This paper investigates whether regional negative public sentiment associated with extreme non-financial social shocks (e.g., violence or crime) will affect the resident firms’ M&A announcement return. Using a sample of 3,200 M&A deals in China, our empirical results consistently show that M&A announcement return is significantly lower after the firm’s headquarter city has experienced negative social shocks. We further find that better CSR performance helps to mitigate the impact of these negative shocks. Overall, we show that firm operations will be largely affected by the resident environment and location, and better CSR performance acts as an effective risk management strategy.

Using Chinese publicly listed firms from 2007 to 2020, this study empirically explores the impact of non-controlling shareholders’ network on the corporate excess goodwill. We find that the centrality of non-controlling shareholders’ network significantly decreases the excess goodwill from mergers and acquisitions, indicating that non-controlling shareholders’ network can restrain the goodwill bubbles. Moreover, the inhibitory effect of non-controlling shareholders’ network on excess goodwill stems from pressure-resistant institutional investors and individual investors. This effect is achieved through the information effect, resource effect, and governance effect. Furthermore, this inhibitory effect is more pronounced in firms located in less developed regions and legal environments, and firms with lower audit quality. In conclusion, non-controlling shareholders’ network plays a positive role in the restriction of excess goodwill in listed companies.

We examine the impact of bankruptcy court establishment (BCE) on corporate acquisition activities using hand-collected data of city-level BCE in China from 2008 to 2020. The results show that BCE promotes corporate acquisition activities largely due to mitigated information asymmetry and decreased deal inefficiency. Our results highlight the important role of judiciary reform in corporate acquisition decisions in emerging markets.

We find that investors react more favorably to corporate announcements of share repurchases, SEOs, earnings, dividend changes, and acquisitions if the announcement is made immediately prior to or on holidays. These announcements are associated with more positive reactions for favorable events and less negative reactions for unfavorable events. This effect is robust to controls for market conditions and a selection bias, is accompanied by subsequent reversals, and is present in several international markets. Our findings suggest that predictable individual mood changes can cause biases in market reactions to firm-specific news.

This paper investigates the effects of serial acquisitions on labor cost stickiness. We show that serial acquisitions can significantly increase the labor cost stickiness through increasing managerial optimism, agency costs and labor adjustment difficulty, and the labor cost stickiness further damages corporate value. The baseline findings are weaker in firms with better internal control and higher institutional ownership. Overall, this study contributes to the literature on serial acquisitions and cost stickiness, provides a new perspective for the value-destroying effect of serial acquisitions in a typical emerging market.

As China’s shadow banking sector expands, the impact of listed companies’ involvement in financial stability and the real economy accumulates increasing attention. Despite being a crucial channel for non-financial firms to participate in shadow banking, the literature has given limited consideration to the acquisition of wealth management products (WMPs). Using data from Chinese listed firms between 2007 and 2020, we analyze how excessive equity financing affects companies’ WMP acquisitions. Our findings indicate that over-financing significantly boosts WMP purchases among these firms, particularly in cases of private ownership, raised environmental uncertainty, and strict financing constraints.

This study investigates the impact of non-controlling shareholders' network on corporate excess goodwill using Chinese publicly listed companies from 2007 to 2020. We find that a stronger centrality of non-controlling shareholders' network leads to a significant decrease in excess goodwill resulting from mergers and acquisitions. This implies that the non-controlling shareholders’ network has a significant inhibitory effect on the occurrence of goodwill bubbles. Mechanism analysis finds that non-controlling shareholders' network can inhibit excess goodwill thorough information effect, resource effect, and governance effect. Furthermore, this inhibitory effect is attributed to pressure-resistant institutional investors and individual investors, and is more pronounced in firms located in less developed intermediary market and legal system environment, as well as firms with lower audit quality. In summary, the non-controlling shareholders' network plays a positive role in curbing excess goodwill in listed companies.

Capital misallocation is a crucial factor that hinders the high-quality development of the capital market. Taking mergers and acquisitions (M&A) cases of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as samples, this study finds that there is a mismatch between the target firm’s profit quality and the M&A premium. Moreover, based on the dual perspective of acquirer and target motivations, this study demonstrates that the target firm’s insufficient motivation to improve its information quality is the primary cause of a capital mismatch. Factors that can enhance the motivation of the target, such as improving financial services and facilitating labour flow, are the cure for capital misallocation. It is a crucial study to understand China’s capital misallocation and of great theoretical and practical significance to understand the combination of efficient markets and effective governments in emerging markets.

This paper uses the IV-2SLS model to explore the impact of analyst attention on firms' internal and external innovation paths from a dynamic perspective of the life cycle. When firms are in the growth stage, the higher the analyst attention, the more firms will significantly increase their internal R&D efforts and make active technology acquisitions; As firms enter maturity, analyst attention plays a role in promoting R&D investment and corporate venture capital activities; When enterprises are in the recession period, firms are more inclined to innovate independently under the influence of analyst attention. This bias is more significant in non-state enterprises and high-tech enterprises. Further study finds that the interaction between analyst attention and firms' innovation path under different life cycles effectively enhances innovation output.

Distinct from existing studies on general institutional investors and institutional investor cliques, this study examines how common institutional owners, who simultaneously hold more than 5% equity blocks in at least two publicly traded firms within the same industry, influence firms’ bad mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China. Contrary to the “conspiracy tort” view, according to which common institutional owners are more likely to vote for bad M&A deals to pursue internalized gains from industry portfolios (Antón et al., 2022b), our results strongly support the “synergy governance” view, according to which common institutional owners perform more actively and effectively in monitoring against bad M&As and improving M&A quality. There is further evidence that common institutional owners with greater peer linkages and industry power and longer-term holdings are more likely to oppose deals with negative acquirer returns. Finally, we find that the effect of common institutional ownership on M&As is more pronounced among firms with stronger earnings management, moderate stock return synchronicity, less management shareholding and higher management expenses. The results are consistent with the “synergy governance” hypothesis whereby common institutional owners are able to leverage their advantages of industry information and supervisory experience to improve the information environment and corporate governance of the firms they hold. Overall, in China’s market, common institutional owners play an active external governance role and effectively improve M&A quality.