benefit rank-and-file employees, not just executives and major customers. The results reveal an important mechanism through which governance structures impact employee welfare and challenge the conventional view that classified boards primarily serve managerial entrenchment.

This paper explores the widespread perception of insurers as bad payers, often accused of unjustly rejecting legitimate claims. We explore the mechanisms leading to this negative image by examining the strategic “nitpicking” behaviour of insurers. Such behaviour involves an insurer’s effort to find evidence that can help it cut the indemnities of honest claims. Our findings reveal that this nitpicking behaviour only arises in markets with asymmetric information, where policyholders are unable to observe insurers’ nitpicking strategies. Conversely, in markets with symmetric information, insurers lose the incentive to engage in nitpicking. Moreover, our study highlights that nitpicky behaviour leads to a reduction in welfare and Pareto-inefficiency. This is because nitpicking is essentially an overpriced gam- ble that charges lower premiums from policyholders at a no-loss state, but cuts actual indemnities received by policyholders at a loss state.

We develop a signaling game model of investment to explore the effects of ambiguity aversion on corporate equilibrium strategies, investment dynamics, and financing decisions in incomplete markets with asymmetric information. Our analysis shows that volatility ambiguity aversion has a similar but more pronounced effect than asymmetric information, leading to higher financing costs, lower investment probabilities, and a greater likelihood of non-participation in investment. Importantly, volatility ambiguity aversion exhibits an amplifier effect, magnifying financing costs, adverse selection costs, and distortion in investment choices under asymmetric information. This increased ambiguity aversion raises the chances of inefficient separating and pooling equilibria, resulting in notable welfare losses. These findings highlight the significant impact of ambiguity aversion on strategic decision-making and equilibrium outcomes in investment, particularly in settings marked by information asymmetry and incomplete markets.

We study the role of firm heterogeneity and imperfect competition for global production networks and the gains from trade. We develop a quantifiable trade model with two-sided firm heterogeneity, matching frictions, and oligopolistic competition upstream. More productive buyers endogenously match with more suppliers, thereby inducing tougher competition among them to enjoy lower input costs and superior performance. Transaction-level customs data confirms that downstream French and Chilean firms import higher values and quantities at lower prices as upstream Chinese markets become more competitive over time, with stronger responses by larger firms. Moreover, suppliers charge more diversified buyers lower mark-ups. Counterfactual analysis indicates that entry upstream benefits high-productivity buyers, while lower matching or trade costs benefit all buyers, with the biggest boost to mid-productivity buyers. All three shocks generate sizeable welfare gains, especially under package reforms. Global production networks thus mediate bigger effects and cross-border spillovers from industrial and trade policies.

Green finance has drawn increased worldwide attention from policymakers as a financial mechanism that could potentially encourage corporations to actively engage in sustainable activities. However, despite a growing body of studies investigating the economic outcomes of green financial policies, there is still a lack of research that systematically quantifies the social welfare implications of green finance. Hence, this study aims to fill this research gap by establishing the causal effect of green finance on corporate environmental responsibility. Exploiting the "bottom-up" enforcement of the green finance pilots in 2017 in China as a quasi-natural experiment and the difference-in-difference-in-difference identification strategy, we find that green finance significantly enhances corporate environmental responsibility performance in high-polluting industries relative to their counterparts, and this evidence continues to survive a battery of robustness checks. Moreover, we explore three underlying mechanisms that possibly explain this beneficial effect: risk-taking, external governance and financing channels. Furthermore, we uncover that corporate environmental responsibility serves as a plausible non-economic channel that combines green finance with economic benefits by stimulating green innovation, promoting total factor productivity and expanding market share. Overall, our study offers new insights on both the economic and non-economic consequences of green finance on business performance.

We investigate the effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 2015 disclosure of complaint narratives on reducing racial disparities in financial services. Employing a triple-differences approach that compares the performance of affected and unaffected financial institutions across communities with varying racial compositions, we find that post-disclosure, minority communities experience welfare enhancements. These include higher savings interest rates (amounting to over $50 million annually), reduced maintenance fees, and lower interest rates on auto loans and credit cards. The research emphasizes the broad impact of service quality disclosure in mitigating racial disparities in savings and lending markets.

In reality, we find assets traded in the transparent centralized market and opaque decentralized market. To explain the traders' choices of venues, we develop a model of dynamic learning and dynamic market choice between the centralized market and decentralized markets. With heterogeneous trader value correlation, we find that when asset sensitivity or volatility is sufficiently low, traders prefer the decentralized market; when asset sensitivity or volatility is intermediate, switching between centralized and decentralized markets can be the optimal market choice; when asset values are sensitive to volatile fundamentals, assets are traded only in the centralized market. We provide empirical evidence in support of the model predictions. We discussed the welfare implications of various market designs under endogenous market choices. We find that introducing post-trade transparency in the decentralized market improves welfare. Surprisingly, introducing pre-trade transparency in the decentralized market may decrease welfare as it increases traders' incentives to choose a decentralized market earlier and hurts future traders in the centralized market.

Corporate philanthropy is increasingly seen as an effective way to promote social equity. This paper estimates the effect of donation tax deduction policy on corporate donations. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies, we find that the donation tax deduction policy has a significant positive effect on the amount donated. This finding remains robust to a number of robustness tests. Meanwhile, our study also suggests that the policy increases donation participation. Finally, heterogeneity analysis suggests that the effect is significant only for firms with high media attention and political connections. Our findings provide important evidence for the optimizing of social welfare.

How much value has been lost in the Chinese bankruptcy system due to excessive liquidation of companies whose going concern value is greater than the liquidation value? I compile new judiciary bankruptcy auction data covering all bankruptcy asset sales from 2017 to 2022 in China. I estimate the valuation of the asset for both the final buyer and creditor through the revealed preference method using an auction model. On average, excessive liquidation results in a 13.5% welfare loss. However, solely considering the liquidation process, an 8% welfare gain is derived from selling the asset without transferring it to the creditors. Firms that are (1) larger in total asset size, (2) have less information disclosure, (3) have less access to the financial market, and (4) possess a higher fraction of intangible assets are more vulnerable to such welfare loss. Overall, this paper suggests that policies promoting bankruptcy reorganization by introducing distressed investors who target larger bankruptcy firms suffering more from information asymmetry will significantly enhance welfare in the Chinese bankruptcy market.