This study investigates whether common auditors have an impact on firms’ green innovation. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find the common auditor ties to firms with green patents are positively related to focal firms’ green innovation. When examining underlying mechanisms behind such effects, we observe that our main findings are more profound for focal firms with more opaque information, communicating with auditors intensively and audited by senior auditors, which indicates information sharing serves as the plausible mechanism. Cross-sectionally, our findings are more remarkable for non-SOEs, firms with lower financial constraints, firms located in regions with environmental courts, local auditors, auditors with green auditing abilities and firms in the same industry. Further analysis suggests that the common auditor ties to firms with green patents can further improve focal firms’ environmental performance and green patent citations, which in turn boosts market share of involved audit firms. Overall, we document that common auditors have a positive spillover regarding green innovation to connected clients through transferring valuable green expertise in a legitimate way.

Using Chinese data, we find that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate and less biased when analysts are socially connected with the company’s signatory auditor. We also find that forecast performance improves following mandatory auditor rotations that result in new analyst-auditor connections and declines following mandatory rotations that terminate existing connections. We further find that our results become stronger when the information that auditors possess is likely to be more useful to analysts, that connected analysts have better career outcomes than unconnected analysts, and that investors and other analysts are more responsive to forecast revisions issued by connected analysts. Finally, we find that connected auditors provide higher quality audits to their connected clients and are more likely to retain those clients. Overall, our findings are consistent with connected analysts benefitting from private information obtained from their social connections with auditors by providing better earnings forecasts, and in turn, with auditors benefitting from information they receive from connected analysts by delivering higher quality audits that improve client retention.

This paper employs a difference-in-differences approach to study whether a Chinese audit firm improves its competencies through organizational learning after one of its audit teams has a client cross-listed in the US. Among a group of companies that are listed only in China, we define those audited by firms that have cross-listed clients as the treatment group, and companies audited by other firms as the control group. We find an improvement in audit quality for the treatment group after their audit firms have cross-listed client experience in the US. A large-scale survey of auditors corroborates these findings and sheds light on specific actions undertaken by audit firms to facilitate learning. Both the empirical and survey results highlight the benefits of auditing crosslisted clients in the US and its positive externality on improving the audit quality of non-US-listed companies.

This paper employs a difference-in-differences approach to study whether a Chinese audit firm improves its competencies through organizational learning after one of its audit teams has a client cross-listed in the US. Among a group of companies that are only listed in China, we define those audited by Chinese audit firms that are not international Big 4 affiliates and have cross-listed clients as the treatment group, and companies audited by other audit firms as the control group. We find an improvement in audit quality for the treatment group after their audit firms have cross-listed client experience in the US, and this improvement is not attributable to the effect of joining an international accounting firm network, registration with the PCAOB, or the consolidation in the audit market. A survey of auditors corroborates these findings and provides evidence on audit firms’ specific actions to facilitate learning. Our findings shed light on the benefits of auditing cross-listed clients in the US and its positive externality on improving the audit quality of non-US-listed companies in China.

Using data from 123 reverse mergers (RMs) in China, this study investigates the determinants and economic consequences of auditor choice in RMs. We find that the choice of a new auditor instead of the incumbent auditor is not related to auditor competence but to the relative bargaining power of RM firms and publicly listed firms (shell firms), and that the probability of choosing new auditors is higher when RM firms have more bargaining power relative to shell firms. We also find that hiring new auditors in the RM is associated with a higher valuation of injected assets and higher pre-listing income-increasing discretionary accruals in RM firms. Furthermore, post-merger firms exhibit drops in accounting performance and firm value and are more likely to restate their financial reports within 3 years of listing when new auditors are appointed in RMs. Finally, the cross-sectional test shows that this effect mainly exists in the context of RMs where the newly appointed auditor is a non-Big 10 auditor and a non-specialist auditor. Overall, our results emphasize the role of RM firms and shell firms in auditor choice for RMs and highlight the implications of such a joint decision on investor protection.

In contrast to previous literature, our study not only examines the communicative value of Key Audit Matters (KAMs) through the capital market reaction to KAMs but also analyses the content and reporting format of KAMs, which vary based on the intrinsic risk of business activity. Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2017 to 2020, we find that more M&A-related KAMs are reported and they are disclosed through less boilerplate language when M&As are accompanied with the Performance Commitment contracts (PCs), an indicator as high possibility of overpayment during M&As thus inducing the high risk of the goodwill impairment and high litigation risk. Additionally, we find that the negative impact of PCs on boilerplate language is amplified when the benchmark in PCs is precisely achieved or when the firm has been sued in recent years. In other words, the disclosure of M&A-related KAMs is more tailored to the client firm when auditors observe a high risk for accountability. Consequently, capital market participants, as well as other recipients of auditing reports, such as regulators and analysts, perceive non-boilerplate M&A-related KAMs as informative for their decision-making process.

Audits are a standard mechanism for reducing corruption in government investments. The quality of audits themselves, however, may be affected by relationships between auditor and target. We study whether provincial chief auditors in China show greater leniency in evaluating prefecture governments in their hometowns. In city-fixed-effect specifications – in which the role of shared background is identified from auditor turnover – we show that hometown auditors find 38 percent less in questionable monies. This hometown effect is similar throughout the auditor’s tenure, and is diminished for audits ordered by the provincial Organizations Department as a result of the departure of top city officials. We argue that our findings are most readily explained by leniency toward local officials rather than an endogenous response to concerns of better enforcement by hometown auditors. We complement these city-level findings with firm-level analyses of earnings manipulation by state-owned enterprises via real activity manipulation (a standard measure from the accounting literature), which we show is higher under hometown auditors.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the effect of industry-specific knowledge transfer on audit performance after a merger of two Chinese audit firms with different levels of expertise in an industry. For clients in an industry audited by both merging audit firms, those audited by the audit firm less specialized in that industry belong to the treatment group, while all other clients belong to the control group. We find an economically-significant improvement in audit quality (as reflected in a reduction in financial misstatements) for the treatment group relative to the control group in the same merged audit firm. We show that the treatment effect is not driven by changes in auditor incentives or personnel movement and is more pronounced when we expect stronger communication between the less and more specialized auditors after the merger. We caution that our findings are specific to China and may not generalize to other countries.

Recent events in China provide a historical opportunity to study the expropriation of minority shareholders. In this paper, we document the use of inter-corporate loans by controlling shareholders to extract funds from Chinese listed firms. Using accounting information from public sources, we show how tens of billions of RMB were siphoned from hundreds of companies during the 1996 to 2006 period. Specifically, we show the nature and extent of these abuses, evaluate their economic consequences, explore their cross-sectional determinants, and report on the extensive efforts by auditors and regulators that eventually contained this practice. Collectively, our findings shed light on the nature and severity of the tunneling problem in China, and the on-going challenges associated with regulatory reform in the country.