Why do firms appoint expired independent directors? How do expired independent directors affect corporate governance and thus impact investment decisions? By taking advantage of the sharp increase in expired independent directors’ re-employment in China caused by exogenous regulatory shocks, Rule No. 18 and Regulation 11, this paper adopts a PSM-DID design to test the impact of expired independent directors on CSR performance. We find that firms experience a significant decrease in CSR performance after re-hiring expired independent directors and the effect is stronger for CSR components mostly related to internal governance. The results of robustness tests show that the main results are robust to alternative measures of CSR performance, an extended sample period, alternative control groups, year-by-year PSM method, and a staggered DID model regarding Rule No. 18 as a staggered quasi-natural experiment. We address the endogeneity concern that chance drives our DID results by using exogenous regulatory shock, an instrumental variable (the index of regional guanxi culture), and placebo tests. We also find that the negative relation between the re-employment of expired independent directors and CSR performance is more significant for independent directors who have more relations with CEOs and raise less objection to managers’ decisions, and for firms that rely more on expired independent directors’ monitoring roles (e.g., a lower proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, high growth opportunities, and above-median FCF). The mediating-effect test shows that the re-employment of expired independent directors increases CEOs’ myopia and thus reduces CSR performance. In addition, we exclude the alternative explanation that the negative relation is caused by the protective effect brought by expired independent directors’ political backgrounds. Our study shows that managers may build reciprocal relationships with expired independent directors in the Chinese guanxi culture and gain personal interest.

This paper investigates whether increased female representation on corporate boards affects firms’ bond financing costs. Exploiting the 2017 Big Three’s campaigns as a plausibly exogenous shock, we document that firms experiencing larger increases in female board representation, induced by the campaigns, experience significant reductions in bond yield spreads and improvements in credit ratings. We identify reduced leverage and enhanced workplace environment as key mechanisms, and show that the effects are stronger among firms with greater tail risk and information asymmetry. An alternative identification strategy based on California’s SB 826 regulatory mandate yields consistent results. Our findings suggest that board gender diversity enhances governance in ways valued by credit markets.

Estimates of canonical affine term structure model parameters are highly sensitive to sample periods. For example, depending on whether the sample starts in 1961 or 1981, the 5-5 forward risk-neutral rate for September 1981 differs by 4.6 percentage points or 98% of the latter. The estimated response of this rate to high-frequency monetary policy shocks differs by a factor of three, even within a fixed sample for the monetary policy transmission regression. We suggest that a shifting endpoint model can mitigate these issues. Additionally, we provide new estimates of the effects of monetary policy shocks on long-term risk-neutral rates.

Using a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 2009 to 2022, we find that the flow of non-core deposits, rather than that of core deposits, becomes more sensitive to bank performance as banks receive increased attention on Twitter. This effect is particularly pronounced during periods of poor bank performance, when Twitter discussions are more influential, and for banks with more liquidity mismatch. Our results suggest that social media, rather than merely disseminating information about bank performance, makes depositors aware of their peers’ attention to banks, thereby intensifying the sensitivity of deposit outflows to weak fundamentals.

This paper proposes the concepts of ESG information flows and a predictable framework of ESG flows based on AR process, and studies how ESG information flows are incorporated into and affect a dynamic portfolio with transaction costs. Two methods, called the ESG factor model and the ESG preference model, are considered to embed ESG information flows into a dynamic mean-variance model. The dynamic optimal portfolio can be expressed as a traditional optimal portfolio without ESG information and a dynamic ESG preference portfolio, and the impact of ESG information on optimal trading is explicitly analyzed. The rich numerical results show that ESG information can improve the out-of-sample performance, and ESG preference portfolio has the best out-of-sample performance including the net returns, Sharpe ratio and cumulative return of portfolios, and contribute to reducing risk and transaction costs. Our dynamic trading strategy provides valuable insights for sustainable investment both in theory and practice.

We examine the effect of minority shareholder voting rights on labor investment efficiency using a sample of Chinese firms. Taking advantage of the difference-in-difference setting, our study reveals that the expansion of minority shareholder voting rights has a detrimental effect on labor investment efficiency. Through analysis of holding period and a managerial shortsightedness index based on textual analysis, we find that this outcome can be attributed to the fact that minority shareholders typically prioritize short-term gains over long-term corporate growth. Moreover, the impact of voting power is more pronounced in determining the investment efficiency of rank-andfileemployees. Our results are more significant for firms that face severe financial constraints, are non-state-owned enterprises, exhibit lower levels of internal control, possess fewer female managers, demonstrate lower human capital quality and higher labor intensity. Taken together, our paper suggests that minority shareholders could be myopia in making labor decisions.

Based on the sample data of Chinese listed companies, this paper finds that the increase in customer concentration significantly reduces the level of enterprise employment. The research results are robust to a series of tests. Further analysis shows that the increase of financing constraints, the increase of enterprise risk and the decrease of profitability are the mechanism of customer concentration affecting enterprise employment. In addition, the negative correlation between customer concentration and enterprise employment is stronger for enterprises with small size, fierce industry competition, and increasing economic policy uncertainty.

We investigate the unintended real effects of regulator-led minority shareholder activism on corporate innovation. We use manually collected data from the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a novel regulatory investor protection institution controlled by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) that holds 100 shares of every listed firm. We find that by exercising its shareholder rights, the CSISC substantially curtails the innovation output of targeted firms. This effect is amplified in cases involving a high level of myopic pressure and few innovation incentives. We further observe variation in the real effects of different intervention methods. Textual analysis reveals that CSISC intervention with a myopic topic and negative tone contributes to a decrease in innovation. The results of a mechanism analysis support the hypothesis that regulator-led minority shareholder activism induces managerial myopia and financial constraints, impeding corporate innovation. Furthermore, CSISC intervention not only diminishes innovation output but also undermines innovation efficiency. In summary, our findings suggest that regulator-led minority shareholder activism exacerbates managerial myopia to cater to investors and financial constraints, ultimately stifling corporate innovation.

Our investigation reveals that the top 10 shareholders are the only credible contenders for dominant control rights in China's listed corporations. To measure the ultimate control of these entities, we adopt the Shapley-Shubik power index and calculate the principal shareholder's control at the top of the control pyramid. Our results demonstrate that approximately 70% of firms exhibit an ultimate control value of 1. Additionally, our analysis reveals a non-linear relationship between the ultimate control, the tunneling behavior of the ultimate controller, and the executives’excess perk consumption .Specifically, our findings suggest that this relationship is characterized by a phase transition.

This paper examines the spillover effect of environmental regulations on firms’ green technological innovation, from the perspective of supply chain relationships. Analyzing data from Chinese listed companies, we find that the average environmental regulatory pressure faced by the client firms of a supplier firm enhances the green patent applications filed by the supplier firm, indicating that environmental regulatory pressure from clients spills over to suppliers. When the industries of suppliers are more competitive or the proportion of their sales from the largest client is higher, suppliers feel more pressured to engage in green innovation, resulting in more green patent applications. Thus, via their negotiation power, client firms can prompt supplier firms to innovate to meet their demand for green technologies. Finally, we show that this effect is particularly pronounced when supplier firms are located in highly marketized regions, receive low R&D government subsidies, or have high ESG ratings.