This study provides the first empirical evidence on the relationship between the chairman of the board of directors (COB) and corporate financial performance. Using a sample of Chinese A listed firms between 2008-2017, we find reliable evidence that the COB turnover improves corporate financial performance. Moreover, the existence of a majority shareholder (Majority) positively influences corporate financial performance, while firm nature (private majority shareholder or public majority shareholder)(Private) may not.

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to provide additional insights on the association between real earnings management (REM) and crash risk, particularly from the perspective of an emerging market economy. It also examines the moderation role that internal and external corporate governance may play in this area. Design/methodology/approach – Relying on archival data from the RESSETand CSMAR databases over a timeframe from 2010 to 2018 of China listed company, the authors test the hypotheses by regressing common measures of crash risk on the treatment variable (REM) and crash risk control variables identified in the prior crash risk literature. The authors also introduce monitoring proxies (internal controls as an internal governance and institutional ownership as an external governance) and assess how effective internal and external governance moderate the relation between REM and stock price crash risk. Findings – The results suggest firms with higher REM have a significantly greater stock price crash risk, and that this association is mitigated by external monitoring. That is, greater institutional ownership, particularly pressure insensitive owners, mitigates the impact of REM on stock price crash risk. However, internal control does not mitigate the association between REM and stock price crash risk. Originality/value – Following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, prior research has documented an increase in the use of REM and a positive association between REM and cash risk. The authors demonstrate that they persist in one of the largest emerging markets where institutional regulations, market conditions and corporate behaviors are different from those in developed markets. Also, the assessment of the moderation effect of internal and external governance mechanisms could have meaningful implications for investors and regulators in Chinese and other emerging markets.

Minority shareholder activism (MSA) on online interactive platforms is a new form of corporate governance in China. This paper investigates whether and how dividend-related MSA affects corporate dividend policies. We find listed firms are more likely to pay dividends and raise payout ratios with MSA. Our baseline findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks. We establish a causal relationship between MSA and future dividend payouts, with both instrumental variable approach and PSM-DID approach, and we provide evidence to show the increasing effect of MSA can be explained by exit threat and voting attendance. Our focused MSA complements the formal voting rights of minority shareholders and overcomes the absence of institutional investor monitoring. Overall, our findings suggest that minority shareholders can effectively monitor management when they are empowered with voice in the age of information.

This paper identiffes culture as an important factor affecting corporate cash holdings by using China and its national culture, Confucianism, as the setting. We find that firms located in regions with stronger Confucian culture hold persistently higher levels of cash. We employ an instrumental variable to draw causal inference. The culture effect is stronger for more ffnancially-constrained and riskier ffrms, suggesting precautionary motives as the underlying mechanism. We ffnd that the culture effect remains intact after controlling for corporate governance heterogeneity, which rules out the agency motives. Lastly, ffrms’ operating performance indicates that high cash holdings is an efffcient outcome.

The rapid development of the digital economy is driving profound changes in production methods, lifestyles, and corporate governance. Human society has entered a new era where digital technology is rapidly advancing and playing an important role. In the era of digital economy, although the production (labor) tools of enterprises are digitized, intelligent, and networked, and new characteristics and scenarios have emerged in the operation and labor methods of enterprises, the human capital possessed by workers has become the driving force for the sustainable development of entrepreneurial enterprises. Workers who master digital technology play a decisive role in the sustainable and healthy development of entrepreneurial enterprises. The article briefly introduces the establishment and development of human capital theory, pointing out that in the digital economy era, human capital has greater potential for appreciation, and its marginal returns show a trend of increasing; Human capital is a key factor in economic growth and development. The surplus of producers in an enterprise refers to the income that producers receive in excess of their production costs. The owners of human resources should receive a portion of the investment return that should belong to human capital from the enterprise in the form of "producer equity", "labor stock", or equity incentives in proportion. Equity incentives have become an important corporate governance mechanism in the capital market. The article also elaborates on the modern partnership system, which can motivate partners to collaborate and innovate, and is an upgrade of the manager system; Briefly introduced the achievements made by Xiaomi Group and Huawei in implementing the business partner system.

This paper explores the relationship between ESG ratings and real earnings management using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2021. We find that ESG ratings and real earnings management are negatively correlated. It reveals that the improvement of ESG rating will help to improve the level of corporate governance, standardize the business activities of enterprises and thus help to reduce the real earnings management of enterprises. Our findings still hold after controlling for potential endogeneity and robustness issues. Further analysis shows that internal and external oversight of companies further strengthens the negative relationship between ESG ratings and true earnings management. Overall, the impact mechanism of ESG rating on real earnings management revealed by us has clear policy implications for how managers can improve the quality of information disclosure in emerging markets.

Direct experience of a peer’s punishment might have a sobering effect above and beyond deterrence (information about punishments). We test this mechanism in China studying the reactions to listed state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) punishments for fraudulent loan guarantees by firms in the same location or industry (peers) and non-peer firms, across SOEs and non-SOEs. After experiencing SOEs’ punishments, peer SOEs cut their loan guarantees by more than non-peer SOEs and peer non-SOEs, even if information is common to all firms. The reaction is stronger for peer SOEs whose CEOs have higher career concerns or face lower costs of cutting guarantees.

Using a director-level dataset of board proposal voting by independent directors of public companies, we analyze the effects of career concerns and current reputation stock on independent directors in their voting behavior. Younger directors and directors in their second (and last) terms, who have stronger career concerns, are more likely to be aligned with investors rather than the managers. Their dissenting behavior is eventually rewarded in the market place in the form of more outside career opportunities. Directors with higher reputation stocks (measured by positive news media mentioning and the number of directorships) are also more likely to dissent. Finally, we find that career concerns are significantly stronger among directors who already enjoy higher reputation.

Using the staggered opening of governmental public data platforms in China, we employ the difference-in-difference approach to investigate how public data access affects stock price synchronicity. We find that stock price synchronicity significantly drops after the public data platform is established in a firm’s headquarters city. The underlying mechanism is reducing information acquisition costs rather than increasing market attention or corporate information disclosure quality. Furthermore, the informational role of public data platforms magnifies under higher informed trade risk, poorer corporate governance, or better regional economic and innovation capacity. We highlight the role of public data in facilitating financial market efficiency.

How to shape a firm’s stock price resilience in the increasingly uncertain environment has become an important topic. This paper investigates the effect of important market participantsfinancial analysts-on stock price resilience. Based on data from 3,444 listed firms from China, we find that firms with higher analyst coverage are more resilient during the Covid-19 induced crisis, which is manifested by a lower pandemic-induced decline in stock price, shorter duration of decline period, higher recovery probability, and shorter duration of the recovery period after the shock. This positive relationship is more prominent for small firms but does not depend on ownership type, and the ratio of star analyst coverage. Further channel tests show that analysts could help in attracting attention from media and institutional investors, improving corporate governance, and reducing financial constraints, which in turn enhance the ability of stock prices to absorb pandemic shocks.