We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing the Renminbi by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic bond market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalize China’s strategy as trying to build credibility as an international currency issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We provide a sufficient statistic to measure countries' reputation over time and show that it can be estimated using micro data on foreign investors' portfolios. We use our framework to explore how countries compete to become a reserve currency provider.

This study documents a pervasive inverse relationship between asset growth rates and bond performance among non-investment and low-investment grade bonds. We argue such inverse relation holds ex ante considering a high growth rate in firm total assets results in growth in tangible assets and lowers bond default probabilities. Our empirical finding supports this hypothesis. Tangible asset growth of poorly rated bonds is negatively associated with contemporaneous bond performance and expected default probability. The finding is robust to different economic conditions and investment sentiments.

What are the benefits to a firm of having investors with gambling preference as shareholders? Motivated by studies showing that gambling investors prefer lottery-like stocks and require lower expected returns to take risk, we hypothesize that firms with positively-skewed assets can use stock splits to attract investors with gambling preference to share risk and to lower cost of equity. Indeed, analyzing a sample of Chinese firms that split their stocks through stock dividends and using proprietary trading data to measure retail investors’ gambling preference, we find that, on average, shareholders increase by 54% and retail gambling investors increase by 119% following stock dividends. Furthermore, while firms become more risk-taking, their cost of equity declines substantially, largely due to the increased retail gambling investors’ pricing influence. Thus, stock splits are effective for improving risk-sharing efficiency, and gambling investors contribute to lowering the cost of capital.

This study examines relation between financial development and the cost of equity capital and finds the following main results: (1) stock market development in general reduces cost of equity, consistent with its role in liquidity provision, information asymmetry reduction, and risk diversification helping to reduce systemic risk; (2) banking development only weakly decreases the cost of equity, consistent with the pervasive state-ownership in large banks constraining their efficiency. Further analysis reveals that the relation between stock market development and cost of equity is more pronounced in large firms and in firms with lower growth potentials, suggesting that stock market development fails to support small and/or growth firms. Moreover, the relation is more pronounced in region with low accounting quality, weak law enforcement, or lower market integration, and in period prior to split share structure reform. The evidence suggests that stock market developments and other institutional arrangements substitute each other in reducing cost of equity. This study contributes to literatures on financial development and cost of equity, and also holds immediate policy implications.

This paper examines whether foreign investor heterogeneity plays a role in stock liquidity on a sample of 27,976 firms from 39 countries for the period from 2003 to 2009. Results show that foreign direct ownership is negatively, while foreign portfolio ownership is positively, associated with various measures of stock liquidity. Furthermore, liquidity also reduces more (less) in firms with larger foreign direct investment FDI (foreign portfolio investment, FPI) during the 2008 market downturn. As predicted by finance theory, foreign investors influence stock liquidity through both trading activity and information channels. Our findings also indicate that the presence of FDI investors improves firm valuation and operating performance even at the expense of an increase in the firm’s cost of capital, suggesting that the value-enhancing benefits from FDI investors’ monitoring efforts outweigh the liquidity costs and high adverse selection premium demanded by less informed investors. In contrast, the positive impacts of FPI ownership on firm performance, as previously documented in existing literature, becomes negative and also not robustly significant after controlling for liquidity.

What might interest rate liberalization do to intermediation and the cost of capital in China? China’s most binding interest rate control is a ceiling on the deposit rate, although lending rates are also regulated. Through case studies and model-based simulations, we find that liberalization will likely result in higher interest rates, discourage marginal investment, improve the effectiveness of intermediation and monetary transmission, and enhance the financial access of underserved sectors. This can occur without any major disruption. International experience suggests, however, that achieving these benefits without unnecessary instability, requires vigilant supervision, governance, and monetary policy, and a flexible policy toolkit.

In this paper, we examine the cost of equity capital for politically connected firms. After controlling for several firm- and country-level determinants, our results show that politically connected firms have a lower cost of equity capital than their nonconnected peers. Our results are robust to alternative measures and proxies for the cost of equity capital. We thus provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, suggesting that these firms are generally considered to be less risky than non-connected firms. Our findings imply that the benefits of political connections outweigh their costs. We conjecture that this perception is fueled by the soft budget constraints generally enjoyed by politically connected firms, and by their lower default probability, given the assurance of corporate bailout in the event of financial downturns.

China’s stock markets have grown rapidly since their inception and have become an increasingly important emerging market for international investors. However, there are few systematic studies on how asset prices are formed in Chinese domestic equity markets; popular financial media even depict the market as irrational. In this paper, we study the asset pricing mechanism in the nascent Chinese stock markets, with the objective of identifying variables that capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns. We focus on the effects of various market imperfections in China. We find that while the market risk (beta) is not priced, there is a significantly negative relationship between firm-specific risk and expected returns. Chinese investors are willing to pay a significant premium for more liquid stocks or for dividend-paying stocks. Furthermore, investors value local A-shares more if there are offshore counterparts (e.g., B- and H-shares) for foreigners, implying that a Chinese firm with a foreign shareholder base has a lower cost of capital, ceteris paribus. Lastly, as with U.S. and other mature markets, firm size and the book-to-market ratio are systematically related to stock returns. Given market imperfections, stocks are priced rather rationally in China, despite the widespread perception to the contrary.

In this study, we directly test for a positive association between priced asymmetric information risk as measured by earnings quality and abnormal profits to insider trading.