Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of information disclosure by unlisted bond issuers on the stock price informativeness of listed firms in the same industry. Design/methodology/approach – This paper takes advantage of information disclosure during the bond issuance and examines the spillover effect of unlisted bond issuers’ information disclosure on listed firms in the stock market. The sample is composed of A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2018. All the data are obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research and WIND databases. The impact of bond market information disclosure on price informativeness of listed firms in the same industry is identified through multivariate regression analyses. Findings – Empirical results show that price informativeness of listed firms has a significantly positive association with the information disclosure of same-industry unlisted bond issuers. Further analyses show that the above finding is more significant when information disclosure of bond issuers is a more important channel for acquiring industry information (i.e. when industry is more concentrated, when economic uncertainty is high, and when industry information is less transparent) and understanding the industry competitive landscape (i.e. when bond issuers are relatively large, when bond issuers and listed firms have more direct product competition, when bond issuance firms are large-scale state-owned business groups), and when there are more cross-market information intermediaries (i.e. more cross-market institutional investors and more sellside analysts).This paperindicates that information disclosure of bond issuers has a positive spillover effect on the stock market. Originality/value – The novelty of the research is that the authors examine industry information spillover from unlisted firms to listed firms leveraging on unlisted firms’ information disclosure in bond markets.

Two motivations of internal financing in business groups are studied using Chinese data: cross-financing to relieve severe financing constraints, and expropriation from minority shareholders in environments with weak corporate governance. We document the existence of both, and discuss their implications on both the efficiency and magnitude of intra-group financing. We find that, from the business group perspective, the internal capital market is most efficient when the groups are well governed and have a pressing need to mitigate external financing constraints.

Business groups organized by pyramids enable the ultimate shareholders to control a portfolio of firms with less cash requirement. Further, corporate pyramid induces an internal capital market and makes capital transfer more convenient within the pyramid. In China, the state and business groups control a large number of listed firms through pyramidal ownership structure. What role does the corporate pyramid play in firms’ investment decisions? What is its influence on firm performance? This paper investigates the capital investment and firm performance from the perspective of pyramidal ownership structure. We find that as the layers of corporate pyramid increases, the capital overinvestment declines. The negative relations between pyramid and overinvestment exist for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which indicate that increasing the layers within corporate pyramid reduces the likelihood of overinvestment of the listing firm and improving investment efficiency. Moreover, we show that the effects of increasing the layers of corporate pyramid on accounting performance are different for SOEs and NSOES. For SOEs, increasing the layers of pyramid results in less government interference on the listed firm and more flexibility in operate. Therefore, increasing pyramidal layers is positively related to accounting performance. While for NSOEs, pyramiding is to build an internal capital market for the ultimate shareholder’s capital investment. Although pyramid may reduce overinvestment of the listing firm, agency costs may offset the positive effect and induce a lower accounting performance.

Using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China, I study top executive compensation and turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the percentage of common directors and managers are less than median level. This result indicates that the incentive system can be used to align the interests of managers in the listed firm with that of its parent company when the information asymmetry is high and the parent company can not effectively monitor. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name.