Working Capital

  • 详情 Concentration in Supply Chain Configuration and Corporate Investment Efficiency
    Purpose: High investment efficiency is a key dimension of high-quality enterprise development. As critical nodes embedded in supply chain networks, corporate investment behaviors are profoundly shaped by the structural characteristics of their supply chains. Concentrated supply chain configuration, as one of the core structural features, has not yet been systematically examined in terms of its impact on corporate investment efficiency and the underlying mechanisms, leaving an important research gap. Design/methodology/approach: Based on a sample of China’s A-share listed enterprises from 2007 to 2023, this study empirically examines the effect of concentrated supply chain configuration on corporate investment efficiency. Findings: First, concentrated supply chain configuration exerts a significant inhibitory effect on corporate investment efficiency, a conclusion that remains robust after a series of tests. Second, mechanism tests indicate that this influence operates primarily through three channels: exacerbating financing constraints, crowding out working capital, and deteriorating the information environment. Third, heterogeneity analysis shows that both supplier concentration and customer concentration inhibit investment efficiency, with the latter having a slightly stronger negative effect. The adverse impact is more pronounced in over-investing enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises, smaller firms, and those in growth or decline stages. Furthermore, regional factor market development, external market power, and internal control quality are found to effectively mitigate the negative effect of concentrated supply chain configuration on corporate investment efficiency. Originality: This study extends the research on determinants of corporate investment efficiency from a supply chain structure perspective, providing new theoretical insights and empirical evidence for understanding corporate investment behavior in China.
  • 详情 Loans and Lies: Does Bank Monitoring Reduce Corporate Misreporting?
    We propose a model of bank monitoring and borrower financial misreporting. Using the staggered liberalization of the banking sector in China as a natural experiment, we find that, consistent with the model’s prediction, entry by more efficient foreign banks reduces corporate misreporting fraud. Fraud reduction is greatest among borrowers of foreign banks, but fraud also drops among borrowers of domestic banks, suggesting a spillover effect. As predicted by the model, fraud reduction is greatest for borrowers with higher levels of fixed assets or lower levels of working capital. Our evidence suggests that improved bank monitoring reduces financial misreporting.
  • 详情 Determinants and Value of Cash Holdings Evidence from China’s privatized firms
    This paper studies the determinants of cash holdings and the marginal value of cash in China’s share-issued privatized firms from 1994 – 2007. We first analyze the effects of firm characteristics on corporate cash holdings and find empirical evidence that is largely consistent with U.S. and other international evidence in previous studies. Specifically, we find that smaller, more profitable and high growth firms hold more cash. Debt and net working capital are negatively related to cash holdings, suggesting that debt and working capital may be treated as cash substitutes. We also find that state ownership is negatively related to cash holdings. Firms with high state ownership are less financially constrained in that they have better access to credit in the mostly state-owned bank lending environment. We further examine the cross-sectional variations in the marginal value of corporate cash holdings. We find that the marginal value of cash declines with higher level of cash and higher level of debt, consistent with evidence in U.S. firms. Our most important finding is that the marginal value of cash declines as the equity ownership retained by the state increases. For the average firm in our sample, the value of an additional dollar is $0.94. An additional dollar is valued $0.33-$0.47 higher in firms with zero percent state ownership than in firms with 50 percent or higher state ownership. This difference is both statistically and economically significant.