This paper is the first attempt in the literature to study the relationship between corporate governance and corporate growth. By developing an econometric model, this paper empirically studied the relationship between corporate governance and growth capability of China’s listed companies based on the panel data of 510 listed companies in Chinese manufacturing industry from the year 2001 to 2007. Main findings and contributions of this paper are as follows: ownership concentration is significantly negatively associated with growth capability; there is a significant negative relationship between equity restriction ratio and growth capability; growth capability of non-state-holding company is stronger than that of state-holding company, but this finding has no statistical significance; the stronger are debt solvency and debt financing ability, the stronger is growth capability; scale of board of directors and proportion of independent directors are significantly negatively associated with growth capability; combination of chairman of board of directors and CEO is beneficial for enhancing growth capability; management annual salary is significantly positively associated with growth capability; proportion of management shareholding has a negative relationship with growth capability, but this has no statistical significance; competition of market for corporate control and perfection degree of law basis and interest protection of medium-small investors are positively associated with growth capability, but these findings have no statistical significance; there is a significant positive relationship between product market competition and growth capability. Based on the above conclusions, this paper put forward some relevant policy recommendations from perspective of corporate governance for enhancing growth capability of Chinese listed companies.

This study investigates the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in China's listed firms. The study examines how the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is moderated by the private control of firms, the presence of a majority shareholder and the presence of independent directors on the board. Using a panel of about 1200 Chinese firms per year from 1999 to 2006 we find significant changes in the ownership and control of firms. The private control of firms and the fraction of independent directors on the board have increased considerably over time. The study finds a significant negative association between CEO turnover and firm performance consistent with the agency model. There is evidence that the CEO turnover sensitivity for poor performance is greater in firms that are privately controlled, or have a majority shareholder, or have a greater fraction of independent directors on the board.

We examine the wealth effects of three regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm's related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, we find that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. This evidence indicates that securities-market regulation can be effective in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation in a country with weak judicial enforcement. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the new regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where block holders have strong political connections.

The Chinese stock market has grown very rapidly, but is often distorted by government regulation, and this is especially true for the initial public offering market. The average underpricing of Chinese IPOs is 247 percent, the highest of any major world market. We model this extreme underpricing with a demand-supply analytical framework that captures critical institutional features of China’s primary market, and then empirically test this model using a sample of 1,397 IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1991 and 2004. The pricing of IPO shares is subject to a cap set by the government, and the supply of IPO shares allowed on the market is also set by the government through the Chinese quota system. The government regulator even controls the timing of flotation of shares onto the stock exchange--after the initial public offering is executed--and there is usually a long time lag between the IPO and the actual listing of shares for trading. A special feature of the Chinese IPO market is that the government is by far the largest issuer. In our sample, 66 percent of the IPOs in our sample are pure share issue privatizations (SIPs), in which the government sells part of its ownership in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the public; fully 88 percent would be considered privatizations under a more expansive definition that included state-connected owners. Insider theft of corporate assets is also a big concern of IPO subscribers in China, and IPO shares must also be discounted for significant tunneling risks. We find that insider shareholdings are a negative determinant of initial returns. We suggest that investment risks in China's primary markets are greater than in other new issues markets, and these risks partly explains the extreme levels of Chinese IPO underpricing. However, the principal cause of the this underpricing is government regulation. The supply restricting measures traditionally adopted by the Chinese regulatory authorities turn IPO shares into hot commodities, which are fiercely bid for, and this leads to corruption and a reallocation of wealth from firms and investors to politically connected individuals and groups.

Recent events in China provide a historical opportunity to study the expropriation of minority shareholders. In this paper, we document the use of inter-corporate loans by controlling shareholders to extract funds from Chinese listed firms. Using accounting information from public sources, we show how tens of billions of RMB were siphoned from hundreds of companies during the 1996 to 2006 period. Specifically, we show the nature and extent of these abuses, evaluate their economic consequences, explore their cross-sectional determinants, and report on the extensive efforts by auditors and regulators that eventually contained this practice. Collectively, our findings shed light on the nature and severity of the tunneling problem in China, and the on-going challenges associated with regulatory reform in the country.

