We examine how the sudden drop in public information search capability caused by Google’s withdrawal from China affects Chinese analysts’ earnings forecasts. We observe, after Google’s withdrawal, a decline in analysts’ forecast accuracy for firms with foreign trade relative to those without it. This decline suggests that the withdrawal hinders analysts’ acquisition of foreign information about firms, which decreases the quality of their earnings forecasts. We also find that the effect of the withdrawal on forecast accuracy is stronger for firms with higher business complexity and more opaque financial reporting and for analysts with weaker information processing capacity and more attention constraints. Additionally, we find that corporate site visits serve as an alternative information source that can compensate for the information loss caused by the Google withdrawal. Last, we document that the withdrawal reduces analysts’ forecast timeliness and increases their forecast dispersion.

We study how bank liberalization affects analyst forecast accuracy using two interest rate deregulations in China—the removal of the cap on bank lending rates in 2004 and the removal of the floor in 2013—as quasi-natural experiments. Our results show that the analyst forecast accuracy for high-risk firms decreases significantly after the removal of the lending rate cap, whereas analyst forecast accuracy for low-risk firms increases significantly after the removal of the lending rate floor. Moreover, interest rate liberalization affects forecast accuracy through operational risk and information asymmetry channels. Furthermore, the impact was concentrated on firms whose actual performance fell short of performance expectations and those that received more bank loans. Our findings imply that interest rate liberalization policies may have unintended consequences for analyst forecasts.

Using the Targeted Poverty Alleviation (TPA) disclosure policy in China as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper analyzes the impact of firm TPA disclosure on analyst forecast accuracy using a staggered difference-in-differences model. The results show a significant increase in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts after firm disclosure of TPA information, and this effect is more pronounced in firms with more greater information asymmetry and firms with less experienced analyst following. Our study provides theoretical and empirical evidence for regulators concerned with information environment of capital market.