agency problem

  • 详情 Impact of Information Disclosure Ratings on Investment Efficiency: Evidence from China
    This study examines the impact of Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s (SZSE) information disclosure ratings on investment efficiency in China. Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies on the SZSE from 2001 to 2018, we discover that superior information disclosure ratings improve investment efficiency after controlling for various firm- and industry-level variables. Our findings remain valid after various robustness tests and using instrumental variables to address the endogeneity problem. Specifically, we find that improving information disclosure ratings help firms attract more investor attention, which leads to higher investment efficiency. In addition, this information disclosure effect is more pronounced for underinvestment firms and firms on the main board than for smaller firms on SEM (small- and medium-sized enterprise) and GEM (growth enterprise market) boards. Our evidence supports the idea that regulatory activities for information disclosure ratings of companies listed on China’s stock exchanges improve investment efficiency.
  • 详情 More Corporate Governance Information Disclosure More Management Expenses? - Evidence from Chinese Site Visit Disclosures
    In this paper, we construct a content analysis structure to explore whether corporate governance information in voluntary disclosures can predict management expenses in the next term. Employing the site visit information disclosure of firms listed on the Chinese A-share market from 2012 to 2021, we find that corporate governance information disclosure is motivated by ownership concentration,and that corporate governance information can predict management expenses and comprises incremental information, indicating that the content analysis we construct is valuable and the disclosure of corporate governance information can mitigate the agency problems.There is a difference between state-owned listed firms and nonstate-owned listed firms.
  • 详情 Measuring the Unmeasurable: CSR Divergence and Future Stock Price Crash Risk
    This paper examines the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the future stock price crash risk using a sample of Chinese listed firms. We employ the divergence of CSR ratings for measuring the unmeasurable outcome uncertainty, and find that conditional on firms’ CSR performance, future stock price crash risk will arise with the CSR divergence. Further results show that the moderating effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker investor protection or higher agency costs. We conclude that firms with higher CSR divergence have more severe agency problem which is complementary to the literature where stakeholders’ theory dominates.
  • 详情 Do Suppliers Value Clients’ ESG Profiles? Evidence from Chinese Firms
    We investigate whether suppliers value their clients’ ESG profiles in China, the largest emerging market featured with low ESG awareness and severe agency problems. We find a robust and negative impact of Chinese firms’ ESG scores on their access to trade credit. The 2SLS regression results based on the instrumental variable indicate that the impact is casual. Additionally, the impact is more pronounced for firms with higher agency costs, greater information asymmetry, and worse financial performance. These results suggest that suppliers in China view clients’ ESG engagement as costly investments caused by agency problems. Finally, we highlight the economic importance of the impact by showing that trade credit access helps Chinese firms decrease debt costs, increase trade credit supply to downstream firms, and promote R&D inputs.
  • 详情 Board Gender Diversity and Dividend Policy in Chinese Listed Firms
    This study investigates the relationship between gender diversity on the board and dividend payouts in China using a large sample over the period 2003–2017. Our results provide robust and strong evidence showing that gender diversity on the board is positively associated with cash payments of dividends. The empirical outcomes confirm that gender diversity on the board facilitates corporate governance and subsequently promotes dividend payouts. We demonstrate that gender diversity on the board has the greatest effect when the board has critical mass participation (three or more female directors) compared with only their token participation. However, independent female directors increase dividend payouts, while female executive directors do not have a significant impact. Furthermore, we extend the literature on the relationship between dividend payments and government ownership by providing evidence that gender diversity has a higher impact on dividend payouts for state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises. After controlling the endogeneity problems, our findings are reliable and robust.
  • 详情 Does Culture Matter for Corporate Governance?
    corporate governance. We hypothesize that (a) Firms in more individualistic cultures should suffer more from agency problems and should use more corporate governance practices; (b) Firms in more individualistic cultures should use more debt since financing policy can also be used to control managerial opportunism, but the cultural effect should be smaller in firms with already higher corporate governance standards. Using the corporate governance scores from ASSET4, we find that individualism can explain a large variation in firm-level corporate governance and the empirical results are consistent with the our hypotheses.