An unparalleled feature ownership structures in China is the presence of non tradable shares (NTS). NTS represented a major hurdle to domestic financial market development for its negative effects on liquidity and market transparency. After some failed attempts, in 2005 the Chinese authorities have launched a structural reform program aiming at eliminating NTS. In this paper, we evaluate the stock price effects of the actual implementation of this reform in 368 firms. The NTS reform generated a statistically significant 8 percent positive abnormal return over the event window, adjusting prices for the compensation requested by tradable shareholders. Results are consistent with the expectation of improved economic fundamentals such as better corporate governance and enhanced liquidity.

Abstract Universal corporate banks are defined as financial institutions that may offer the entire range of financial services, and own equity in financial and non-financial firms. The emergence of universal corporate banks is one of the responses of banks to the environmental changes in global financial markets. An idealized model of corporate bank is developed to describe the nature of corporate bank. The corporate banking policies include internationalization of financial services and information net-work, expansion and integration of corporate banking functions, creating close corporate clients relationship, acquiring knowledge and information advantage in corporate and financial markets, performance of corporate control and corporate governance to influence corporate management. Transaction cost and other theories are used to explain the universal corporate bank, especially the rationale for expansion and r-organization, for developing close corporate relationship, for acquiring information and knowledge of corporate clients, and the influence concerning corporate governance. In this study, the evolution of regulation, present situation of banking system, future development of corporate banking in some countries are investigated. It is found that free selection of organizational structure and financial activities of financial institutions is a general tendency in these countries. The problems such as conflicts of interest, culture conflict encountered when implementing corporate banking policies are discussed in this study. Different organization designs, management models, external regulations, and corporate culture are introduced as solutions. The development of corporate bank has great implications for financial reform in China. The pre-requisitions and barriers of developing universal corporate in China are discussed. A case study of China Construction Bank is utilized to illustrate the current situation and further development of banks in China. It is argued that a gradually financial liberalization with correct order should be accomplished. Some recommendations are produced for further reform of financial market in China including diversification of bank’s ownership, permission of foreign banks enter Chinese financial market, liberalizing interest rate, and establishing a fully floated foreign exchange market.

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This paper considers the extent to which countries or companies can successfully borrow foreign corporate governance elements with a view to improving their own governance system. Companies in particular theoretically can rent other countries’ governance system through cross-listing. At bottom, the question is whether foreign legal elements can be “plugged-in” neatly into an existing corporate governance system, be compatible with it, and produce the expected improvements. Advances in different branches of psychology dealing with cultural orientations and cognitive styles suggest that the greater the cultural distance between the source and target countries the more difficult it would be to implement such a strategy for corporate governance reform. To demonstrate these points in detail, this paper considers South Korea’s corporate governance system and its culture as a reference case.

This paper examines both the time series and cross-country patterns in the development of stock markets around the world. It adopts a flexible modeling framework that allows for the breakdown of changes in equity market capitalization into changes in macroeconomic and financial fundamentals, shifts in valuation technology and market sentiment, and improvement in valuation efficiency. Using panel data on 32 countries, I show that for developed countries, the size of their equity markets is positively related to the correlation of these markets with the global portfolio, and is negatively related to government consumption. For developing countries, the level of financial intermediary development and openness to trade are found to be conducive to the development of local equity markets. For given levels of market fundamentals, developed countries with greater economic freedom and stronger shareholder protections are associated with more highly valued equity markets, while the French or German civil law countries and countries with insider trading legislation tend to have relatively poorly valued equity markets. For developing countries, ceteris paribus, high quality of accounting standards is found to be associated with higher valuation of their equity markets. I find that only equities in emerging markets become more highly valued, indicating an improvement in valuation efficiency over time. Australia, Canada, the United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore have the most highly valued equity markets in the developed world, while Malaysia has the mostly highly valued equity market in the developing world. It appears that favorable shifts in valuation technology and market sentiment contribute the lion’s share of the growth of global equity markets.