Using proprietary data from China’s interbank bond-pledged repo market, we show that the interest-rate risk and credit risk of the pledged bond are key determinants of repo pricing. From a bond-option perspective, we develop arbitrage-free models that anchor the repo yield curve to the pledged-bond yield curve. The fair repo haircut is interpreted as the per-unit price of a call option on the pledged bond. We extend this framework to incorporate bail-in or bail-out potential, which enhances the model’s empirical performance and provides a novel explanation for systematic repo cheapness and existence of negative haircuts.

2014 年我国货币信用体系实现信用创造机制范式转型，正式进入以不动产为核心载体的抵押品经济时代。本文识别出中国不动产抵押品的核心结构参数，将其定义为不动产抵押品非对称乘数（Collateral Asymmetry Multiplier，CAM），其中枢估计值为2.37，95%置信区间为[2.16，2.55]。研究选取2001—2025年宏观数据，构建内嵌时变摩擦的不动产抵押品经济模型，综合采用 Bai-Perron 断点检验、NARDL非对称协整模型与历史地理外生工具变量实证识别。检验结果显示，2014年是信用锚转型的显著结构性断点；不动产抵押品下行收缩效应为上行扩张效应的2.37倍，高市场化区域强度放大至3.02倍；不动产抵押品价值波动通过资产负债表渠道抑制居民可选消费与企业投资，动产融资体系缺失持续放大非对称冲击。基于 CAM 参数的识别，提出差异化区域化宏观审慎方案，为信用周期调控提供量化依据。

2014 年我国货币信用体系实现信用创造机制范式转型，正式进入以不动产为核心载体的抵押品经济时代。本文识别出中国不动产抵押品的核心结构参数，将其定义为不动产抵押品非对称乘数（Collateral Asymmetry Multiplier，CAM），其中枢估计值为2.37，95%置信区间为[2.16，2.55]。研究选取2001—2025年宏观数据，构建内嵌时变摩擦的不动产抵押品经济模型，综合采用 Bai-Perron 断点检验、NARDL非对称协整模型与历史地理外生工具变量实证识别。检验结果显示，2014年是信用锚转型的显著结构性断点；不动产抵押品下行收缩效应为上行扩张效应的2.37倍，高市场化区域强度放大至3.02倍；不动产抵押品价值波动通过资产负债表渠道抑制居民可选消费与企业投资，动产融资体系缺失持续放大非对称冲击。基于 CAM 参数的识别，提出差异化区域化宏观审慎方案，为信用周期调控提供量化依据。

A unique natural experiment in China – the city-level staggered introduction of admin-istrative approval centers (AAC) – reduces bank loan processing times by substantially speeding up the process of registering collateral without affecting credit decisions. Fol-lowing the establishment of an AAC, firms significantly reduce their cash holdings. State-owned enterprises are less affected. Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings de-creases, as does the cash flow sensitivity of investment. The share of short-term debt increases, while inventory holdings and reliance on trade credit decrease. Defaults also decrease. These results suggest that timely access to credit has important implications on firms’ financial management.

We examine the financial and real implications of bank CEOs’ social minds induced by female socialization on sustainable loans. We find evidence of an economically sizable and statistically significant bank CEO-daughter effect in lending behaviours, controlling for borrower industry as well as bank characteristics. In specific, the “greenness” of a bank is significantly higher, when the lead bank CEO parents a first-born daughter compared to an otherwise lender. Looking at the specific lending contracts written by banks, we find that lead banks whose CEOs parent a first-born daughter provide loans with lower spread, fewer financial covenants, and less likely to require collateral, for borrowers with better Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance. Furthermore, we find that bank CEOs’ parenting experience with first-born daughters would predict borrowing firms’ future CSR performance positively, suggesting banks with CEOs raising a first-born daughter would promote the corporate social activities of borrowers.

This paper examines the impact of collateral shocks on corporate financialization using a sample of Chinese-listed firms from 2008 to 2021. We find a statistically and economically significant positive effect of collateral appreciation on financialization, consistent with profit-chasing motives, even after addressing endogeneity concerns. Additional tests reveal the effects are more pronounced among financially constrained, bank-dependent, and high-agency-cost firms. Financialization also elevates the risktaking and financial risks of firms. Overall, we provide novel evidence that collateral shocks stimulate corporate financialization, with implications for incentives, regulation, and systemic risk monitoring.

We document a speculation channel through which house market booms negatively affect entrepreneurship. To address endogeneity concerns, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in house prices generated by staggered and unintended policy spillovers in China. We find house market speculation triggered by house booms crowds out entrepreneurship. Reduced labor supply, reduced capital supply, and heightened entry costs do not appear to explain our main findings. The negative effect exhibits in the OECD countries as well. Our paper complements the well-documented collateral channel by offering novel evidence on a previously under-explored adverse consequence of house market booms – their hindrance to entrepreneurship.

This paper documents that ffrms are increasingly financing innovation using their stock of innovation, measured as patents. We refer to this behavior as financing innovation with innovation. Drawing on patent collateral data from both the US and China, we first show that (1) in both countries, the total number and share of patents pledged as collateral have been rising steadily, (2) Chinese firms employ patents as collateral on a smaller scale and with a lower intensity than US firms, (3) firms increase their borrowing and innovation after they start to use patent collateral. We then construct a heterogeneous firm general equilibrium model featuring idiosyncratic productivity risk, innovation capital investment, and borrowing constrained by patent collateral. The model emphasizes two barriers that hinder the use of patent collateral: high inspection costs and low liquidation values of patent assets. We parameterize the model to firm-level panel data in the US and China and find that both barriers are significantly more severe in China than in the US. Finally, counterfactual analyses show that the gains in innovation, output, and welfare from reducing the inspection costs in China to the US level are substantial, moreso than enhancing the liquidation value of patent assets.

This paper studies the effect of top management team (TMT) network centrality on bank loan contracts. We show that firms with high TMT network centrality obtain bank loans with lower loan spreads, larger loan size, longer maturity, and fewer collateral requirements. From the mediating effect analysis, we find that TMT interlocking networks affect loan pricing by reducing agency costs, improving the quality of accounting information, expanding resource channels, and enhancing the credibility of companies. In addition to easing financial constraints, TMT network centrality is also beneficial to investment efficiency and innovation output of corporates, but it will decrease firm performance.

This paper uses a loan transactions dataset from China to identify whether shadow loans cost more than formal bank loans even with collateral. This motivates us to explore the reasons as to why a listed firm would opt for such loans. Using propensity-score matched data, we find that privately-owned firms with shadow loans are forced to obtain these loans since they are politically discriminated following a regulation change in 2009 that favoured state-owned firms. However, state-owned firms obtain shadow loans due to their inferior firm characteristics. Further, we employ a Difference-in-Differences methodology to uncover that privately-owned firms experience a decline in their performance, investment growth and an increase in default probability following their high dependence on shadow loans when they are excluded from the formal loan market. The above results survive various robustness checks, including doubly-robust inverse-probability weighted Difference-in-Differences regressions.