  • 详情 Efficiency of Multiunit Structure and Internal Capital Market
    Multiunit structure can internalize the managerial market to promote competition among subsidiary managers, and create an internal capital market within firms to alleviate external financing constrains, and it also may lead to diversification to lower the operation risk and regulation. While it brings in more agency problem created by subsidiary managers, causing the efficiency of internal capital market and diversification confusing. Using the data of listed firms in China, an emerging market, this paper examines the efficiency of multiunit structure within the firm, investigating the influence on capital allocation and firm performance. We find that multiunit structure is better in emerging market since it is efficient in capital allocation, reducing the inefficient investment by reducing the overinvestment and alleviating the underinvestment, and the bright side of multiunit structure dominates the agency problem associated, thus beneficial for firm performance, both short-term and long-term accounting returns. In less developed capital market under current situation, multiunit structure is better.
  • 详情 The Agency Cost of Pyramidal Ownership:Evidence from a Pure Incentive Shock
    Previous studies have typically found a negative relation between pyramidal ownership and firm value, and have interpreted it as supporting evidence of the incentive problems created by pyramiding. Those studies, however, do not adequately control for the endogeneity of ownership to factors that also affect firm performance, leaving the agency problem indistinguishable from the unfavorable fundamental shock. Using a unique sample of privately owned listed enterprises in China, this paper examines the effect of pyramidal ownership on returns in response to the announcement of the Share Split Reform in China. This reform triggered zero fundamental shocks but resurrected entrepreneurial incentives in proportion to the separation of ownership and control. Estimates of agency cost of pyramidal ownership are significant and material, and are robust against a range of alternative hypotheses. Moreover, institutional investors appear to appreciate the reform more when a firm’s pyramidal ownership is less separated. The findings suggest that, despite the endogenous determinant of ownership choice, agency theory alone successfully explains the pyramidal discount.
  • 详情 The Impact of Ownership and Ownership Concentration on the Performance of China's Listed Frim
    This paper investigates the impact of ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China’s listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we conduct simplex, interactive and joint analyses. We find that ownership concentration is approximately associated with higher firm performance. Ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance. Firm performance is better when the state is the largest of the top shareholders and/or institutions dominate ownership among the top tradable shareholders. Our results support the theory that high ownership concentration mitigates the agency problem.
  • 详情 Does Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Matter in China? Evidence from Financing and Investment Choices in the High Tech Industry
    Financing of and investing in R&D are prone to risks of appropriation by competitors, information asymmetry, and agency problems. Although legal protection of intellectual property (IP) rights at the national level is necessary to encourage investing in R&D, we show that the effective enforcement at the local level is critical. We focus on the impact of provincial level IP rights enforcement on the financing of and investing in R&D, using a unique and rich database of high technology firms. These firms are located in twenty-eight provinces/districts throughout China. The enforcement of IP rights differs at the provincial level, although the firms are under the same set of national and international laws. To identify the causal effect of provincial level IP rights enforcement on firm behavior, we use several approaches to deal with the issues of endogeneity, reverse causality, and simultaneity. Controlling for provincial institutional factors such as economic development, banking system development, legal system performance, and local government corruption, we find that the enforcement of IP rights positively affects firms’ ability to acquire new external debt (including formal and informal financing) and external equity. Firms in provinces with better enforcement of IP rights invest more funding in R&D, generate more innovation patents, and produce more sales from new products. We also find better enforcement of IP rights encourages financing of and investment in R&D in foreign and ethnic joint ventures. The results confirm that enforcement of IP rights matters even in China. Our paper provides firm level evidence that financing of and investing in R&D are the channels that link enforcement of IP rights and economic growth.