A significant number of procurements in both public and private sectors have adopted the practice of splitting the award among multiple bidders in an auction, as an alternative to the one-winner-take-all approach. This aims to encourage participation from small firms and reduce dependency on a single supplier. One prominent example is China’s national drug procurement multiple-winner auction, where the drug supply is divided among several winners, increasing in proportion to the number of participants. Given the societal importance of drug prices, it is crucial to properly examine the rationale for using split-award auctions. However, there is limited theoretical and empirical guidance available in the literature. This paper investigates the competitive impact of split-award auctions on key outcomes, such as participation and procurement costs, using both a theoretical framework and empirical evidence. Theoretically, it demonstrates that split-award auctions consistently boost participation but also increase expected procurement costs in almost all instances. The expected procurement cost decreases only if the split-award auction raises participation from 0 to 1 compared to the winner-take-all auction. Empirically, the paper estimates the direction and magnitude of the effects on participation and expected procurement costs using drug procurement data. The findings reveal that split-award auctions moderately increase average participation by 0.85 bidders (17%), but significantly raise the unit expected procurement cost by 4 CNY (38%). Almost half of the overall increase in expected procurement costs stems from reallocating production to more expensive bidders, while the other half results from increased markups charged by bidders in response to this reallocation.

We review theoretical and empirical work on the economic effects of the United States and China trade relations during the last decades. We first discuss the origins of the China shock, its measurement, and present methods used to study its economic effects on different outcomes. We then focus on the recent U.S.-China trade war. We discuss methods used to evaluate its effects, describe its economic effects, and analyze if this increase in trade protectionism reverted the effects of the China shock. The main lessons learned in this review are: (i) the aggregate gains from U.S.-China trade created winners and losers; (ii) China's trade expansion seems not to be the main cause of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment during the same period; and (iii) the recent trade war generated welfare losses, had small employment effects, and was ineffective in reversing the distributional effects due to the China shock.

This paper studies the economic impact of the emergence of FinTech platforms on financial intermediation. In China, platform distributions of mutual funds emerged in 2012 and grew quickly into a formidable presence. Utilizing the staggered fund entrance onto platforms, we find markedly increased flow sensitivities to performance. Akin to the winner-take-all phenomenon in the platform economy, net flow captured by top 10% performing funds more than triples its pre-platform level. This pattern of platform-induced performance chasing is further confirmed using private data from Howbuy, a top platform in China. Consistent with this added incentive of becoming top performers in the era of large-scale platforms, fund managers increase risk taking to enhance the probability of becoming top performers. Meanwhile, organizational cohesiveness of fund families weakens as platforms level the playing field for all funds.

We examine whether investor behavior can be influenced by the social norms to which they are exposed. Specifically, we test two competing hypotheses regarding the influence of social trust on the disposition effect related to mutual fund investment. On the one hand, a higher level of social trust may elicit stronger investor reactions by increasing the credibility of the performance numbers reported by funds. This results in higher flow-performance sensitivity, which mitigates investors’ tendency to sell winners and hold onto losers. On the other hand, societal trust may reduce concerns about expropriation, thereby weakening investors’ need to react to poor performance. The resulting lower flow-performance sensitivity increases the disposition effect. Based on a proprietary dataset of complete account-level trading information for all investors in a large mutual fund family in China, we find compelling evidence 1) of a significant disposition effect among fund investors; 2) that a higher degree of social trust is associated with higher flow-performance sensitivity; and 3) that (high) trust-induced flows mitigate the disposition effect. Our results suggest that, in addition to cognitive biases, investor behavior is also strongly influenced by social norms.

Using comprehensive account-level data from 2016 to 2019, we examine retail investor trading behavior in the Chinese stock market. We separate millions of retail investors into five groups by their account sizes and document strong heterogeneity in their trading dynamics and performance. Retail investors with smaller account sizes cannot predict future price movements correctly, in the sense that they buy future losers and sell future winners. These investors fail to process public news and display behavioral biases such as overconfidence and gambling preferences. In sharp contrast, retail investors with larger account balances predict future returns correctly, incorporate public news in their trading, and gain more in stocks which are more attractive to investors with behavioral biases. For liquidity provision, the smaller retail investors follow daily momentum strategies, demanding immediate liquidity, while they become contrarian over weekly horizons, and they contribute positively towards firm-level liquidity. On the contrary, larger retail investors ae contrarian at daily horizons, providing immediate liquidity, but their potentially informed trades demand liquidity over longer terms.

Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with a regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and challenger fintech entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks’ customer data enables better borrower screening or targeting by fintech lenders. Open banking could make the entire financial industry better off yet leave all borrowers worse off, even if borrowers could choose whether to share their data. We highlight the importance of equilibrium credit quality inference from borrowers’ endogenous sign-up decisions. When data sharing triggers privacy concerns by facilitating exploitative targeted loans, the equilibrium sign-up population can grow with the degree of privacy concerns.

This paper examines the interactive effect of private equity (PE) and excess control rights on the process of firms’ going public. We find that firms with high excess control rights have more earnings management before IPO, and they are more likely to seek PE investors especially when the earnings management is high. We further show that the involvement of PE investors increases the probability of the firms’ IPO application being approved by the regulators in firms with high excess control rights. However, PE backed firms with high excess control rights are found to have a higher IPO fee, lower initial returns and lower long term post-IPO performance. We argue that in emerging markets where the protection of minority shareholders is weak and the economy is dominated by relationship and networks, ultimate owners have a strong incentive to have PE investors help them access the IPO market at the expense of minority shareholders’ interests, especially when they have excess control rights. In fact, instead of playing a monitory role, PE investors actually conspire with the ultimate owners to exploit minority shareholders’ interests and both PE investors and controlling shareholders become big winners, while minority shareholders are the only losers in the IPO process.

The separation of the government from the industry in telecommunications sector was carried out in a gradualist or experimental manner to make sure a “reform without losers”. Both the supervising ministries and local governments became the “early winners” who were in favor of the status quo. A meaningful industrial reform started from 1994 but ended in 1998. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was just right on time to secure the outcome of the reforms. However, determined by the nature of uncompetitiveness and state monopoly, the telecommunications sector was against the liberalization requested by the GATT/WTO members. Close administrative and financial connections between the supervising ministry and subordinate sector caused a high degree of convergence of their interest that in turn implies that the ministry had strong incentives of protecting the sector. After having terminated the fragmented governance since 1995, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) successfully prevented the sector from giving much concession compared to the other sectors during Sino- US negotiations. Although a limited concession was made, it is possible that the supervising ministries would not fulfil its commitment. On the one hand, the MII would refuse to cut off its administrative and financial ties with the enterprises. On the other hand, the enterprises would still be willing to be protected by the government for the monopolistic benefits. Even though the door is half-open to international competition, the Ministry had developed other means to block the entry of foreign service providers. A new form of fragmented governance is taking shape since 2003 when the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was founded. It created tensions between the bureaucracies and might create loopholes for the foreign entry in the future.

China’s Stock Market is the most important emerging market awaiting for investigation by both academics and industrials. We study the pro…tability of long position in winner-based threshold momentum strategies after accounting for the trans-action cost. We …nd substantial pro…ts (double to octuple the money every year) in daily threshold trading strategies when trading cost is not accounted. However, at very low level of trading cost, say 0.2%, all pro…ts disappear. We employ a model that rebalance the portfolio carefully to save the transaction cost, but the trading rules still fail to profit at a reasonable level of trading cost. Thus, the momentum pro…ts may not compete with the trading cost.

Abstract: China is the most important emerging market awaiting for investigation by both academics and industrials. We study the profitability of long position in winner-based threshold momentum strategies after accounting for the transaction cost. We find substantial profits (double to octuple the money every year) in daily threshold trading strategies when trading cost is not accounted. However, at very low level of trading cost, say 0.2%, all profits disappear. We employ a model that rebalance the portfolio carefully to save the transaction cost, but the trading rules still fail to profit at a reasonable level of trading cost. Thus, the momentum profits may not compete with the trading cost.