We collect the geographical dataset of bank physical branch in China from 2008 to 2023, obtaining the 261,382 branches. Through careful data processing, we calculate the bank branch closure at city-level and merge it with regional entrepreneurship in China. With the panel dataset at city-industry-year level, we find that bank branch closure (BBC) significantly reduces neighbor entrepreneurship, which is proxied by the number of new firm entry. In mechanism analysis, we document that bank branch closure affects entrepreneurship through the financing channel and mobility channel. We also find that commercial bank branch closure plays a crucial role in affecting entrepreneurship. The reduction effect of BBC is more pronounced for those observations located in geographical intersections, coastal lines. Further, we explore the impact of BBC on the direction of entrepreneurship, showing that there is less new firm formation in manufacture industry after the BBC. In addition, we show that BBC may contribute to the entrepreneurship failure as well. Our findings may shed light on the policy makers, bank owners and those who want to form a new firm.

Using bank-county-year level mortgage application data, we document that minority borrowers are systematically evaluated with less soft information compared to White borrowers within the same bank-county branch. Using variation in local sunshine as an instrument and conducting a series of robustness checks, we show that the soft information imbalance significantly increases the denial gap between minority and White applicants. However, this imbalance does not appear to affect pricing disparities. Further analysis shows that internal capital reallocation to under-resourced bank branches can serve as an effective strategy to reduce soft information imbalances and, thus, promote more equitable credit allocation. Our results highlight that soft information imbalance is an overlooked but significant factor driving disparities against minority borrowers.

Rural banking competition may promote or hinder agricultural total factor productivity (TFP). We analyze a novel dataset on all commercial bank branches in rural China, combined with measures of productivity based on stochastic frontier analysis. To identify causality, we use: 1) an instrumental variable approach based on the administrative division of banks, and 2) a propensity score matching difference-in-difference approach exploiting banking de-regulations in 2009. Both methods reveal that competition has a positive impact on TFP. A heterogeneity analysis finds that the effect is primarily significant along the Beijing-Kowloon railway and its East side. Technology adoption is the typical channel through which lending is hypothesized to impact TFP. We find that the positive effect of competition is larger in areas with greater technology use, but we find an insignificant direct impact of concentration on technology adoption, suggesting the channels of effect may be more complex than previously thought.

We examine the roles of bank ownership and CEO political faction membership in facilitating or hindering the implementation of central bank policy in China. Specifically, we examine the response of China’s commercial banks to People’s Bank of China (PBC) guidelines intended to decrease mortgage lending and to slow down the rise in residential property prices. We find that both bank ownership and faction membership matter. Central government-owned banks whose CEOs are members of the specialist finance faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) respond most strongly to PBC guidance, whereas provincial or city government-owned banks whose CEOs are members of a generalist faction respond least strongly. The implementation of PBC policy has real effects: in those cities where central government-owned banks with specialist CEOs constitute a larger percentage of total bank branches, house prices grew more slowly, as did the number of residential real estate transactions and the number of new listings. Where in contrast provincial and city government-owned banks with generalist CEOs dominate, the number of transactions grew faster; the rate of house price appreciation and the number of listings were however unaffected. We conclude that China’s different levels of government and the CCP’s different factions enjoy some discretion in responding to PBC guidance and that they exploit the discretion they are afforded to vary the strength of their response.

This paper examines the relationship between the large-scale construction of broadband infrastructure and digital financial inclusion in rural China. To make causal inferences, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment and use a difference-in-differences identification strategy with panel dataset of Chinese counties from 2014 to 2018. The results show that broadband infrastructure significantly contributes to digital inclusion. Further, we distinguish between two dimensions of digital inclusion, namely, the coverage and the usage. We find that while broadband infrastructure significantly promotes the coverage dimension, its effect on the usage dimension is limited. Besides, the effects of broadband infrastructure on digital inclusion, and in particular on the usage dimension, are larger in areas with higher levels of human capital, higher levels of social capital, and higher penetrations of bank branches. Taking into account those moderators is important to fully harness the potential of broadband infrastructure on financial inclusion.

Using a proprietary loan data set, we study how a large state-owned bank uses its internal ratings in loan granting decisions around China’s 2008 economic stimulus programme that relies on bank credit for financing. We find that there is little change in the rating process of the bank, and internal ratings remain a valid, albeit weaker, predictor of loan interest rates in the stimulus period. Weakened rating-interest rate relation is concentrated for borrowers from the industries that the stimulus programme focuses on, for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for bank branches operating in provinces with a low level of credit market marketization, or when the credit rater and loan officer have no collaboration before. We also find that interest rates remain a valid predictor of ex-post loan outcomes in the stimulus period. Overall, there is no evidence that loan decisions of the state-owned bank are severely compromised in the economic stimulus period as speculated by some media. By showing how a state-owned bank maneuvers between supporting government stimulus initiative and maintaining market-based lending, we contribute to the limited literature on the roles of internal ratings in loan contracting decisions, and add to the debate over the roles of state-owned banks.

Banking competition may enhance or hinder the financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Using a survey on the financing of China’s SMEs combined with detailed bank branch information, we investigate how concentration in the local banking market affects the availability of credit. It is found that lower market concentration alleviates financing constraints. The un-concentrated presence of joint stock banks has a larger effect on alleviating credit constraints, while the presence of state-owned banks has a smaller effect, than the presence of city commercial banks.