This paper investigates the gambling preference of Chinese investors in the convertible bond (CB) market through a natural experiment—the 2018 amendment of Article 142 of the Company Law. Utilizing CB issuance data from 2016 to 2023, we employ a cohort difference-in-difference approach and find a 4% to 7% increase in IPO premiums for high-repurchase-expectation CBs across various measures. This significant increase indicates that the legal revision reshapes investors’ expectation and adjusts their valuation of CBs. Furthermore, the event-study analysis reveals the escalating impact of legal revision, driven by the herding behavior of gambling investors.

Convertible bonds were first introduced in China in 1998. Their popularity has risen in the past decades through various domestic regulatory reforms, as more and more companies came to recognize their advantages over conventional bond or equity issuances as ways to raise capital. In this paper, we study the role of convertible bonds in Chinese A-share listed companies’ decision to refinance, using data from 1999 to 2018. First, we find that firms with high information asymmetry tend to issue more convertible bonds than equities to mitigate financing cost, especially under the “Regulation of Restraining Non-public Issuance of Shares (NPIS)” launched in 2017, a regulation that retrains listed companies to issue shares non-publicly. Second, the introduction of “Breaking Rigid Redemption” policy, which breaks the custom of using rigid redemption clauses when financial institutes issue corporate bonds and asset management products, effectively promoted interest rate marketization in China and as a result, companies with a strong tendency to shift risks began to issue convertible bonds to reduce issuing cost after 2017. Third, regulatory requirements on the qualifications for companies played important roles in their refinancing choices. Lastly, we also find that SOEs in China are overall less sensitive to risk-shifting and information asymmetry, given their ample loan resources compared with non-SOEs. Our findings delineate the behaviors of Chinese A-share listed companies in their refinancing and explain the sudden surge in convertible bonds issuance since 2017.

We develop a new type of contingent capital, called contingent convertible security (CCS), which is like a contingent convertible bond (CCB) but differently can be interconverted \emph{repeatedly} and automatically between debt and equity depending on two specified levels of the cash flow generated by the firm that issues the CCS. We derive closed-form expressions of the equilibrium prices of corporate securities and optimal capital structure when the cash flow of the firm is modeled as geometric Brownian motion. Especially, we provide very simple formulas on optimal capital structure including a CCB. We show that the CCS can not only decrease default risk like a CCB, but also can significantly increase the firm's value. In particular, the CCS can be used to solve financing problems of small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as banks.