agency issue

  • 详情 Linear Contracting in Joint Ventures
    We present a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing contractual relationships in joint ventures (JVs), integrating both agency and information problems. Our analysis shows that linear contracts are optimal, with the fixed component mitigating information asymmetries and the share term addressing moral hazard. We demonstrate that JVs outperform self-ownership only in the absence of agency problems; when such problems exist, JVs are preferable solely under unbalanced two-sided agency issues—otherwise, self-ownership dominates. Moreover, the relative importance of agency versus information problems depends on firm productivity: information problems dominate for highly productive firms, whereas agency concerns prevail when productivity is low. Empirical evidence from Chinese public companies corroborates these theoretical predictions.
  • 详情 Impact of Fintech on Labor Allocation Efficiency in Firms: Empirical Evidence from China
    Fintech has significantly influenced the traditional financial industry by introducing advanced technologies and innovative business models with profound impacts. We aim to study the effect of Fintech development on labor allocation efficiency, and to explore its underlying mechanisms. Using a set of companies on Chinese A-share market over the years of 2011- 2020, we find that Fintech development plays a positive role in labor allocation efficiency, mainly through suppressing labor overinvestment. This positive effect is further reinforced by market competition. In addition, our investigation reveals that the primary pathways through which Fintech enhances labor allocation efficiency are lowering information asymmetry, mitigating agency issues and substituting low-skilled labor. Moreover, we show that the dimensions of depth and digitalization are particularly important in improving labor allocation efficiency among the three dimensions of Fintech development. Lastly, we find that Fintech development enhances total factor productivity by improving labor allocation efficiency.
  • 详情 Greed to Good: Does CEOs Pay Gap Promote the Firm Digitalization?
    Digital transformation (DT) is an ongoing and costly process that requires careful planning and the motivation of top executives (CEOs). This research analyze the CEOs compensation as a motivation to embrace DT by reducing agency issue. We determine the extent of DT through a textual analysis method and utilize data from Chinese publicly traded companies spanning the period between 2007 and 2020. Our study findings are threefold, (a) we observe a positive relationship between CEOs' pay gap and DT, highlighting the significant role CEOs compensation plays in encouraging CEOs to adopt digitalization, (b) we find that managerial shareholding significantly enhances this relationship, (c) we note that the relationship between CEOs pay gap and DT is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises compared to non-stateowned enterprises. Additionally, we discover through channel analysis that agency cost and audit quality mediate the relationship between CEOs pay gap and DT potentially by reducing the agency problem between CEOs and shareholders. These findings are vital for comprehending the pay practices and behaviors of corporate executives regarding digitalization in China. Importantly, the study results remain robust when considering instrumental variables (IV), propensity score matching (PSM), and alternative techniques.
  • 详情 Agency Problems, Firm Valuation, and Capital Structure
    This paper studies the optimal contracting problem between shareholders and the agent in a general cash-ow setup, and offers a framework to quantitatively assess the impact of agency problems. Under the structural model of capital structure studied in Leland (1994), we solve the optimal employment contract explicitly, and nd that debt-overhang lowers the optimal leverage. Consistent with the data, our model delivers a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and rm size, and the interaction between debt-overhang and agency issue leads smaller rms to take less leverage relative to their larger peers. During nancial distress, a rm’s cash-ow becomes more sensitive to underlying performance shocks due to debt-overhang. We also consider the possibility of debt covenants to alleviate the debt-hang problem.
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